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In the 1980s the future of public service broadcasting in 
Britain was called into doubt. Technological developments in 
cable, satellite and digital technologies were, it was argued, 
poised to end the condition known as 'spectrum scarcity'; while 
the emergence of a neo-liberal Conservative government, pledged 
to rolling back the frontiers of the state', was of the opinion 
that the current system of public service broadcasting provision 
was no longer necessary given the number of broadcasting channels 
now available; broadcasting, in its view, would increasingly be 
able to mirror the publishing industry in its structure and 
future regulation. 
Critics however, were loathe to accept the argument that 
technological considerations alone ought to drive broadcasting 
policy; and two key questions emerged. Firstly, how was public 
service broadcasting to be defended in a climate increasingly 
hostile to public service ideals and institutions in general; and 
secondly, and as a result of the first question, how was public 
service broadcasting to be understood? 
This thesis seeks to answer both these questions and argues 
that in the process of clarifying the nature of public service 
broadcasting in the past, that solutions for its defence in the 
future will be found. Public service broadcasting, was not, it 
will be argued, simply about institutions like the BBC, but 
evidence of a much broader and widely shared (across the 
political divides) understanding of the proper role of 
broadcasting in a democratic society (at least until the 1980s) . 
In short, public service broadcasting in the past was never 
simply a response to a set of technological conditions; instead 
it was forged from a set of political, economic, Administrative 
and cultural ideas about the nature of society and broadcasting's 
role in it; and hence its ability to respond to the new 
conditions of the 1990s and beyond. 
Introduction 
In Britain since the early 1980s there has been a widely 
held perception, shared by politicians, broadcasters and 
academics, that public service broadcasting is in crisis. It is 
a crisis which has been linked to two distinct developments; one 
is technological in origin, the other political. It is argued 
for example, that we are on the verge of a technological 
revolution; that the arrival of cable, satellite, digital and 
interactive technologies will end the condition known as spectrum 
scarcity, and that in the very near future there will be an 
infinite number of broadcast channels for the public to enjoy. 
These technological developments have been closely 
associated with (but are not directly related to) a political 
attachment to the idea of deregulation, of rolling-back' the 
frontiers of the state, of de-monopolisation and privatisation; 
an attachment at the heart of neo-liberal Conservative policy 
since Mrs Thatcher swept to power in 1979. This has not been 
simply a British phenomenon: 'public service is being challenged 
across the world. Its future is threatened by new technologies 
and by governments eager to privatise public sector 
institutionsl(Richard Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 1). 
As far as public service broadcasting is concerned the 
argument, championed by Conservative politicians and new media 
players (particularly the newspaper industry seeking a share of 
the lucrative broadcasting market) has been that all broadcasting 
(but in particular public service broadcasting) must adapt to 
these changed circumstances. In short, that the 'status quo is 
not an option' (Lord Thompson, 1990: 4) and that as the number 
of channels available increases, regulation must take into 
account the fact that the 'sort of regulation sensible for a 
world of four channels is not likely to be sensible for one where 
some dozens may be available' (Douglas Hurd, speaking in his 
capacity as Home Secretary, cited by Lord Thompson, 1990: 6). 
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These techno-political arguments about the f uture of public 
service broadcasting were given their clearest expression in 1986 
by the Committee on the Financing of the BBC (Peacock Report) 
[Cmnd 9824]. The committee was set up by Mrs Thatcher who was 
looking to extend her general philosophy of deregulation to 
broadcasting; however, it did not reach the conclusion wished for 
by its political mistress, and in what was a largely 'wide- 
ranging and thoughtful documentl(Lord Thompson, 1990: 4) 
concluded that the BBC ought to remain funded by the licence fee 
(not advertising as had been suggested) for the foreseeable 
future. 
if the Peacock report did not come to the right' 
conclusions, as f ar as the Government was concerned, it was 
nevertheless, enormously influential. Firstly, its 
recommendations about commercial television led to a major change 
in the way commercially- funded broadcasting was financed (by 
'franchise auction' following the implemention- of the 1990 
Broadcast Act); and secondly, its analysis of public service 
broadcasting and the impact of new technology, set the tone for 
the subsequent debate about the nature and future of public 
service broadcasting. 
In fact, although the committee 'had some difficulty in 
obtaining an operational definition, of public service, either 
from the broadcasters, or indeed from anyone else (Paddy 
Scannell, 1989a: 135 citing the Peacock relDort, 1986: 130) the 
report was a serious and methodical attempt to understand (at 
least from the point of view of policy) what was meant by public 
service broadcasting and what kind of programmes public service 
broadcasters ought to deliver. 
The Peacock committee acknowledged that there were many 
interpretations of public service broadcasting. For instance, it 
accepted a distinction between public service as a set of 
institutional arrangements' and 'public service as a shorthand 
way of referring to certain characteristic beliefs about the aims 
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of such institutions and the methods by which they should pursue 
them' (Peacock report, 1986: 130). In particular, the report 
noted that most broadcasters insisted on a duty to inform, 
educate and entertain, as well as the principle of universality. 
However, in the final analysis the committee did not develop its 
definition of public service as a set of 'characteristic beliefs, 
about public service and public service institutions, and 
concluded instead, that the best operational definition of public 
service was 'simply any major modification of purely commercial 
provision resulting from public policy, (Peacock report, 1986: 
130). 
In short, public service was def ined in a very general way, 
so that any intervention whatsoever in the operation of the If ree 
market' could be interpreted as 'public service'. For example, 
in the committee's view even a full broadcasting market, would 
require a public service element, such as the 'collective 
provision of programmes which you and I are willing to support 
in our capacity as taxpayers and voters, but not directly as 
consumers' (Peacock relDort, 1986: 131) ; and such an intervention, 
using the Peacock definition, ought to be considered to be 
'public service,. However, this differed from an earlier 
understanding of what was meant by public service broadcasting 
which stressed that all of broadcast output ought to be 
addressed, rather than that which the market could not or would 
not provide (Annan report, 1977). 
The findings of the Peacock committee, its stress on the 
impact of new technology, its argument that in the near future 
broadcasting would increasingly mimic the publishing industry; 
and that sooner or later, regulation and funding would have to 
adapt to these new circumstances, led to a fierce debate about 
the future of public service broadcasting amongst broadcasters, 
interested observers and academics working in the field. 
In particular, there was growing disquiet about the future 
of the BBC as the major public service broadcasting institution. 
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For although the BBC's licence fee was not abolished, and the BBC 
survived Peacock relatively unscathed, the f ear remained that 
public service broadcasting in general, and the BBC in 
particular, was threatened by new technology and the Government Is 
political antipathy toward public service institutions. 
Veteran broadcaster and f ormer managing director of BBC 
World Service, John Tusa, has argued that the BBC's kind of 
public service broadcasting 'provides a sense of community to the 
nation' and is central to the 'issue of social cohesion or social 
fragmentation' (1994: 7). While academics like Nicholas Garnham 
have argued that the British public service broadcasting system 
embodies the principles of Jurgen Habermas's public sphere and 
should be protected from market forces because it provides a 
I national f ocus f or political debate and inf ormation I crucial f or 
'the national political process'(1986: 45). Others, like Paddy 
Scannell and David Cardif f have begun to construct a social 
history of public service broadcasting which describes the 
importance of the public service ideal for public communication 
and and also takes issue with contemporary assumptions about the 
end of spectrum scarcity (1991: 3). 
In short, these supporters of broadcasting as a public 
service have attempted to debunk the idea that broadcasting 
policy was in the past, or ought in the future, be driven by 
technological considerations alone. In their view public service 
broadcasting presupposed the belief that the public interest 
needs 'to be asserted by public authority, (Will Hutton, December 
13 1995) and that social relations ... are political rather than 
economicl(Nicholas Garnham, 1986: 45). 
Despite these important interventions there has however, 
been little suggestion of either a systematic theory of public 
service, or indeed, of public service broadcasting. Instead, 
public service has been understood more in terms of its 
relationship to a number of public policy problems - such as how 
to secure an efficient, accountable and universal service in 
iv 
public utilities - rather than as a coherent philosophy. 
This is not to say that public service as a concept has been 
entirely neglected; for instance, in the 193 Os public service was 
analysed in relation to the development of public corporations, 
and the BBC was singled out as an example of a public service 
institution par excellence. (cf. Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933; 
W. A. Robson, 1937; T-O'Brien, 1937; Lincoln Gordon, 1938). 
However, since the 1930s there has been little attempt to provide 
a detailed analysis of public service broadcasting in terms of 
this wider debate about public service; indeed, Paddy Scannell 
has argue d that the reason why public service broadcasting 
appears to be in crisis is because of that very failure (1989). 
This thesis will therefore, locate and analyse the 
development of public service broadcasting in terms of wider 
debates about public service in general; and the key questions 
will be whether public service broadcasting can survive the 
I communications revolution I and how useful it is to def ine public 
service broadcasting as I simply any major modification of purely 
commercial provision resulting from public policy' (Peacock 
report, 1986: 130). 
The post-Peacock refrain has been that public service 
broadcasting in general, and the BBC in particular, were 
technological accidents appropriate in the past because there 
could be no freedom of entry to the broadcasting market. Choice 
could not be provided across many channels, so it had to be 
secured within onel(Richard Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 7). 
However, the assumption about the role of technology in 
determining the establishment of public service broadcasting has, 
it will be argued, been a misguided one. If, for instance, the 
existence of technological constraints (spectrum scarcity) can 
be shown to have played a relatively minor part in the emergence 
of public service broadcasting, then the arrival of infinite 
channel capacity is not necessarily the end of public service 
broadcasting. 
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The thesis will concentrate therefore, on whether it is 
possible to identify some distinctive characteristics of public 
service broadcasting beyond arguments about spectrum scarcity; 
in short whether, at key moments in its history, public service 
broadcasting constituted a set of belief s or core principles 
which could be understood as a concrete theory; and if so, 
whether a philosophy of public service broadcasting remains 
possible in the 1990s and beyond. 
Critics such as Raymond Williams (1958), Keith Middlemass 
(1979) and Harold Perkin (1989) have viewed public service as 
playing an important ideological role in the practical 
abandonment of class conflict in Britain (Keith Middlemass, 1979: 
21). This raises a further question as to whether public service 
and public service broadcasting ought to be viewed as essentially 
reactionary, or whether they still have something to offer in 
terms of 'good outcomes for economy and society' (Will Hutton, The 
Guardian, 'The Public Interest is Just a Lottery', December 13 
1995). 
Finally, this thesis is not a detailed history of the BBC 
(as an example of a particular kind of public service 
broadcaster) nor an analysis of public service programming. It 
is the study of a concept, an idea, and how various influential 
groups and individuals have thought about public service, both 
as a general concept and in its specific application to 
broadcasting. In so doing it will be argued that by the 1930s 
public service could indeed be understood as a Ith 
, 
eoryl inasmuch 
as those who worked in the public services and wrote about public 
service and public service broadcasting, shared a distinct set 
of beliefs about what they were doing and why they were doing it. 
In short, even though, 'with the passing of time the concept has 
become more and more obscure' (Paddy Scannell, 1991: 4) that public 
service and public service broadcasting will emerge as coherent, 
pragmatic concepts with continuing relevance for the future. 
Chapter One will demonstrate how the origins of the public_ 
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service concept lay in nineteenth century debates about the 
nature of the state, the importance of character, duty and 
obligation; and the idea of the public good as a basis for 
policy. In particular, the stress on service will be shown to 
have its roots in patterns of Indian colonial administration, 
where there was a pressing need to secure loyalty and honesty in 
employees responsible for administering an Empire. Public service 
and public service broadcasting will also be shown to have their 
roots in nineteenth century arguments about the role of culture 
in society. 
Chapter Two will look at how the concept of public service 
was shaped by a growing belief in a 'positive, role for the state 
under the conditions of late capitalism. In particular, the 
debate between individualist and collectivist perspectives in 
Liberal political thought will be shown as crucial for 
understanding the importance of the idea of self -development and 
character in the emerging public service philosophy. 
The chapter will also describe how towards the end of World 
War one, public service was linked to the attempt to reform the 
administration of the state; this was signalled by the view that 
many services would need to be operated in the national interest 
if liberal democratic society was to survive post-war, political 
and economic developments. Public service therefore, was 
increasingly associated with arguments to do with state 
intervention in the national interest and the need, in a mass 
democracy, to take into account public opinion. 
Chapter Three will illustrate how, by the 1920s public 
service could be understood as an increasingly coherent set of 
principles. These principles embraced a definition of efficiency 
which stressed the 'human factor,, a belief in people rather 
than balance sheets, and a commitment to service to the 
community. These principles were widely shared. and actively 
pursued (however inadequately) and were later adopted by public 
service institutions like public corporations, in particular the 
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BBC. 
It will be argued that by the 1930s, the key elements in 
public service philosophy and practice had been established; and 
that public service from this time can be understood as a 
coherent, concrete and pragmatic philosophy based on a clearly 
articulated view of society. Furthermore, that public service 
broadcasting drew its ideas almost exclusively from this pre- 
existing philosophy of public service; and that both were a mix 
of organisational theory, human relations theory and a blend of 
, scientific principles with ethical ideals, (Marshall. E. Dimock, 
1978: viii). 
Chapter Four will focus on the development of public service 
broadcasting in tandem with the growth in public corporations. 
In particular, public service broadcasting will emerge as a 
flexible and adaptable ethos in the face of economic, political, 
cultural and technological developments. For example, by 1923 
(and prior to its establishment as a public corporation) the BBC 
was understood as a public service institution which produced 
public service programmes. Public service broadcasting was 
, definite in character,; it was to provide universal service (in 
terms of access and content) and the public interest was to be 
embodied in a board of commissioners. It will be argued 
therefore, that although public corporations like the BBC have 
long been associated with public service broadcasting, public 
service broadcasting was never tied to this one institutional 
form; hence its potential to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Chapter Five will focus on one of the most important 
elements in the public service paradigm - efficiency. Efficiency 
will be shown to be an enduring theme, and the means by which the 
BBC's monopoly (and subsequently public service broadcasting in 
general) was legitimated until the late 1970s, when definitions 
of efficiency began to change, in line with changing definitions 
of democracy. The re-establishment of public service definitions 
of efficiency - efficiency in its widest sense - will be shown 
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to be vital for the future health of public service broadcasting. 
Finally, Chapter Six will f ocus on the enduring problem 
faced by public services; the need for such institutions to be 
both accountable and independent. It will be argued that if 
public service broadcasting is to survive in the future (in 
whatever form it takes) then the problem of accountability must 
be resolved and the relationship between the governors and the 
governed, the broadcasters and the public, reinvigorated. 
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Chapter One. 
The origins of the public service concept 
The concept of public service is most closely associated 
with political, economic and administrative developments in the 
twentieth century. However, elements of the public service 
paradigm have characterised the relationship between individuals 
and the state from the sixteenth century onwards. 
1.1 Public service as an ethic and an institution 
The idea of public service began as a description of 
behaviour, a way of distinguishing between private and public 
duty or between the state and the individual (in particular it 
described what behaviour was expected of soldiers and sailors in 
the armed services). Subsequently, the concept became attached 
to institutions like the Post Office and the Civil Service; and 
more recently, to the public utilities and broadcasting. From the 
beginning however, the dual nature of the concept of public 
service was clear. on the one hand it was used to describe the 
way the public interest was embodied in particular institutions, 
and on the other, it referred to an ethic which was to govern the 
behaviour of individuals in the employ of the state. 
Public service also signalled to the proper sphere of state 
activity versus private enterprise, as well as raising issues 
such as the need for an efficient administration. Public service 
for instance, took on some of the elements of what was called 
public mindedness or heartedness or spirit. These concepts were 
seen as desirable attributes for persons and societies and had 
long been associated with a notions of service'. In the 
seventeenth century for example the view was that in a civil 
State or Publick, we see that a virtuous Administration... is of 
the highest service, (oxford English Dictionarv, 1989: 63). 
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How this virtuous administration, might work in practice 
was a matter for dispute; and in fact, the prevailing critique 
of the public service up until the mid nineteenth century - the 
civil service or one of the armed services - and what existed in 
terms of public service ethics - was almost entirely critical. 
These particular services were regarded as being synonymous with 
corruption and nepotism. 
Public service also raised the question of whether there was 
a single, homogeneous public, or a number of distinct publics 
organised around class or taste. Indeed, there was the important 
issue of whether all members of the public or publics were to be 
considered as equals. For instance, well into the nineteenth 
century the 'public, referred to was effectively less than one 
comensurate with a full and universal franchise. The public (or 
at least the public worth cultivating) was essentially the 
political class and this, because of the narrowness of the 
franchise, was an extremely thin wedge of society. 
In the mid Victorian period however, the expansion of the 
electoral franchise began to open up political and cultural life, 
and there grew an awareness that the public (particularly in 
matters of taste and culture) might not be as homogeneous as had 
previously been thought; that in fact, as John Ruskin noted in 
1880,1 there is a separate public for every picture and for every 
book' (oxford Enqlish Dictionarv, 1989: 1.21) . This notion of the 
possibility of several publics co-existing had political and 
cultural implications and by the 1930s it was increasingly common 
to assume that 'there is a separate public for every issue 
raised. We are compelled therefore to think of various 
publics'(Oxford Enqlish Dictionarv, 1989: 87). 
One of the earliest references to a Ipublicque service, can 
be found in the sixteenth century during the reign of Henry VIII. 
Here its meaning was one of simple contrast to private interests 
-a person might work for the King and work for himself - 'so 
that they be well employed, both in the publicque service and in 
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their own particular, (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989: Lambard, 
Peramb, Kent, 1826). However, reflecting the politics of the 
times, 'publicque service' also referred to service to the 
monarch rather than to a constitutional state thus echoing a key 
concern in political science about the nature of political 
obligation. This was a concern first identified by Jesus in the 
New Testament, when he spoke of the relative duties owed by a 
citizen to his Monarch and to his God: 'Then saith he unto them. 
Render therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesarls; and 
unto God the things that are GodIsI(The Holv Bible, 1979: 29). 
By the 1640s the phrase public service was in use in 
reference to taxation in the North American colony of New Haven 
where the farmers that have butter and cheese were desired to 
keepe it in their hands, that in case the publicque service 
requirie it, they may be furnishedl(Oxford Enqlish Dictionary, 
1989: 1645). Again 'publicque service' defined the limits between 
what a person might produce and keep for themselves and what was 
due to those who ruled; here however, there was a sense of a 
greater entity than a single monarch; now dues we re owed to the 
state. In this way, the term publicque service was used to 
provide a definition of the parameters between the private and 
the public, the state and the individual. 
By the seventeenth century, under the influence of Puritan 
republicanism, the notion of the public began to develop an 
increasingly moral dimension. In 1671 for instance, the poet John 
Milton wrote in his poem Samson Agonistes 
', 
to the public good 
Private respects must yield, thus stressing the necessity for the 
interests of the public to take precedence over private 
interests. 
At the same time constitutional and political changes had 
meant that 'Publick Bills' in the legislature were increasingly 
commonplace (1678). In 1765 Blackstones was to report that 
I statutes are either general or special, public or private. A 
general or public act is an universal rule, that regards the 
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whole communityl(Oxford Enqlish Dictionary, 1989: 85). The law 
itself had established the principle of separate public and 
private spheres of activity and in 1706 public service was again 
referred to in terms of taxation. For instance, it was resolved 
in Parliament that this House will receive no Petitions for any 
sum of Money, relating to the publick Service, but what is 
recommended from the Crown' (Oxford Enqlish Dictionarv, 1989: 
211). In other words there had been established a specific area 
of 'publicque service' within the state administration and this 
was to be financed solely through general taxation. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, under the 
influence of utilitarian and liberal theorists like Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, there began to be established a 
vocabulary of public administration and public law, while in the 
United States there were already references to the institutional 
phenomena of the public corporation. 
Public corporations, are such as exist for public political 
purposes only, such as countries, cities, towns and 
villages. They are f ounded by the government, f or public 
purposes, and the whole interest in them belongs to the 
public (Oxford English Dictiona , 1989: 222). 
By the 1840s commentators were arguing that I it may be said 
there are contracts which ought to be declared void for reasons 
of public policy, or to use a more correct expression ... reasons 
of public utility, (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989: 457) and by 
1853 that 'public policy... is that principle of the law which 
holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency 
to be injurious to the public or against the public good' (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 1989: 437). 
By the 1850s the term public service - used to refer to both 
the Civil Service as an administrative institution and to a set 
of particular characteristics - had not only entered common 
speech but because of the gap between intention and practice, was 
increasingly considered in negative terms. Public service had 
begun to imply bureaucracy, red tape and a means of preventing 
4 
ordinary people from achieving social justice or even individual 
happiness. 
This kind of critique of the public service was central to 
the work of the writer Charles Dickens. For instance, in his 
novel Little Dorrit (1857) Dickens offered a detailed analysis 
of the political and administrative changes transforming English 
public life. The setting of the novel in the Circumlocution 
Office referred to the developments which were taking place as 
a result of the Northcote-Trevelyan ref orms of the civil service 
which had been set in motion in 1853. 
Dickens had played an active part in supporting the movement 
for reform. On June 27 1855 for instance, in an address to the 
newly created Society for Administrative Reform, he referred to 
a speech that had been made by Layard to the House of Commons the 
week before: 
This House views with deep and increasing concern the state 
of the Nation, and is of the opinion that the manner in 
which merit and efficiency have been sacrificed, in publiC 
appointments, to Party and family influences, and to a blind 
adherence to routine... (and that this] has given rise to 
great misfortunes and threatens to bring discredit upon the 
nation's character and to involve the country in great 
disasters (Charles Dickens, 1967: 18). 
In Little Dorrit Dickens was concerned with the devastating 
and particular ef f ects of red tape on his characters, as well as 
offering a more general critique of society, and in particular, 
the deadening and corrupting nature of modern bureaucracies. ' 
However, by the 1880s this image of public service - in both the 
1 There is f or instance, a scene where Barnacle, on a visit 
to Clennam in the Marshalsea prison, resignedly defends the 
, right' of the administration to be 'left alone'. He reminds 
Clennam that his form filling hasn't got him anywhere: 'Look at 
it from the right point of view, and there you have us - official 
and effectual. It's like a limited game of cricket. A field of 
outsiders are always going in to bowl at the Public Service, and 
we block the balls'. Clennam responded: 'What became of the 
bowlers? I Barnacle replied that they I grew tired, got dead beat, 
got lamed, got their backs broken, died of f, gave it up, went in 
for other gamesl(Charles Dickens 1967: 804). 
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legal system and civil service - had mostly been transformed as 
a result of the institutional changes brought about by the 
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms, the growing credibility afforded to 
the notion of public law and publi c administration and a 
legitimacy conferred on the various public services by the 
emerging professional elites. 
1.2 Public service and the influence of colonial 
administration 
The ideal of I service I was also important to the developing 
concept of public service. Definitions of service ranged from 
the condition of being a domestic servant, to being a religious 
servant of God, through to the condition or employment of a 
public servant in the British service - in effect, a soldier or 
a sailor. These military activities were considered as spheres 
of duty, or occupation or profession. To take service meant to 
enlist under a military commander, to join a fighting force; and 
was later extended to include the consular service, the customs 
service, the diplomatic service, the civil service and the excise 
service. Service was seen therefore, as a primary aspect of the 
state Is activities - although there were also important instances 
of private enterprise having links to notions of service. 
The term civil service for instance, originally applied to 
the Covenanted servants of the East India Company who did not 
belong (at least directly) to the Army or Navy or indeed to the 
state (Sachchidananda Bhattacharya, 1967: 260) It was only later 
that the term was extended to include all the non-war like 
branches of the public administrative service of the state - the 
diplomatic service, the post office, educational institutions 
controlled by the state and the collection of revenue by the 
state. 
In f act it was the experience of colonialism in India which 
helped to establish administrative expertise and an ethical 
framework of behaviour for public servants which was later 
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adopted by both the British civil service and by the quasi- 
autonomous organisations (public corporations) which began to 
operate the public services in Britain from the 1920s onwards. 
From the eighteenth century the East India Company had begun 
to take control of more and more Indian dominions. This meant 
that more clerks or 'writers' as they were known were put in 
charge of administering newly acquired territory. These writers 
were young British men, nominated by the Company's directors or 
chosen because of their relationship with shareholders; they were 
often under twenty years of age, had little education and were 
on low salaries. In a short time these young men were found to 
be guilty of gross corruption and dishonesty, so the Company 
required them to sign 'covenants' or contracts promising to 
service the Company with honesty and integrity - later this was 
extended to the officer class. Thus by the nineteenth century 
the Covenanted Civil Service had become a regular part of the 
Company's administrative machinery in India (Sachchidananda 
Bhattacharya, 1967: 261). 
While the Indian experience gave the British administrative 
class a useful lesson in the complexities of administration (the 
need for high standards, the necessity of securing loyalty, 
honesty and good service from its employees) ;a lesson which was 
to influence the reform of the British civil service in the 
1850s; the Indian experience also gave administrators and 
politicians the experience of dealing with a semi-autonomous 
organisation and the attendant difficulties of exerting political 
control from a distance. 
The administration of India by Britain falls into two 
periods - 1773 to 1858 and 1858 to 1947. Prior to 1773 the 
administration was carried out by the East India Company, 
however, by the 1770s it was at last considered that 
'institutions which had been created for carrying on the 
administration of a commercial and trading concern 
were... inadequate for running the administration of a kingdom' 
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(Sachchidananda Bhattacharya, 1967: 161). 
The Regulation Act of 1773 left the administration of India 
in the hands of the Company but also provided for the 
Parliamentary supervision of the Company's administration in 
Indian territories. However, it quickly emerged that 
Parliamentary control over the Company's affairs in India could 
not be effectively exercised and Pitt's India Act of 1784 vested 
goverment jointly in the Crown and the Company and tightened up 
Parliamentary control by setting up a Board of Control in 
England. This dual system of control via Parliament (through the 
Board of Control) and by the Company lasted until the mutiny of 
1857, when the President of the Board of Control sat in Cabinet 
in effect as Minister for India. 
Government by Board of Control or by public corporation or 
by commission was not confined to Britain and her Empire. 
Commissions were commonplace in the United States of America 
where a legal framework of public law demanded the regulation of 
public utilities in the public interest. The state was always 
willing to intervene when national security was at stake and the 
US government's relationship to the Panama Canal for instance, 
bears more than a passing comparison to the activities of the 
British government and the East India Company. 
The British Empire however, provided the best example of 
these developments. For instance, in the state of Victoria in 
Australia, there was not only much greater enthusiasm for the 
positive effects of state intervention in public life than in 
Britain itself but the state was seen as essential in order to 
, secure social and economic objectives, (F. W. Egglestone, 1932: 
23-4). Australia was a country where a large section of the 
population were fairly recent immigrants, where life was often 
perilous and survival contingent on the construction of a modern 
infrastructure; accordingly, the state was viewed as an essential 
part of the project of constructing a new society. 
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Equally, the military roots of the concept of service should 
not be underestimated and one could argue that one of the 
difficulties that the concept of public service finds itself in 
the late twentieth century is in part to do with the de- 
militarisation of society in general. Notions of duty and 
obligation have been increasingly displaced; in many instances 
only to be replaced by demands for rights'. In the nineteenth 
century however, the concepts of duty and obligation were central 
moral imperatives which underpinned, at least in theory, the 
entire edifice of British administrative and public life. 
1.3 The ideal of service - duty, obligationand character 
Duty and obligation also underpinned the idea of service; 
a concept which has been identified as one of the great 
achievements of the Victorian middle class and one that deeply 
influenced later generations: 
The Victorian reýorming ideal of service was animated by a 
sense of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the 
community, aimed particularly at those most in need of 
ref orm - the lower classes. It was institutional is ed in the 
bureaucratic Practices of the newly emerging professional 
classes - especially in the reformed civil service of the 
late nineteenth century whose members saw themselves as 
public servants (Paddy Scannell, 1989a: 22) 
In this sense the idea of service equated with the I neutral I 
element in the state apparatus and it was taken f or granted that 
men in government service were If it and proper persons I; that 
they were classless (in the sense of remaining impartial in all 
conflicts) and conscious of party, if at all, only in their 
private lives. This was later modified to meet twentieth century 
requirements and extended to cover experts and advisers to 
government, the staffs and boards of public corporations in the 
1920s and 30s, and after 1945, of the nationalised industries. 
However, the great difficulty with the notion was that neutrality 
was often defined as congruence with the aims of the state, as 
perceived and defined by those same experts and public servants 
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(Keith Middlemass, 1979: 23). 
The idea of service was also linked to Liberal arguments 
about the importance of I character' For Liberal individualists 
it was character which was the 'primary aim of politics'. 
Increasingly however, 'the ideal of character came to be 
recognised as a positive function of the state'. In this way, 
character (which had been associated with the self-reliance of 
Liberal individualists) metamorphosed into 'self -development' or 
self -realisation, and became increasingly associated with Liberal 
collectivism (Stefan Collini, 1979: 22). 
In practical political terms this meant that Liberal 
individualists as well as Liberal collectivists could argue that 
the removal of certain material obstacles - poverty for instance 
- was acceptable, since it would help facilitate greater self- 
knowledge. The implication was that poverty was as dangerous to 
a man's character as any degree of dependency upon the state 
(Stefan Collini, 1979: 22-28). 
The high moral content in Liberal thought was linked to 
another influential trend in late Victorian and early Edwardian 
society; the gradual shift from utilitarianism towards 
philosophical idealism. Idealism was characterised by its 
lorganicism, and its emphasis on: 
society as a unity rather than an aggregate, upon the social 
specification of individual morality, and upon the supreme 
role of the state as the expression of the individual will 
of the community (Stefan Collini, 1979: 44-46). 
Phrases like the ideal of service, the duty to contribute 
to the common good, the need to make the best of one's self, the 
duty of self-improvement, were all evidence of the influence of 
idealism on collectivist thought. However, these ideas were 
neither the exclusive property of collectivist reformers' nor 
a result of arcane academic theorising; they were in fact at I the 
heart of the hegemonic assumptions of the age' (Stefan Collini, 
1979: 49). 
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In the twentieth century this idea of service became 
associated with the BBC and other cultural institutions like the 
documentary f ilm movement. Documentary f ilm, which in Britain was 
closely allied to, public relations, became imbued with many of 
the characteristics of public service through the influence of 
the Empire Marketing Board and the Post office; and, many of the 
new public utility companies found themselves demanding the 
services of film-makers: 
Public utility companies ... were in general more preoccupied 
with corporate image building rather than expanding the 
market f or their product. one way of doing this was to 
associate corporate policy with public education and public 
planning (Paul Swann, 1989: 14). 
The gas industry for instance, sponsored a variety of films 
addressing social issues such as poor housing, pollution, 
malnutrition and education. The intention was that by linking gas 
with liberal solutions, that the industry would be associated 
with a modern, socially progressive image while at the same time 
encouraging new customers. 
1.4 Public service - education for democracy 
By the 1920s the arrival of universal suffrage meant that 
the 
, 
idea of public opinion was at last taken seriously. 
Increasingly governments had to 'win consent' for their actions 
and this implied improving the lot of the lower classes. Action 
in this area f ocused particularly on educational and cultural 
needs, in particular, the new mass medium of wireless; the mass 
of People it seemed, needed to be educated for democracy'. 
This approach had been exemplified in the thought of Matthew 
Arnold, the nineteenth century poet and educationalist. Arnold's 
opinion was that culture should be available to all, that culture 
could be the emollient which eased tensions between the classes 
and prepared the masses for democratic society. He equated 
individualism with anarchy, and culture with unity and service, 
in particular service to the state: 
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The State, whoever may administer it, is sacred and culture 
is the most resolute enemy of anarchy, because of the great 
hopes and designs for the State which culture teaches us to 
nourish (Matthew Arnold, 1869: 259) 
Arnold's influence on public service broadcasting has been 
well documented by Paddy Scannell (1990) . For instance, the first 
director-general of the BBC, John Reith, frequently echoed his 
definition of culture as being all the best that has been 
thought and written about in the world, (Paddy Scannell, 1990: 
22). It was Arnold however, who stressed the importance of 
character on culture and culture on character; and this notion 
of character was to become central to arguments about public 
service ethics. 
Culture without character is, no doubt, something frivolous, 
vain and weak; but character without culture is, on the 
other hand, something raw, blind and dangerous. The most 
interesting, the most truly glorious peoples., are those in 
which the alliance of the two has been affected most 
successfully (Matthew Arnold, 1973: 111) 
Culture for Arnold was a means of reducing conf lict and 
hostility in class society, a way of civilising the unruly 
masses, and preventing revolt from below. Culture and Anarchy, 
Arnold's best known work, 'expressed that fear in its very 
title'(Paddy Scannell, 1990: 23). Arnold's belief that culture 
should be I carried from one end of society to the other, in order 
to humanise all that is 'harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, 
professional, exclusive, so that it remained I the best knowledge 
and thought of our time, and a true source, therefore, of 
sweetness and lightl(Matthew Arnold, 1993: 79) found expression 
in the lofty idealism of early public service broadcasting. 
The best knowledge to Arnold was knowledge that was 
accessible, shareable and public, knowledge that could be part 
of a 'common culture, and not imprisoned in a form of expression 
that was specialised, technical, idiosyncratic or private. This 
idea of the capacity of culture to unify, to heal divisions in 
society, was one of Arnold's most potent legacies (Stefan 
Collini, 1993: xxii), particularly for Reithian public service 
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broadcasting. ' 
Arnold's thinking was also radical in that it proscribed for 
the state an extremely active and positive role. For Arnold it 
was self -evident that the I state should intervene in the terrain 
of culture and education' and as far as he was concerned English 
democracy ran no risk of being over-mastered by the State... It's 
real danger is, that it will have far too much its own way, and 
be left far too much to itselfl(Matthew Arnold, 1973: 106). 
Concluding remarks 
A number of themes emerge. The first has been the on-going 
debate about the role of the state in a liberal democratic 
society. Here the argument has centred around the extent to which 
the state should seek to intervene in economic, cultural and 
social af fairs against the belief that the market should be 
allowed a free hand. It is a debate between those who view the 
state as an enabler, a vehicle for the articulation of the public 
interest, and those who view state power simply in terms of 
restraints on individual liberty. In the 1920s the argument was 
won by those who believed that the power of the state could be 
harnessed for the public good; in the 1980s it was won by those 
who believed the opposite. 
The second theme is also related to the perceived role of 
the state but invokes the theme of citizenship. Public service 
implied a political obligation by individuals to the state both 
in terms of an abstract 'duty' and in terms of a financial 
relationship. In return, individuals could expect the protection 
of the state and regard themselves as citizens. 
The third is to do with arguments about the notion of 
' In Scannell Is view it was the combination of Arnoldian 
notions of culture and Victorian ideals of service which suffused 
the BBC Is programming f or the entire period of the monopoly. This 
attitude, did not, in his view, survive the 1950s, in 
broadcasting or elsewhere for that matter. 
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service. The idea of service to the public, is absolutely 
central, particularly as far as public service broadcasting was 
concerned. Service implied a matrix of duties and obligations as 
well as the idea that individuals could be spoken to as rational 
citizens. The idea of service also had a moral dimension; 
although service was very much an ideal' (and behaviour often 
fell short of its exacting standards) and also possessed some 
rather reactionary aspects. For example, the idea of service was 
very much aimed at improving, the moral behaviour of the lower 
orders; and it was taken for granted that the political, economic 
and cultural elites should set and enforce standards in society. 
In the 1980s this old idea of service was pitted against a 
more commercial, entrepreneurial and amoral approach, and lost. 
In the 1990s however, politicians fearful of electoral failure, 
have resurrected the idea of service. Notions of 'service', 
Citizen's Charters and the need for civic humanism, are once 
again on the political agendas of both Conservative and Labour - 
though what they will mean in practical policy terms is not 
clear. The difficulty remains; in the 1920s the idea of service 
was part of a larger worldview; this no longer exists and it is 
unclear how service in the 1990s can address the needs of a more 
complex and fragmented society. 
Fourthly, f rom. the very beginning it was clear that the 
public service concept had a dual character; it was both an ethos 
(a way of doing things which invoked the common good above 
individual gain) and was embodied in a variety of institutions 
(some departments of state but also some commercial organisations 
such as the Covenanted Civil Service, and until 19ý6, the British 
Broadcasting Company). 
These arguments about the efficacy of the public service 
concept for delivering solutions to problems of public policy are 
enduring ones. As we shall see in the next f ew chapters, the 
conditions which gave rise to the emergence of the public service 
concept have not gone away; the questions are the same in the 
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1990s as they were in the 1890s. In what areas should the common 
good take precedence over individual gain? To what extent can 
commercial organisations be expected to articulate the public 
interest? In a democratic society what are the best mechanisms 




Public service and the state 
In the late nineteenth century liberal intellectuals were 
increasingly concerned about the future of the modern democratic 
state. This concern led to a debate which, influenced by an 
expanding franchise, was underpinned by the conviction that the 
moral character of the working classes needed to be closely 
monitored; although it was not clear whether the state should be 
responsible for ensuring self-reliance and self -development, let 
alone become involved in industry or the economy. More generally 
it was a debate which explored the relative merits of 
individualist or collectivist approaches to liberal democratic 
life. 
In the sphere of communications the debate was one which 
focused on the issue of natural monopoly and how natural 
monopolies like the railways, the telegraph and telephony should 
be best administered in the public interest 
In the twentieth century this same debate became linked to 
arguments about planning. Between 1918 and 1939 planning was 
often used as a synonym for collectivism, and both terms implied 
a concern with expertise or technocracy since it was believed 
that an expanded state would require an aristocracy of talent' 
to administer it (Trevor Smith, 1979: xiv: citing Ernest Barker, 
1915: 192-3). It was also in this inter-war period that public 
service theory began to take shape, drawing on a range of sources 
which included Liberal individualist arguments about the 
importance of I character I and Socialist ones about ef f iciency and 
political accountability. 
In this chapter the focus is on the ways in which the 
relationship between private and public (between what was the 
responsibility of the state as opposed to the individual) 
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expressed itself in the area of communications and in debates 
about the role of government; while the evolution of public 
service is seen as evidence of the growing acceptance of a more 
positive role for the state. 
2.1 Individualism. v. collectivism 
In the 1880s intellectuals had begun to question, more 
rigorously than ever bef ore, both the role of capitalism - which 
seemed to be responsible for so much misery - and the future of 
democracy under the conditions of industrialisation. ' For 
Liberals the debate coalesced around the terms individualism' 
and I collectivism', which became powerful symbols of intellectual 
dif f erence. By 1918 the terms had f allen into disuse, but the 
debate they generated was to influence the way public service 
theory was to be conceptualised in the 1920s. 
The nineteenth century conflict between Liberal 
individualists and collectivists was characterised by a desire 
to establish the extent to which the state ought to be involved 
in private and public affairs. The individualists were 
represented by thinkers like Herbert Spencer (1884) who argued 
that the state was only justified in restricting... liberty to 
prevent a man from harming his fellows, and the economy was a 
self-regulating mechanism which only functioned efficiently when 
there were no limits upon competition, (Carole Seymour-Jones, 
1992: 84). 
Liberal collectivism on the other hand, was linked to the 
less narrowly ideological 'attempt to implement social reform 
through the legislative and executive powers of the state I (Stefan 
1A good example of this kind of intellectual was Beatrice 
Webb. In her youth, and under the inf luence of Herbert Spencer, 
author of Man versus the State (1884), she had come to believe 
that individualism, self-help, laissez-faire and minimal state interference, were the answer to society's ills (Carole Seymour- 
Jones, 1992: 160). in the 1880s however, she moved towards Fabian 
Socialism and the idea of collectivism as the basis for social 
action. 
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Collini, 1979: 34). The collectivists often risked association 
with the socialists - which they were not2 - but it was their 
belief that any disadvantages incurred by increased state 
intervention could be of f set by the advantages. For example, they 
viewed collectivism as a morally superior basis for society 
because it was based on cooperation rather than competition. 
Collectivism and individualism were not however, the polar 
opposites which Spencer's extreme, anti-statist individualism 
tended to suggest. It was possible for example, that 
I collectivist I policies could be based on individualist thinking. 
Thus, the increase in volume in state activity in the late 
Victorian and early Edwardian period was not incompatible with 
individualism because individualism was about the grounds for 
legislation, not the frequency; furthermore, not all government 
action was to be seen as a growth in collectivism - for instance$ 
late Victorians saw individualism as the inspiration for much 
legislation up to the 1880s (Stefan Collini, 1979: 16-17). 
Equally the 'qualified individualism, of writers like Henry 
Sidgewick (1891) was far less hostile to the state than that of 
Spencer. Sidgewick for instance, believed it was legitimate for 
the state to legislate to protect children, to enforce 
professional standards, prevent deception in trade, restrict 
dangerous processes of manufacture, control disease and make 
certain sorts of information available. In other words, certain 
activities, while not being justifiable on purely individualistic 
grounds, could be properly seen as the I task of the state I. These 
were those class of functions which are now identified as public 
goods - defence, the minting of currency, provision of 
lighthouses (Stefan Collini 1979: 18-21). Ultimately this class 
2 For instance, in AN. Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in 
Enqland durinq the Nineteenth Centurv it is stated that a person 
can be a collectivist without being a socialist. It would not therefore, 'be entirely misleading to say that Collectivism indicated a wider range of state action than strict socialism whereas socialism generally connoted a level of moral aspiration beyond mere Collectivism'(1905: 64). 
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of functions would include broadcasing. 
Although it was the case that individualists could support 
'collectivist, policies, individualism was still frequently used 
to combat the trend toward state intervention; and individualist 
arguments were used in politics, economics and science to attack 
the state. 
The political argument against the state was an objection 
to any increase in the powers of government on the grounds that 
it would increase the likelihood of corruption, mismanagement and 
bureaucracy. It was feared for instance, that power concentrated 
in government hands would threaten the liberties of individuals, 
or conversely that government efficiency might lead to, what in 
modern day parlance is called, 'welfare dependencyl(Stefan 
Collini, 1979: 23-31). 
The economic argument against the state was the most 
powerful source of opposition to state intervention in the 
nineteenth century. While there was an acceptance of the need for 
a range of state functions there was a 'general assumption that 
the economy was a system which regulated itself better than could 
be done by any form of direct management or control'. opposition 
to state intervention differed widely depending on the subject. 
Welfare was less of a target for instance than taxation (Stefan 
Collini, 1979: 24-25). 
Meanwhile, the scientific argument against the state 
consisted of 'presenting an account of Progress such that 
Individualism f igured as both the mechanism of advance and a 
constitutive part of the goal I. Evolutionary biology was pressed 
into service as evidence, metaphor and law, to demonstrate that 
competition was the motor of advance in the natural and social 
3 A. J. P. Taylor, for instance, has argued that during the 
1920s defence and broadcasting were the two areas (apart from during the General Strike) which could be singled out as being beyond party political difference (A. J. P. Taylor 1965: 291-297). 
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world alike (Stefan Collini, 1979: 26-31). 
By the 1920s however, individualist arguments against state 
intervention had been superseded by hard political realities as 
well as by the growing intellectual coalition which increasingly 
saw the state and planning as a means of securing political 
objectives. However, as we shall see when we look at the way the 
British communications infrastructure developed, this did not. 
mean that state control in Britain had emerged in a coherent 
pattern. 
Thus, although it is true to say that by the 1920s there was 
a growing and widespread belief in a 'positive' state; a state 
which ought to develop a virtuous, role leading to the 'highest 
service, to the public; the idea of state intervention in the 
economy remained controversial. Indeed, the role and the size of 
the state has been the most intractable long-'term issue in 
politics' (Hugo Young, The Guardian, 1995). 
2.2 The development of state intervention in industry 
During World War One the state, for the first time, became 
involved in industrial production for the war effort. After the 
war the desire to return to the 'normality, of the past was too 
strong to combat opposing tendencies towards permanent control 
and in fact, after 1918 there was a brief upsurge of enthusiasm 
for economic freedom. Nevertheless, the state emerged from the 
war with more functions in the financial and economic spheres 
than it had before. For example, government controlled industries 
and services, notably coal mining, shipping and the railways, 
were not easily disposed of (Sidney Pollard, 1980: 49). 
Between the end of the war and the early 1920s the two 
tendencies which had characterised the late nineteenth century 
now intensified. One tendency stressed the need for economic 
freedom and the other, was equally vociferous in f avour of public 
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ownership. often the two existed in uneasy partnership. The 
period also saw a growth in protection and subsidy. There were 
three causes; fear of shortages which might follow the outbreak 
of further war, a desire to shelter new industries from foreign 
competition and the hope of preventing unemployment. Economic 
incentives were imposed in the form of tariffs to protect key 
industries. For instance, in 1927 a Quota Act w' as passed to 
protect the British film industry and steps were taken to relieve 
unemployment with the launching of small programmes of public 
works and the extension of unemployment insurance. 
In particular the idea of the public corporation began to 
gain in popularity. Public corporations had been pioneered by the 
Dock and Harbour boards before 1914 and were followed by the 
Forestry Commission in 1919, the Central Electricity Board 
(1926), the British Broadcasting Corporation (1926), the London 
Passenger Transport Board (1933) and the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (1939). ' The CEB was particularly significant 
because it was the first public corporation of its type, 
preceding the establishment of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation only by a few months. 
Public corporations like the CEB and the BBC were similar 
in many ways. Both were created to perform a new function and 
both received support from their respective manufacturing 
industries. John Maynard Keynes observed the trend and 
recommended the extension of the principle of semi-autonomous 
bodies ... whose sole criterion of action within their f 
ield is 
solely the public good as they understand it, ... [these 
bodies] 
, are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but 
are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the 
democracy expressed through Parliament'(1926: 41: cited by 
E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 295) . 
I Public corporations had however, been rejected by the 
Report of the Committee on the Machinery of Government., 
[Cd 92301 in 1918 on the grounds that they were detrimental to 
Parliamentary accountability. 
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The purpose behind the CEB's creation for instance, was to 
create a national grid and to provide a bulk electricity supply 
to retailers'(Herman Finer, 1937: 128); although others have 
argued that it was not particularly effective and that by 1936 
twenty five per cent of the population was still without access 
to electricity. 
[The CEBI was simply an example of an ad hoc statutory body 
responsible for a new function. It provided and maintained 
the 'grid, at public expense and purchased new current from 
the generating stations for resale to the distributors, 
without interfering with the private or municipal ownership 
of these concerns. It was primarily a service to industry 
(E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 298) 
Herbert Morrison however, used the CEB as a model for the 
London Passenger Transport Bill in 1931. Morrison acknowledged 
the importance of the CEB to industry but did not believe that 
it compromised its public service role. He argued that the CEB 
'was not a political body, it was a business body, but there was 
an element of public accountability, public service and public 
spirit' (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 299 citing The Times March 24 
1931). 
The CEB had arisen out of the 'demands of industrialists' 
for an increase in electrical power to service the postwar 
economy in the af termath of the Reports of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction. In 1919 for instance, the Electricity Commission 
had been set up but it had 
f ailed to cope with the haphazard system of hundreds of 
separate local generating stations and distributing units. 
[It became obvious that] coordination would only be achieved 
politically by intervention from the state, and technically 
by the provision of a costly national transmission system 
with standardisation of frequency (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 
298). 
Nationalisation was opposed but the demand for some kind of 
state action was insistent, in particular from the electrical 
manufacturing industry (the British Electrical Allied 
manufacturers' Association and the Federation of British 
22 
Industries); although there was some opposition from vested 
interests in the supply of electricity (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 
298). 
In sum therefore, state intervention by the 1920s remained 
limited and piecemeal; what was more important was the change in 
attitude towards the idea of government intervention in 
industrial and economic affairs and the growing stress on the 
need for management of certain sectors. By the end of the decade 
anxiety about the condition of the British economy and serious 
doubts as to the validity of long accepted economic dogmas were 
growing among more moderate thinkers than those on the extreme 
left of the Labour Party; while, there was also pressure on 
government from depressed interests in agriculture, coal and 
cotton, with both employers and employees believing that some 
kind of legislation would improve their economic position (Sidney 
Pollard, 1980: 40-42). 
This was a period of massive polarisation between rich nad 
poor. For some there was growing wealth, improved amenities and 
a widening of horizons; f or others there was prolonged and at 
times massive unemployment combined with privation, social 
stagnation and personal hopelessness. The period also witnessed 
a decline in the old staple industries and the emergence of new 
ones.. This was accompanied by increasing industrial 
concentration. 5 
These trends were reinforced by the growth in new mass 
consumer markets and efficient means of transport and 
distribution to supply them, which called forth mass production 
by single, large firms. However, this concentration often 
resulted in 'restriction of competition and the creation of 
5 Concentration of industry need not automatically equate 
with monopolistic control and part of the motivation behind this 
trend was to take advantage of the technical - and economic 
advantages of size, aided also by the contemporary revolution in 
office equipment and administrative techniques. 
23 
monopolistic markets, and by 1939 monopolies had become the 
normal framework of economic life, to the extent that free 
competition had nearly disappeared from the British scene (Sidney 
Pollard, 1980: 102-4). 
The public attitude to the extension of monopolistic market 
conditions was very striking. At the end of World War One the 
Committee on Trusts had taken it for granted that monopoly was 
undesirable and in 1919 the Treasury had enforced a gentleman's 
agreement on the banks to abstain from further amalgamations. 
However, these were the 
last symptoms of a dying era. The drive towards the 
Irationalisation, of industry, introduced in this country 
from Germany about 1924, was perhaps the first sign of 
change. It began as a movement to improve techniques, but 
it was soon mainly looking for savings by structural and 
economic, rather than technical reorganisation (Sidney 
Pollard, 1980: 104). 
By the end of the 1920s 'planning' had become a favoured 
term and former attitudes towards competition and monopoly had 
been reversed. For instance, in 1928 the Liberal Industrial 
Inquiry, which included Lloyd George, J. M. Keynes, L. T. Hobhouse, 
Seebohm Rowntree and Sir Josiah Stamp, produced a 500 page report 
on Britain's Industrial Future. This linked ideas about state 
intervention and public control with the conviction that it was 
the growth in the scale of industrial units and the growth of 
political democracy that had forced these changes. The inquiry 
concluded that there was now 
f elt to be something inconsistent between the industrial 
status of the worker as a factory hand subject to strict 
discipline and holding his employment on the most precarious 
of tenures, and his po. litical status as a free and equal 
citizen and a maker and unmaker of governments (Britain's 
Industrial Future, 1928: xxii). 
The report, which was popularly known as the 'Yellow Book', 
pre-empted Keynesian economics and advocated the expansion of 
electricity supplies, improvements in telephony, and a massive 
scheme of public works in road construction and house building 
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as the means to eliminating unemployment. Echoing the post-war 
reconstruction committee reports it also argued that the 
problems of modern Government have become more numerous and more 
technical ... [and the Government] is driven to recognise that 
in 
modern conditions its policies necessarily affect industry' 
(Britain's Industrial Future, 1928: 116). 
The 'Yellow Book,, which was to provide the basis for the 
Liberal's 1929 General Election manifesto, did not sweep Lloyd 
George back to power, but was nevertheless extremely influential. 
It was essentially an amalgam of avant garde thinking drawn 
from various fields including economics and industrial 
relations. Overall, it came down on the side of efficiency 
rather than democracy to an extent even greater than the 
Webbs (who] at least wrestled with the problem of the 
tension between democracy and efficiency (which was] at the 
heart of the great debate [about planning] (Trevor Smith, 
1979: 25). 
The report did not support public ownership, on the 
contrary. It's view was that the I direct management of industries 
by Departments of State, or agencies analogous to them' is 'prima 
facie undesirable and likely to remain the exception rather than 
the rule' (Britain's Industrial Future, 1928: xxiii) . However, the 
f orm of words did not rule out public ownership per se and 
indeed, the report stressed that 'the theory that private 
competition, unregulated and unaided, will work out, with 
certainty, to the greatest advantage of the community is found 
by experience to be far from the truth' (Britain's Industrial 
Future, 1928: xiv) 
While the report rejected the idea of industrial democracy 
or any kind of guild socialism as advocated by writers like 
G. D. H. Cole, there was a growing sense in the country, that a 
very wide measure of public control will be necessary if the 
badly needed work of rationalisation is ever to make any real 
progress' (Sidney Pollard, 1980: 106 citing The Economist); and 
the Liberals themselves supported the establishment of public 
boards and corporations. This support reflected the political 
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shift the party had undergone. From the party of the 
, industrialist, investor and politician, it had become the 
'small party supporting capitalism from the point of view of the 
manager, professional man and public servant'(E. Eldon Barry, 
1965: 295). 
Efficiency in management, integrity in the public service, 
respect for the interests of the 'community, (consumers) and 
loyalty to democratic form, were taken by the Liberals as 
ideals for 'management, of the whole economy. The essence 
of Britain's Industrial Future was that private enterprise 
was still the best economic system, and that its admitted 
defects could be remedied, in part by state intervention and 
in part by skilled management. This was to be the middle way 
between individualism and socialism (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 
295). 
However, the Liberals were not alone in these concerns; they 
were also shared by Socialists, even if the solutions were 
different. It was the Webbs and the Fabian socialists, who had 
been responsible for the growing understanding that extensive 
economic intervention by the state would require considerable 
adaptation of the machinery of government (A Constitution for the 
Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, 1920); and it was the 
Webbs who had most clearly outlined the problematic relationship 
between democracy and efficiency. 
The Webbs had been concerned to prevent the extension of 
state power from leading to a reduction in public accountability 
of the legislative and executive organs of government; hence the 
separation of the political and social powers of government into 
the Political Parliament and the Social Parliament. The dual 
Parliamentary system they envisaged was designed to improve 
efficiency in the conduct of government business and their 
emphasis on efficiency was to become an enduring motif for both 
the advocates of planning and for public service theorists in the 
future (Trevor Smith, 1979: 9). 
By the 1930s the state was playing an increasingly active 
role in the cartelisation of industry; it 
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intervened directly to provide a monopolistic framework 
where firms were too weak or too scattered, as in the old 
staples of coal, cotton, iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
agriculture. For a third type of industry, the public 
utility, the country groped its way through to a new and 
significant form of organisation, the public corporation 
(Sidney Pollard, 1980: 106). 
These public corporations, as we shall see, were largely an 
attempt to 'cope with the problem of the administration of large 
or nationally important industries' . In most cases they were used 
when large capital sums were required and when the industry 
concerned needed a secure control of its market. In particular, 
they were expediant when there existed 
a strong interest in general or social, as distinct from 
sectional, welfare. It was a compromise to avoid both the 
exploitation of the public by a private monopoly, and the 
day-to-day political interference to which ordinary 
departments of state are normally subjected. The capital 
might be held by the state or by former owners, including 
private shareholders but there was the most complete 
separation possible between ownership and control (Sidney 
Pollard 1980: 106). 
2.3 State development in communications 
In the area of communications this uneven pattern of state 
intervention was apparent from the mid nineteenth century 
onwards. The goal of laissez-faire had become increasingly 
difficult to maintain under the burden of Empire, bourgeois self- 
interest and the processes of industrial i sation, which in Britain 
were extremely well developed. For example, it was because of the 
forces of industrialisation that the rising commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie increasingly looked to the state to 
provide them with a favourable business climate at home and to 
promote their interests against those of their foreign rivals. ' 
6A good example of this is the way in which the wireless 
manufacturers in Britain worked with the state to develop public 
service broadcasting. 
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However, as we have seen the British state did not develop 
in a systematic fashion, and where European states chose to 
intervene in areas like communication infrastructure, in Britain 
there was generally no coherent provision for the financing of 
such industries. In Europe, state intervention, industrial 
policy, and tariff walls to protect 'infant industry, were more 
frequently employed; and in the case of communications 
infrastructure (roads, canals and railways) the European view was 
that because vast capital sums were required only the state could 
offer the kind of guarantees needed to attract private 
investment. 
In Britain this was not the case. Generally speaking, the 
banks made little provision for the f inancing of industry and as 
a consequence British communications infrastructure grew up in 
a highly decentralised and fragmented way, with the railways, for 
example, being built by separate local companies drawing on local 
capital markets. However, although in the case of the railways 
the role of the state was secondary it was not absent, because 
companies still needed an Act of Parliament to give them the 
power to compulsorily acquire land and to provide limited 
liability. Additionally, since the days of the canals, Parliament 
had also inherited an interest in the maximum charges which could 
be imposed by railways. 
It was the case therefore, that throughout the nineteenth 
century the railways had been a major focus, of the debate on 
how to regulate natural monopolies in the public interest' 
(Nicholas Garnham, Matthieu Joosten, Jenny Owen, 1994: 42). In 
fact, as early as 1837 there had been the suggestion that they 
be brought under a form of public ownership. In his observations 
on Railways, with reference to Utility, Profit and the obvious 
necessitv for a National Svstem, William Mudge, an officer in the 
Royal Engineers, had suggested that the goverment appoint a 
, board of commissioners, composed of sound practical men' and 
including a mathematician, a geologist and an engineer, to 
examine all railway projects in order to find the best routes 
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from aI national I point of view; although he did not suggest that 
the government construct new railway lines or take over existing 
ones (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 79-80). 
Later in the 1840s, a Select Committee under Gladstone, who 
was then President of the Board of Trade, investigated the 
question of railway development but pressure from vested 
interests prevented the implementation of rationalising measures. 
By the 1860s however, there was increasing pressure on the 
government to act in the f ace of the growing number of 
amalgamations taking place in the railway industry and the 
growing danger of private monopoly. In particular, the railway 
reformers took heart from the striking example of state purchase 
that happened in 1868-91 when 'with no difficulty at all, the 
government got authority to purchase the telegraphs from the 
half-dozen companies who had been developing this new system of 
communication'. Private enterprise had been successful in the 
cities, the most profitable sphere, but had 'jibbed at the 
complete wiring of the country which was demanded by traders I and 
when the telegraph system was 'handed over to the Post Office' 
no-one raised the 'cry of laissez-faire' (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 
84). 
Several more attempts were made to bring the railways into 
state ownership but they were unsuccessful. By 1873 even The 
Times, editorial (March 27) was arguing in favour of state 
action. Twenty-f ive years ago, it argued, I government management 
was 
synonymous with waste, miscarriage, extravagance and every 
other incident of commercial f ailure but now the change 
which has come over the spirit of the age is almost incredible. Whether from the precedent of the Electric Telegraph and other branches of the Postal service, or 
whether from a growing conviction that the state ought to do more for the people than it does, we f ind it stoutly 
argued that government work is better done than any other 
work and the presumption has at length culminated in the 
proposal to make the state proprietor and manager of all the Railways in the Kingdom (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 87). 
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In the end however, it was not until a Labour administration 
was elected in 1945 that the railways were finally brought under 
state control. 
The nineteenth century economy therefore, was not 
characterised by unrestrained 'free, enterprise and although 
early debates on communications were influenced by ideas about 
strongly competitive, free and private companies, it was also the 
case that communications were increasingly viewed as an instance 
where the state ought to play an important role. 
The Post Of f ice f or instance, was considered by I ancient and 
ýsemi-inviolable contention' as a monopoly of the Crown, to be 
operated by public officials (J. H. Robertson, 1947: 21); and its 
acquisition of the telegraphs in 1870, the telephones in 1911 
and, its claims over wireless telegraphy and broadcasting were 
seen by some civil servants as an opportunity to provide the Post 
Office with the means to become a true Ministry of 
Communications. For some politicians this was a logical and 
acceptable development, for others it was perceived as a threat 
to the principle of laissez-faire. (J. H. Robertson, 1947: 21). 
In general however, governments did not subscribe to the 
idea that the state should help the businessman, save by 
enforcing honest and orderly trade procedures and by organising 
the odd trade exhibition. Liberals for instance, fought the 
movement to impose tariffs and the party as a whole shared with 
their main political opponents a complete lack of interest in any 
proposals for the nationalisation of industries (though some 
Liberal radicals were in favour of the nationalisation of land) . 
Thus, although there was some state intervention in 
communications f rom the mid nineteenth century onwards, each 
instance of intervention was preceded by long debates about the 
extent to which the existence of natural monopoly outweighed the 
prior claims of competition. It was also still the case that 
apart from the Post Office early twentieth century governments 
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had relatively few trading or industrial interests; a situation 
which had begun to change during the 1870s when 'gas and water 
socialisation, made some headway at a municipal level. In this 
period for instance, Joseph Chamberlain's Birmingham City Council 
was responsible for considerable improvements to the lives of 
city dwellers. 
Public enterprise was seen at its best and most courageous, 
in the destruction of the slums, the adoption of the great 
housing schemes, the acquisition and development of gas and 
water undertakings, the provisions of parks and recreation 
grounds and the establishment of the Birmingham School of 
Art (J. L. Hammond, 1935: 50). 
However, by 1914 there was still no suggestion that in 
general terms the national economy could or should be managed, 
by central government (F. M. G. Willson, 1957: 294) ; although there 
was a huge expansion within the state administration itself. For 
instance, in the period following the Northcote-Trevelyan Report 
of 1853 the Civil Service and public services (boards and 
commissions) had begun to grow quite significantly. Decisive 
landmarks were the Superannuation Act of 1859 and the development 
of Parliamentary machinery such as Orders in Council in 1870 and 
1920 (W. A. Robson 1937: 11). 7 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, communications 
debates were less to do with whether the state should intervene 
or not but the grounds and methods by which the management of 
these industries could be justified (Nicholas Garnham, Matthieu 
Joosten and Jenny Owen, 1994: 45). In communications 
the major and continuing theme has been the problem of 
regulatory control of private enterprises and in particular 
whether to choose the certainty of law and regulation 
through the courts or the flexibility of discretionary 
regulation by specialised regulators (Nicholas Garnham, 
' orders in Council were the procedure whereby companies 
were formed by Royal Charter as an exercise of the Royal Prerogative. The Privy Council authorises the incorporation on the advice of the minister and after the Cabinet has approved the 
principles. The BBC was created as a public corporation using this method (Dimmock 1933: 30). 
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Matthieu Joosten, Jenny Owen, 1994: 42). 
It is an issue which remains as problematic in the 1990s as 
it was in the nineteenth century. 
2.4 Public Service and reconstruction 
The key period for the emerging concept of public service 
was the outbreak of war in 1914. The war had led to a vast 
expansion of state activities (though these were largely 
temporary measures) and military developments in wireless during 
this period had led to the establishment of a broadcasting 
industry in the early 1920s. Although many of the administrative 
changes which occurred during this period were reversed later on, 
the war was to have a profound effect on the way a modern nation 
state conducts its business and this was particularly the case 
as regards industrial and economic policy and management. 
For instance, bef ore 1914 what thinking was done on economic 
matters in government circle's was confined almost entirely to the 
Treasury and the Board of Trade at the level of department 
officials. The academic study of economics was not widespread and 
there were no professional economists in the Civil Service. 
Equally there was no widespread collection of economic data nor 
any attempt to co-ordinate departments on the question of the 
national economy (F. M. G. Willson, 1957: 294). 
In crude terms the war ushered in a system of I advanced 
capitalism' . Large scale organisations which had been fairly rare 
prior to this period became increasingly common and businesses 
began to make use of new scientific techniques, in production 
and management, techniques which were emerging both in Britain 
and the USA. 
These increasing concentrations of capital produced strong 
trends towards monopolisation in key areas and were accompanied 
by growing political pressure for electoral ref orm and social 
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policies. After the war Britain was faced with massive debts, 
increased world competition, shrinking markets for its goods and 
a population much less willing to accept the political and social 
inequalities of the past. Increasingly it seemed (to all 
political parties) that there was a need for some kind of 
national planning to solve these kinds of questions. 
Despite these vast increases in government power in 1914, 
they were for the purposes of sustaining a siege economy, and 
were accompanied by an equally dramatic period of abandonment of 
these powers in the years following the Armistice. Thus the long 
term administrative rearrangements which occurred between 1914 
and 1922 were as much to do with longer term trends and the 
realisation that scientific and technical progress was needed in 
both government and the wider economy. 
However, the end of World War One did see the emergence of 
what is known as the 'reconstruction debate, and this debate 
raised key issues for future arguments about the nature of public 
service, both as an ethic and in terms of the kinds of 
institutions which might be able to deliver such a service. In 
1917 a Reconstruction Committee was formed, which later was 
enlarged into a Ministry of Reconstruction with numerous 
departmental committees investigating economic and social 
questions. This ministry published a series of reports which 
fuelled the belief that there ought to be major changes in the 
administration and influence of the state, when the war ended. 
However, what those changes would be were a. matter for 
political contestation. Labour and the TUC, for instance, thought 
that reconstruction should herald in both nationalisation and 
union representation in management. It was in this atmosphere, 
for example, that the 17th Annual Conference of the Labour Party 
in 1918 adopted clause four of its new constitution. 
To secure f or the producers by hand or by brain the full 
fruits of their industry, and the most equitable 
distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of 
the common ownership of the means of production and best 
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obtainable system of popular administration and control of 
each industry and service (E. Eldon Barry, 1965: 197-200). 
As f ar as the development of the public service concept was 
concerned however, there were two important committees. The 
first, dealt ostensibly with the problem of maintaining timber 
supplies in a national emergency (Final Report of the Forestry 
Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee of the MinistrV of 
Reconstruction, Reports f or the Ministry of Reconstruction 1918, 
xviii. 43., [Cmd 8811); and the second examined ways in which 
government departments could be made more rational and efficient. 
(Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, Reports for the 
Ministry of Reconstruction, 1918, [Cmd 9230]). 
However, both committees' reports were influential because 
of the ways in which the national interest was used as a 
justification for increased state intervention, and for their 
concern with the issue of efficiency. It is possible therefore, 
to isolate, as early as 1917, two themes which were to emerge as 
key elements in the public service paradigm - the national 
interest and efficiency -b, oth of which were packaged in terms 
of a vision of the 'positive, state. 
The Forestry Committee for example, in its response to the 
severe shortages of timber which had occurred during the war (and 
the resulting need for importation) argued that 'remedial 
measures' would have to be taken in 'the interests of national 
economy' to ensure that this situation was never repeated. It 
concluded that forests are a national necessity, and in the 
, interests of national safety' that the 'care of forestry' ought 
to be Icentralised in one body'. The resulting Forestry 
Authority should have the funds and powers 
to survey, purchase, lease and plant land and generally to 
administer the areas acquired with compulsory powers to be 
exercised, when needed, after due enquiry and the award of 
fair compensation (Final ReDort of the Forestry Sub- 
Committee, 1918: 426-431). 
The report also suggested that forestry offered work and 
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accomodation to returning soldiers; and that the training which 
had been offered foresters in the Forest of Dean since 1912 was 
an example of the ability of the state to conduct successful 
schemes of afforestation or provide effective management'(Final 
Report of the Forestry Sub-Committee, 1918: 435). Equally, the 
report argued that 
If the forestry problem is one of national insurance of 
which the state is not justified in requiring private 
individuals to bear the burden it f ollows that the state 
must itself bear it (Final Report of the Forestry Sub- 
Committee,. 1918: 454) 
It was this kind of analysis of the role of the state which 
became increasingly dominant in the period and which made future 
state interventions a matter of precedence rather than 
innovation. Although in general groups with interests in 
forestry - the Royal Arboricultural Society, the Royal English 
Arboricultural Society, the Landowners' Cooperative Forestry 
Society'(Scotland) and the English Forestry Association - were 
either supportive of the report or ambivalent about the need f or 
state intervention, they wer 
,e 
all clear that I ef f iciency I and the 
, national interest' required that something be done. 
The Report of the Machinery of Government Committee on the 
other hand examined questions of reorganisation, rationalisation 
and efficiency in government departments. However, as with the 
Forestry report the subtext was a growing awareness that the 
activities of public services needed to be predicated upon an 
idea of the public good or benefit to the community. The report 
suggested a number of developments both in terms of 
administration and in the way policy ought to be formulated. 
Policy, it was urged, ought to be better prepared. Research and 
enquiry should be carried out or supervised by a 'department of 
government specially charged with these duties, and recruitment 
should be carefully monitored; while those in charge ought to 
devote more time to this 'portion of their duties'. 
These needs had been f irst understood in 1915 when a new 
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department under the Lord President of the Council was f ormed to 
organise the knowledge required f or the aplication of science to 
industry. The principle however, on which the reorganisation of 
functions between departments was to take place, was 
distribution according to the nature of the service to be 
rendered to the community as a whole (The Report of the 
Machinery of Government Committee, 1918: 8). 
The report was also concerned to examine methods of 
political control and in so doing raised the issue of political 
accountability and how it was to be managed in a meaningful way. 
The 1918 report suggested that financial control within 
departments was fundamental to effective control by Parliament 
over public expenditure; but equally, there was an awareness of 
the problem of certain cases' where the lconstaný criticism' of 
Parliament would make independence difficult. Examples given were 
the Road Board and the Development Commission and the report 
suggested that a board might be set up to examine all 
applications from industries for state assistance I. However, the 
report concluded in the strongest terms that the principle of 
Parliamentary accountability ought to be maintained: 
we are so far f rom thinking that the importance of a service 
to the community is prima facie a reason for making those 
who administer it immune from ordinary Parliamentary 
criticism (Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, 
1918: 11). 
The report also accepted the need to secure public opinion 
more ef f ectively and a key innovation was the suggestion that 
Advisory Committees be set up to secure and retain 'public 
confidence', providing they did not impede ministerial 
responsibility. Advisory Committees would help Ministers command 
the confidence of Parliament and the public in their 
administration of the services which seem likely in an ever 
increasing degree to affect the lives of large sections of the 
community' (Report of the Machinery of Government Committee 1918: 
12). Later Advisory Committees would become a common mechanism 
within public corporations for dealing with the problem of public 
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opinion and public accountability. The BBC in particular, was a 
clear example of a public corporation which developed along those 
kinds of lines. 
The primary object of- the inquiry was therefore, to promote 
, the efficient and economical working of the public services, 
while not unbalancing the relationship between the Legislative 
and the Executive. This issue of efficiency versus the need for 
political control was a key problem for both government 
departments and for the emerging public corporations and boards. 
Stress was placed, once more, upon the need for financial control 
of departments as a way of securing Parliamentary control and 
civil servants were to be encouraged to administer the services 
for the benefit of the community,. The report concluded that 
each government department needed proper expenditure proposals, 
unimpaired Ministerial responsibility, and 'co-operation with 
advisory bodies in matters which bring departments into contact 
with the public, (Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, 
1918: 15). 
Finally the report urged government to be aware that 
a more ef f icient public service may expose the state to the 
evils of bureaucracy unless the reality of Parliamentary 
control is so enforced as to keep pace with any improvement 
in departmental method (Report of the Machinery of 
Government Committee,, 1918: 16) 
The suggestion that there should be developed a series of 
public corporations to replace the ordinary departments of state 
had been rejected (mostly because of the problems of 
accountability) ; however, as we shall see, the idea had taken 
root, and would find almost universal favour in the future. 
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Concluding remarks 
The growth of state activity in the twentieth century has 
its roots in the Victorian past. The emergence of both direct 
state take-overs (national isation) , the formation of independent 
or semi-independent administrative agencies (boards, public 
trustees and corporations) and the regulation of social issues 
(the poor, public health) can be traced back to 'this period. Then 
as now debates were held over the right mix between state 
regulation and 'free' market forces, between collectivist and 
individualist approaches to liberal democracy. 
Then as now debates were held over the rationale behind 
public ownership, the responsibilities of administrative agencies 
and their accountability to Parliament. The result has been a 
typically incremental and ad hoc pattern of state activity which 
has led to uncertainty about the relative responsibilities of the 
private sector and the state sector for providing services, often 
resulting in administrative and organisational confusion (Pitt, 
1980: 24). 
There are lessons to be learned f rom these debates about 
individualism and collectivism which took place between 1880 and 
1914. For example, 
once individualism and collectivism are seen as polar 
opposites, the state as the sole vehicle f or collective 
action, the complexities of real world political economies 
are necessarily reduced to the banalities of old-style state 
socialism on the one hand and new-style market 
fundamentalism on the other (David Marquand, The Sunday 
Times, 1995). 
The point is not that neither individualist or collectivist 
approaches to political problems offer total solutions, but that 
liberal individualism does not of itself exclude state 
intervention or indeed, public ownership. 
The public service concept for instance, as applied to the 
public utilities in general and broadcasting in particular, is 
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testimony to the way in which in the past 'collectivist' policies 
could be supported by individualists. This throws light on a 
contemporary debate and suggests that contrary to the arguments 
of the neo-liberal Conservative Right there is not a straight 
choice between collectivist and individualist approaches to the 
state in modern industrial societies. By the end of the 1930s 
this had been a question which seemed to have resolved itself; 
and limited public ownership in the form of the public 
corporation or board had become the practical expressions of the 
debate about the proper mix of free enterprise and state 
intervention within liberal democratic societies and how such 
states ought to be managed. 
In this period public service began to assume not only a 
greater philosophical coherency but was also made more concrete 
as an administrative practice. For example, the key elements of 
public service philosophy were now embodied in documents which 
would in future extend the limits of the state's involvement in 
a wide range of areas. For instance, the creation of the Forestry 
Authority, as a result of the Final Report of the Forestry Sub- 
Committee, was proof of a willingness to accept that the state 
ought and indeed, could provide effective management' of some 
public resources, in the national interest. 
The Reconstruction Committee reports were therefore, 
indicative of the extent to which public service philosophy had 
begun to infiltrate thinking about the administration and scope 
of the modern, industrialised state. In each case for instance, 
the acceptance that there was a concrete national interest, 
either in forestry, or in relation to the need for a more 
rational administration, was linked to the necessity of paying 
attention to public opinion and justified on the grounds of the 
public service idea of service to the community,. Meanwhile 
questions of efficiency and accountability emerged as organising 
themes for understanding and questioning the new role of 
government. 
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Thus, although by 1918 public service was not a coherent 
theory, the themes which characterised it were becoming 
increasingly dominant. By the early 1920s the idea of the 
national interest, the important role of public opinion, the 
necessity for efficiency were elements of a developing ethos of 
public service, which were soon to find expression in the 
institution known as the public corporation. It is to these 
developments which we turn in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter Three 
Public service development in the 1920s: the influence of 
the philosophy of public administration and the growth of 
public corporations. 
As we have seen, in the early part of the twentieth century 
public service was linked to broader administrative and 
institutional developments. In turn these developments were tied 
to the rapid expansion of the modern bureaucratic state and the 
perception by governments that in future they would need to re- 
think and possibly expand their sphere of influence and control 
as a condition of their survival. 
After 1918 the key institutional development was that of the 
public corporation model of state intervention in the economy, 
and these public corporations represented an important stage in 
the development of a philosophy of public service. However, in 
this same period the public service idea was also establishing 
itself within the administrative departments of the state and was 
being articulated by a large number of influential politicians, 
civil servants and academics. This public service theory or 
philosophy of public administration was concrete and pragmatic; 
a philosophy which in retrospect appears as detailed and coherent 
as American public utility theory (Jean-Paul Simon, 1992). 
3.1 Public service and public administration 
In tracing the elements of this evolving public service 
philosophy the journal Public Administration has proved 
invaluable, for it is here that public service is defined as an 
ideal to be aspired to, as well as a description of contemporary 
practice. The journal was published by the Institute of Public 
Administration, and established in the same year as the Institute 
in 1922. It quickly became a forum for a debate regarding the 
interests and concerns of what might be termed the liberal/left 
political elite (but not exclusively so) and included 
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contributions from academics, politicians and civil servants. 
The focus of the Institute's work was on both broad and 
detailed questions of public administration at local and 
governmental levels. In particular contributions were aimed at 
discussions about the administration and management of public 
utilities or services which could be defined as having a strong 
public interest rationale. These services included the railways, 
gas and electricity utilities, the postal service, telecom- 
munications and broadcasting. 
The aims of the Institute and the journal were threefold. 
Firstly, there was a clear desire to develop the study of public 
administration as a distinct academic discipline; secondly, there 
was a focus on monitoring the internal organisation of the 
existing public services - staff conditions, pay, training and 
more general management practices (of f ice methods and conditions) 
including questions relating to the demarcation of function. 
Thirdly, these organisational concerns were underpinned by more 
fundamental issues relating. to financial and political control 
within central government, between central and local authorities 
and within the publicly owned utilities (Index of the Journal of 
Public Administration, V01.1, No. 1,1923: 3). 1 
Key figures included men like Sir Henry Bunbury who argued 
that the Institute had formed under the influence of two 
conflicting movements affecting public services; the first he 
described as the new doctrine of Whitleyism or wage councils and 
their 'frank acceptance by the government of the day'; and the 
second, I the strong reaction in the public mind af ter the war 
against public servants in general and the Civil Service in 
I More generally the Institute was concerned with the 
relations between bureaucratic organisations and the public (publicity and propaganda), legislative functions, judicial 
functions, the economic sphere (the state in relation to finance, industry and agriculture), the state in relation to labour, 
public health, social benefits, public safety, international 
relations and the preparation of statistics and registers. 
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particular, (Public Administration, Volume XI., No. 4., October 
1933: 340). 
In other words, on the one hand governments were 
increasingly accepting of the necessity of state intervention in 
the economy, and were committed to the creation of a more 
equitable society by creating institutions to monitor and control 
wage levels. While at the same time, they were also aware of a 
f ear that these developments would lead to unaccountable and 
despotic rule by bureaucrats and officials. 
The journal was characteristically reticent on the question 
of how these issues might be addressed politically; indeed, 
somewhat predictably, one of the first principles of the 
Institute was its denial of any political content to 
administration. The journal declared itself to be beyond party 
politics, reflecting perhaps, the climate of consensus. ' This 
denial of political content meant however, that the issue of 
class was ignored. Indeed, class as an organising principle was 
effectively displaced by th 
*e public service notion of a shared 
code of gentlemanly behaviour, while party political affiliations 
were rejected in the same way as lacking in any meaningful 
significance. However, the idea that the administrators might 
constitute a political elite or interest group was implicit in 
their gentlemanly code; but, in a circuitous fashion, it was 
deemed not worthy of comment because gentlemen were always beyond 
reproach. 
The denial of the political implied that there was no 
conflict between the gentlemanly ways of service and the 
principle of a democratic representative politics, when in fact 
2 See Dennis Kavanagh, 'The Postwar Consensus', 20th Century 
British Historv, No. 2., 1992, OUP, for a critique of this notion 
of consensus. Also see K. Middlemass's argument about the 
tripartite corporatist consensus which ruled Britain from 1918 
to the late 1970s. Middlemass's argument describes the role of 
public service broadcasting in that process as an institution of 
political and cultural hegemony (1979). 
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the gentlemanly ways of service were to some extent code f or 
class privilege and power. The historian Harold Perkin has made 
this point powerfully, arguing that public service is essentially 
a conspiracy by and in favour of middle class interests (1989). 
Contributors to the journal did nevertheless discuss more 
f ormal, political matters, but these were of a constitutional 
nature and f ocused on the role of the administrator in upholding 
and interpreting the British Constitution, and the part played 
by civil servants in the process of policy making. (R. M. Thomas, 
1978: 22). Ultimately however, the journal's mission was to 
review 
the efficiency of public services and the efficiency of 
public servants. In respect of the central question whether 
or not certain services should be controlled and conducted 
by public bodies (the journal] is silent. That question 
falls within the sphere of legislation, and administration 
begins after legislation has made its decision (journal of 
Public Administration, Volume 1. No. l., 1923: 3). 
Efficiency was a central theme. In general contributors did 
not subscribe to the technical definition of efficiency but to 
one which embraced the 'human factor,; and in theoretical terms 
it was this human factor which was a central thread in the theory 
and practice of public service, whether it related to departments 
of state, the various public utilities or to public service 
broadcasting itself. 
The Institute of Public Administration was structured on a 
regional basis and held regular summer conferences, autumn 
programmes and conferences, as well as 'public service dinners, 
which were attended by local dignitaries and government ministers 
alike. The president, Lord Haldane, was a Liberal MP, education- 
alist and the author of the influential Report of the Machinerv 
of Government in 1918, which had addressed questions of 
administration and reconstruction after the Great War. The 
Treasurer, Sir Henry Bunbury, was not only Comptroller and 
Auditor General at the Post Office but also an influential 
committee member of the f irst broadcasting committee of inquiry, 
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the Sykes Committee, in 1923. Other founding members included, 
William, Lord Beveridge a Liberal MP and future architect of the 
Welfare State; Sir Josiah Stamp, a civil servant, economist and 
chairman of the London, Manchester and Scottish Railway (who 
succeeded Haldane to the presidency of the IPA following 
Haldane's death); Harold Laski (the socialist academic) and 
Fabian philosopher and political scientist, Graham Wallas. 
The journal also drew on a range of political commentators 
including the guild socialist G. D. H. Cole; Stanley Baldwin the 
former Conservative Prime Minister (writing in 1934); the 
political scientist Ernest Barker; the Labour trade unionist, 
Ernest Bevin; Austen Chamberlain the Liberal MP; the political 
scientist D. N. Chester; Marshall. E. Dimock the American public 
administration theorist; Ivor Jennings the political scientist; 
John Maynard Keynes the economist (who contributed in both 1933 
and 1936); Harold MacMillan the future Conservative Prime 
Minister (1938); A. C. Pigou the welfare economist (1925); 
J. C. W. Reith, director-general of the BBC (1930); W. A. Robson the 
political scientist and . public administration 
theorist; 
G. H. Stuart Bunning; Stephen Tallents, secretary of the Empire 
Marketing Board, then Public Relations officer for the Post 
Office Film Unit, and the British Film Institute; as well as 
Fabians Beatrice and Sidney Webb. Bunbury, G. H. Stuart-Bunning, 
Graham Wallas and Josiah Stamp were all regular contributors on 
a range of different subjects. 
It is Bunbury however, who emerges as the key figure in the 
process of constructing the philosophy of public service. It was 
Bunbury for instance, who articulated the administrator's view 
of public service, arguing that 'the men who had established the 
British public administration profession, particularly the 
practising administrators, were pretty much out of the same 
mould. They believed in first principles and derived them to a 
large extent from the moral philo , sophy 
tradition'. These 
administrators, he argued, were 'part of culture and of 
leadership. Their distinctiveness comes from the fact that they 
45 
are servants and yet they have a central position in holding the 
country together and helping it to find its desired place in the 
sun .... most of these men were of the liberal persuasion in the 
philosophical-historical meaning of that term, although they 
invariably chose to keep their own party preferences to 
themselves (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xiv, in reference to 
Bunbury's contribution to the philosophy of public service). 
The philosophy of public service has also been described as 
a philosophy of public administration (R. M. Thomas, 1978) which 
in its most salient features is virtually indistinguishable from 
a theory of public service. As with public service, it was 
articulated by public administration theorists and politicians; 
men such as Graham Wallas, Josiah Stamp, Lyndall Urwick, Oliver 
Sheldon, William Beveridge and Viscount Haldane. However, it was 
the American public administration theorist, Marshall. E. Dimock, 
who first drew the parallels between the philsophy of public 
administration and a philosophy of public service and who 
recognised the important contribution made by Bunbury. 
For Dimock British public administrators and public 
administration were characterised by a sense of responsibility, 
by an ability to the use their initiative, accountability, hard- 
headedness, balance and a belief in people rather than balance- 
sheets'. Equally admirable was the British system of devolved 
powers, or the practice of leaving the management of monopolies 
to an qxpert class of managers rather than trying to 'regulate 
them to death,. In Dimock's opinion this was simply the most 
efficient system that could be envisaged , efficient in both 
economic terms and in human terms (1978: xiv-xv). 
It was Dimock for instance, who reflected that the 
philosophical influences on the architects of public service 
philosophy, had included the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, 
the Christian objectives of socialism, the technical rationality 
of Fabianism, mixed in with a dash of capitalist self -help. 
Although he observed that in general these men disliked labels 
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of any kind since they were possessed of a 
strong f eeling for the organic nature of the economy and the 
fact that every event in one part of it is inevitably 
registered in every other part. The ideal was to encourage 
common citizens to govern themselves by learning as much as 
their leaders, and applying it in their daily pursuits 
(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xvi). 
The philosophy of public administration was an imaginative 
mix of organisational theory and human relations theory, one 
which resulted in the 'unification of scientific principles with 
ethical ideals'(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: viii). The parallels 
with broadcasting are striking; in much the same way John Reith's 
public service broadcasting emerged as the practical expression 
of an attempt to combine technological and scientific principles 
(for instance, spectrum scarcity and notions of administrative 
efficiency) with a system of ethics, 'high, culture and cultural 
and moral values. 
According to Dimock, the British and the American public 
administration tradition shared the moral philosophy perspective 
of thinkers as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Justinian, 
Rousseau, Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill; and the essence of 
this approach was that 
power corrupts and that the antidote is service, that the 
justification of price is service and efficiency, that 
breach of trust is never forgotten by the public, and that 
a meritocracy is the only sure road to public confidence and 
the firm's survival (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xvii). 
British administrator were much to be admired; they were 
professional in terms of their jobs but laymen in terms of 
outlook, personality and attitude. They were pragmatists, men who 
like Bunbury and Haldane, subscribed to Leon Duguit's aphorism, 
'the very purpose of administration is to get things 
donel(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xviii-xv). 
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3.2 The principles of public service 
The key elements in the philosophy of public service 
articulated by the administrators and writers of the 1920s and 
30s included the following: a demand for efficiency in its widest 
sense and a belief that 'efficiency' could in itself act as a 
mechanism of public control or accountability, an attachment to 
the idea of progress - both economic and societal and an 
understanding that public services should be both available to 
all and universally useful in some way (as well as an 
understanding that these developments were symptomatic of changes 
in the role of the state in modern democratic societies) . Key 
words were rational,, scientific', ethical,,, organic', 
Imeritocratic', the 'community will', 'education' and 
Icivilisation'. Indeed, the whole point of the philosophy was 
that public service was a civilising force and would produce a 
qualitatively better society in the future. 
Public service philosophy did not however, possess I abstract 
principles'; indeed, it made a virtue of its pragmatism. Graham 
Wallas for instance, made the point that although Aristotle, 
Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu were very interesting to read they 
were not much help when trying to develop Poor Relief or in 
trying to decide what to do about the Gold Standard (Graham 
Wallas, 'Government', Public Administration, Volume VI, No. 1, 
1928) . 
This was entirely characteristic of the public service 
approach; and most of what these men wrote suggested the musings 
of practical men normally concerned with the day-to-day operation 
of Civil Service departments or public utilities and not given 
to philosophical speculation. As such their analyses lacked the 
rigour one might expect from a more academic approach but had the 
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benefit of candour and enthusiasm. 
At the heart of the philosophy was a commitment to the 
importance of education in the modern world. Haldane wrote for 
instance, that 
the modern state [if] it is democratic in constitution and 
industrial in occupation can only survive if industry, its 
professions and its administration are conducted by men and 
women with ideas (obituary, 'Lord Haldane: His Influence on 
Higher Education and Administration, Public Administration, 
Volume VI, No. 4, October 1928). 
Ideas of value, he thought, were most likely to emerge f rom 
the universities and he contrasted the role he believed ideas 
played in creating efficient adminstration to the penchant of 
Continentals f or those same I abstract principles I (obituary, I Lord 
Haldane: His Influence on Higher Education and Administration, 
Public Administration., Volume VI., No. 4: 350, October 1928). 
Quite how ideas, differed from abstract principles' it was not 
clear; but again this was characteristic of the Public 
Administration approach - hostile to 'Continental theory' and 
firmly rooted in British pragmatism. In a sense it was this 
pragmatism which lay beneath the entire project of public 
service, and which gave it its 'coherence of vision'. For some 
however, the British approach was evidence of a complex vision 
of society, a sociological theory to match that of men like Weber 
(R. M. Thomas, 1978). 
Public service was also predicated on arguments about 
science and progress; a response perhaps to fears about the 
future direction of society. It was feared for instance, that 
modern industrial society might disintegrate scientifically and 
politically, that the human sciences were lagging behind the 
3 This pragmatic approach was also reflected in the style in 
which contributions to Public Administration were written. Most 
began life as lectures Te-livered to public audiences, and were 
written in a non-academic style without footnotes or accurate 
references to the written works of other writers. This continued 
to be the case up until World War Two when a more formal, 
academic and rigorous style began to be introduced. 
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natural in the race to understand the world, and that a world 
primarily conceived by economists and aimed principally at 
economic progress would eventually destroy itself. Josiah Stamp 
for example, was very concerned about the impact of science on 
society; in his opinion scientific discovery had no moral or 
ethical quality and it is easy to assume that every new 
revelation contributes to progress, (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 153-155). 
This emphasis on science and progress was part of a much 
wider debate which had its roots in the Enlightenment; and 
included a concern to understand what held societies together and 
what society actually was. In the twentieth century in Europe and 
North America there has been a concerted effort to try and 
discover the laws governing social behaviour, similar to the 
efforts that had been made in relation to the natural world in 
the nineteenth century. In Britain however, the orthodoxy has 
been that social theory has not achieved the stature of the 
European socioloy of Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto or Emile 
Durkheim. 
British sociology for instance, has been described as 
shallow, eclectic and methodologically naive ... distorted by the 
British impulse towards moralism and social reform... fatally 
immersed within the toils of domestic and imperial public 
administration, (Jose Harris, 1993: 221-222). While it may not be 
possible to argue that the philosophy of public service is equal 
to European sociology in its ability to describe the social 
world, it is nevertheless the case that public service in this 
period was emerging as a coherent set of ideas which attempted 
to order and understand contemporary society. 
The search for macro-solutions to the problems of 
administration not only implied an increasingly corporatist 
approach to political and economic problems but was allied to a 
growing interest in the progress of the individual or personal 
development. (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 155). In this way public service 
was concerned about society as well as the 'character' of 
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individuals; and an ethical framework for the Civil Service, 
industry and public corporations was envisaged which would embody 
these values (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 138). 
Graham Wallas's approach for instance, was socio- 
psychological, marrying ethics and science, and based on his 
arguments about the need for human happiness, which had been 
derived from his interpretation of the ancient Greek concept of 
harmony of the soul. Wallas's happiness as a basis for an ethical 
society, was not however, the same as the happiness of Jeremy 
Bentham and he 
realised that to aim at man's happiness in organisational 
life was not a guarantee for attaining the good of society. 
Nevertheless, the production of happiness would be more 
likely to achieve the social good than aiming simply for the 
production of wealth or other organisational goals (R. M. 
Thomas, 1978: 147-151). 
Lyndall Urwick on the other hand, concentrated on the 
question of business administration and came to the conclusion 
that the end of industry must be the 'good life, whatever the 
economic consequences. Human creativity was therefore, a means 
to this end (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 151). 
Meanwhile Oliver Sheldon in The Philosophy of Management 
(1923) argued that the 'community will, was necessary for real 
societal changes to occur. To this end management needed to help 
the community to become better educated, and until the day when 
democracy and mass education were achieved it was the role of 
industrial management to 'set the tone of national ideals ... if 
industrial leaders are self-seeking and devoted only to material 
ends national ideals will tend to follow a similar path' (R. M. 
Thomas, 1978: 152-3). 4 
Sheldon believed that it was up to the state or the 
I In the light of current concern over the pay and share 
option deals of the higher management of the newly privatised 
public utilities, this seems rather prescient. 
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leadership to shine light on other ideals in society so that the 
'Kingdom of Heaven, could be built on earth. This Christian view 
was shared by Stamp, whose goal was to build a higher f orm of 
society, one based on 'equilibrium, or balance (R. M. Thomas, 
1978: 153-155 and in 'The Administrator and the Planned Society' 
Public Administration, Volume XVI, 1938: 3-22). 
Harold Laski, G. D. H. Cole, Herman Finer and Graham Wallas 
located their analysis of the 'English, tradition of public 
service within a broader understanding about the future of the 
state. Laski and Wallas for instance, considered the notion of 
the 'positive' state and while Wallas concentrated on the 
improvements which had occurred in administrative practices, 
Laski expressed concern for the direction in which increased 
government control was going. Meanwhile Finer argued that state 
intervention and centralisation were not particularly recent 
developments and that it had been laissez-faire which was 
, temporary and local, and an exception to state control ('State 
Activity before Adam Smith', Public Administration, Volume XI, 
5 No. 2, April 1932). 
Wallas had elaborated on the growth of the positive state 
in his essay 'Government' (Public Administration, volume VI, No. 1, 
1928). He noted that all I the civilised communities of the 
world, were moving from a position where the functions of 
government had been largely negative to one where they were 
largely positive: 
Governments have come to be engaged not merely in preventing 
wrong things from being done but in bringing it about that 
5 Harold Laski pointed out that the positive state - which 
was the result of increasing legislation to do with 'vast areas 
of social life' - had led to a 'corresponding increase in the 
power of the executive,. In his view there had been a 'wholesale 
transference of control from Parliament to the departments' and 
that 'Parliament may legislate but it does not govern'. He 
concluded that the tendency was inevitable and the real problem [was) the erection of safeguards against its abuse'( 'Growth of 
Administrative Discretion', Public Administration, Volume 1, 
No. 2,1923: 92-93). 
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right things shall be done. 
At first his argument appears technologically determinist, 
locating the cause of this development in the growing complexity 
of human society which had 
[resulted) from scientific discovery. It is because the 
village carrier turned into a vast railway system, the 
miller's wheel into a vast system of electric power, the 
village moneylender or the private bank of the market town 
into the vast system of international credit, that 
Governments have found themselves compelled to be positive 
('Government', Public Administration, Volume VI, No. l: 1928: 
3-9). 
However, he also understood that technological development 
was neither inevitable or beyond human control; te. chnology could 
be shaped to human and ethical ends if the political will was 
there to ensure it. For example, in his opinon the railways would 
be more efficient today if there had been some intelligent 
government direction to the process of development, but Sir 
Robert Peel would not allow what he called I the torpid hands 
of the State' to interfere (Public Administration, Volume 
VI, No. 1,1928: 3-9). 
In Wallas Is estimation public service philosophy had its 
roots in the nineteenth century and in the administration of 
Britain's colonies. It was this experience, which he believed had 
been the blueprint for the positive state in general and for 
public services in particular. The administration of India for 
instance, had taught the British an important lesson; that 
recruits to the service had to be carefully trained or the Board 
of Control risked the ultimate sanction, the 'possibility of the 
disappearance of their Empire in Indial(Public Administration, 
Volume VI, No. 1,1928: 3-9). 
It was not simply the case that the East India Company had 
had to employ particular strategies to control corruption; but 
the experience of administration at such a distance, and over 
such a vast enterprise had provided successive British 
governments with a particular kind of expertise. The experience 
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had also drawn British governments into a series of unique 
alliances with a commercial company thus demonstrating at first 
hand that it was not necessary for the state to own an 
institution in order to impose regulation on it. The Indian 
experience also left its mark on individuals, on administrators, 
civil servants and politicians, people who would later influence 
reform in the civil service and shape professional codes of 
behaviour. 
For example, a major influence behind the reform of the 
Civil Service in the 1850s had come from Sir Charles Trevelyan, 
who had been a brilliant young Indian civil servant, and as a 
mature official had been placed with the Treasury to help advise 
the government on organisational matters. Trevelyan later joined 
up with Sir Stafford Northcote and together the pair, in the wake 
of the European revolutions of 1848 and the breakdown of the 
administrative side of our services' in the Crimean War (which 
had led to agitation for adminstrative reform sweeping the 
country) 'altered the foundation of the Civil Service, so that 
it was positive, based on what ought to be done, instead of 
merely doing that which must be done, ('Government', Public 
Administration, Volume VI, No. 1,1928: 8). Jeremy Bentham's 
outline of a Constitutional Code (1832) had proposed recruitment 
to the Civil Service by competitive open exam and special 
scholarships to prevent domination by one class, but it wasn't 
until the Northcote-Trevelyan report that these ideas were put 
into practice. 
By the late nineteenth century these ideas about the 
importance of administrative efficiency based on the open and 
competitive examination were linked to a number of developments. 
Firstly, there was a growing perception that industrial society 
would need institutions and structures capable of dealing with 
a high degree of complexity; the rise of bureaucracy and 
administrative efficiency in Prussia, as outlined by Weber, was 
understood as a clear response to this. 
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Secondly, there was the idea of science, and the need for 
, scientific government'. While there was some concern to create 
forms of scientific managment in Britain, there was also much 
scepticism about it. 6 Wallas pointed out that scientific 
management put too great a stress on economic incentives at the 
expense of other factors which were responsible for creating 
human happiness, such as personal liberty. ' 
Like Wallas, Herman Finer was concerned to place public 
service and the state in an historical context. In a paper 
entitled 'State Activity before Adam Smith'( Public 
Administration, Volume X, No. 2, April 1932: 157-169) he argued 
that before the publication of Smith's Wealth of Nations, which 
was so inimical to State activity, it was seen as quite proper 
for the State to regulate human activity through Parliament or 
the King. 8 In Finer's veiw it was mercantilist ideas which had 
begun the process whereby the national, welfare was elevated 
above the welfare of individuals; and that this had led to a more 
' Scientific management is generally attributed to the work 
of the American F. W. Taylor in The Principles of Scientific 
Management. (1911). It was Wallas amongst others who led the 
British opposition to what was seen as Taylor's over-reliance on 
mathematical calculations and the speed with which work was 
carried out. A British Government report Time and Motion Study 
(1923) agreed with this critique (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 13) and inevitably Taylorism was generally opposed by British trades 
unions. 
" Wallas Is concern about the ef f ects of monotony on workers in his book The Great Society: A Psychological Study (1914) was 
also given consideration by the influential Committee on the Health of Munitions Workers in 1917. (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 14). 
' Finer described how the process of mercantilism had led to 
the expansion of the state. In his view it was under the reign 
of Elizabeth the First that the State began to develop its role 
as regulator by using the Statute of Artificers which sought to 
regulate conditions of apprenticeship, choice of employment and 
pay, a system whereby Justices of the Peace were made local 
administrators. He noted also that by the end of Elizabeth's 
reign Poor Relief had been given a permanent administrative locus in the parish, and sources of relief were made an obligatory tax, 
while the Privy Council devised ways and means of supporting an ordered social and economic system. 
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active state, one which was engaged in permitting some things and 
f orbidding others, a process which of ten led to trade wars -9 
Significantly, Finer also believed that mercantilism should be 
considered a branch of administrative activity rather than an 
economic doctrine; and that it was only when manufacturing 
developments occurred at home in the late eighteenth century that 
mercantilism began to be seen in terms of an economic activity, 
and ultimately became obselete. 
Sir Henry Bunbury on the other hand, charted the development 
in the course of the nineteenth century, of a laissez-faire 
, individualistic, approach to the state; one which increasingly 
centred around the importance of education. Bunbury admitted that 
this was not a universally held belief, especially by writers 
like Sir Herbert Spencer who had denied that the state should be 
responsible for the mental culture of its citizens because 
society was a product of 'organic, development and not one that 
could be manufactured'. In Bunbury's opinion however, laissez- 
faire in the matter of education had not prevailed, simply 
because in the end even strong individualists acquiesce in the 
necessity of State education' ('The Economic Regulation of Public 
Utility Services', Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 3, July 
1926: 233-237). 
Public service, for these public administration theorists, 
had a strong ethical foundation, and this ethical approach was 
exemplified in arguments about service. Haldane and Sheldon in 
particular, anlaysed this conception of the ethical ideal of 
service to the community. Sheldon recommended it to private 
industry while Haldane recommended it to civil servants as the 
best way of fulfilling their duty to the state. Haldane argued 
that 'the dominant common object ought to be the service of the 
public in the most efficient form practicable. Virtue is its own 
reward here as elsewherel(R. M. Thomas, 1978: 156-159). 
9 Finer suggests examining Weber's General Economic History, 
Chapter XXIX for further elucidation of this point. 
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Haldane even suggested an esprit de corps based on this idea 
of service, an ethic which depended on the 'non-economic motive 
of self-sacrifice'. In his view organisations already exhibiting 
this spirit of self-sacrifice for public duty were the British 
Navy and Army; self-sacrifice being inculcated by education and 
tradition, a tradition which sacrifices the life of the 
individual for duty to the State'(Thomas, 1978: 158). 
Oliver Sheldon spurred the industrial management of Britain 
towards a similar goal. This idea of service to the community had 
gained concrete moral expression at Seebohm Rowntree's Cocoa 
Works in York and it was Rowntree's notion of community service 
by industry which Sheldon adopted. 10 
Sheldon divided his notion of service to the community into 
two parts: the first, management's relation to the community and 
the second, management's relations with its own workers. In the 
case of the former he associated three objectives with service 
to the community - that industry should create goods or provide 
services of such a type that will benefit the community; that in 
the process of wealth production industry should look to the 
general welfare of the community and pursue no policy that is 
detrimental to it; that industry should distribute the wealth 
produced in such a manner as to serve the highest ends of the 
community. In this way goods were seen to possess both an ethical 
and an economic value. 
Efficiency was not to be judged by scientific standards 
alone but by the supreme standard of communal well-being. In the 
case of the management's relations to its own workers Sheldon 
argued that factory life and life in the community outside were 
inextricably linked and there was no reason to suppose that the 
economic relation should have priority over the social; secondly, 
he believed that management must understand the various ties 
10 In 1918 Quaker employers including Rowntree proposed that 
business should adopt an ethic of service and the Rowntree 
Factory was a model for this (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 159). 
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workers had as parents, voters and citizens and that workers 
should be given more leisure time; although he defined leisure 
as Ischole, meaning schooling or education (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 
159-161). 
There was however a subtext to these arguments. For 
instance, both Haldane and Sheldon were concerned to prevent the 
Civil Service and industry from becoming dominated by the trade 
unions. Just as the concept of efficiency was to be used as a 
substitute for control or accountability, service it seemed could 
be used to skirt the dominant interests of management and unions. 
The ideal of service for communal well-being was to be placed 
before all other considerations. However, neither Haldane or 
Sheldon offered much in the way of practical guidelines as to how 
this might be achieved. Haldane seemed to put his f aith in 
higher education, while Sheldon never f ully explained how the 
'community will' was to be ascertained. Indeed, Sheldon rather 
assumed a 'consensus of opinion among management and the 
community on highly charged ethical issues, (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 
162). 
on the question of an idealised administration working 
towards the happiness and well-being of workers the influence of 
the Quaker reformers is evident; however, public service style 
solutions to problems of organisation and management also emerged 
from a number of bodies which included the Ministry of Munitions, 
the Industrial Fatigue Research Board and the National Institute 
of Industrial Psychology. Meanwhile, those writing in the public 
service tradition suggested a range of ways in which industrial 
society could be made more comfortable for workers. 
Wallas for example, stressed that unhappiness lay in 
monotony and the repetition of movements and that happiness lay 
in social groups, self -respect and non-economic motives (R. M. 
Thomas, 1978: 167) and Urwick focused on the importance of small 
groups; while Josiah Stamp argued that non-economic incentives 
were necessary for the establishment of a Christian order (R. M. 
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Thomas, 1978: 169-170). Service to the community, the alliance 
of the scientific with the ethical, notions of education, self- 
sacrifice, duty; the inherent power of ideas to change social and 
economic conditions. These were the principles at the heart of 
public service philosophy. 
It was the antithesis of a Marxist approach which locates 
everything, at least in the f inal analysis, in the economic. 
Indeed, for the proponents of public service, their greatest wish 
was to distance themselves from both unions and management and 
appeal to the community beyond such interest' groups. Economy 
and value for money and thrift were important but only within the 
context of wider human values. Industry was not simply about 
making things or offering a product for exchange. Everything was 
connected - society was organic - industry was important but only 
in its relation to the community. Traditional politics and 
interest groups were side-stepped and the appeal was to the 
organic community of individuals. In this sense public service 
was actually a rather individualistic concept. 
Administrators (in both state and industry) saw their role 
'as part of a culture of leadership' and understood that if they 
wanted to continue to occupy these elite roles they would have 
to justify themselves to the electorate. The notion of class was 
no longer sufficient for this purpose, but the notion of service, 
with its stress on human relations, was found to be a highly 
flexible and useful substitute. " 
11 Raymond Williams (1958) argued from the opposite 
perspective; from the point of view of those whom the elite 
groups sought to control. For him the idea of service to the 
community was no real 'substitute for the idea of active mutual 
responsibility,. 
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3.3 The principles of public service broadcasting 
In this context it is clear that public service broadcasting 
did not emerge in the f orm that it did by chance nor was it 
simply the product of the individual, genius of John Reith; 
although he was instrumental in articulating the BBC Is particular 
public service character. Broadcasting as a public service was 
part of a larger whole, an aspect of public service philosophy; 
and it is to public service broadcasting and its relationship 
with public service philosophy that we now turn. 
Public service broadcasting's debt to the ideal of public 
service is evident. The principles of public service included a 
commitment to efficiency in its widest, non-economic sense, to 
the idea of science and progress, to universal access, to 
education, to the expression of national ideals; it was to be 
meritocratic, expressive of the community will, and a civilising 
force in society. These characteristics were also descriptive of 
the Reithian approach to broadcasting. 
Reithian public service broadcasting spans the period from 
1922 to the end of the monopoly in 1954/5; and Reith, for 
example, was quite clear in his own mind that broadcasting was 
commonly understood to be a public service prior to the BBC 
becoming a corporation in 1926. Indeed, in his 1924 book, 
Broadcast over Britain, he described public service as an ethos 
first, and as an institution second. 
Although he was clearly influenced by the ideas of Sir Henry 
Bunbury and the Public Administration writers, it was 
neverthelesss, Reith who was instrumental in defining the BBC's 
institutional character as a public service (though his attitudes 
were largely shared by those responsible for policy making). 
Reith argued that broadcasting should be protected from purely 
commercial pressures; that the whole nation should be served by 
the service; that there should be unified control (or a 
monopoly); and high programme standards. These were views which 
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were largely shared by his contemporaries (C. A. Lewis, 1924; 
A. R. Burrows, 1924; P. P. Eckersley, 1941). 
It was Reith however, who gave public service broadcasting 
its distinctive f lavour. For him broadcasting had a specif ic 
cultural and moral mission and it was the unquestioned duty of 
the educated and cultured elite of broadcasting to enlighten the 
public as a whole. This involved not giving the public what it 
wanted, because few know what they want, and very few what they 
need' (J. C. W. Reith, 1924: 34). In fact, Reith's vision involved 
a definition of democracy which effectively excluded the idea of 
popular choice, in that it denied that popularity could be the 
final arbiter of culture (D. H. LeMahieu, 1988: 146-147). In 
Reith' s opinion only a monopoly run by I experts I or prof essionals 
could assure high standards. 
Between 1922 and the outbreak of war in 1939 broadcasting 
was therefore, viewed as a public service on two counts; firstly, 
because of its relationship to the public service institution 
(the monopolistic private company which was evolved into the 
monopolistic public corporation) and secondly, because of 
broadcasting's social and cultural mission, and its articulation 
of certain public service ideals. However, public service 
broadcasting was never formulated in specific terms, though 
aspects of what we generally understand by the term did emerge. 
For instance, committee members on the 1923 Sykes committee spoke 
of broadcasting as being 'public property, and as having an 
'educative' and entertainment value. They argued that the 'ether 
should be worthily occupied, and that broadcasting was 'an 
obligation and not a right I; however, they did not offer a simple 
definition of the term. 
Subsequent committees came no nearer to a straightforward 
definition. In 1926 the Crawford committee, which was responsible 
f or recommending that the BBC be set up as a public corporation, 
stated in its report that the BBC should 'act as Trustee for the 
national interest in broadcasting', that the governors should be 
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persons of judgement and independence, free of commitments with 
, no other interests to promote than those of the public service,; 
that programmes would 'never be used to cater for groups of 
listeners, however large, who press for trite and commonplace 
performances', and that programmes should cater for all classes 
of the community'. 
The Ullswater report of 1935 focused on the need for 
broadcasting to allow for the 'public interest to predominate' 
and this was largely understood as preventing the profit motive 
from intruding; and the Beveridge report in 1951 articulated the 
view that broadcasting should be regarded as a public service 
because it had a social purpose which was not for sale like any 
other popular commodity. For the Beveridge committee, it was the 
duty of the broadcasting authority not 'to please the greatest 
possible number of listeners but to keep open the channel for 
communication of ideas of all kinds, popular and unpopular' 
(Beveridge report, 1951: 52). 
Beveridge viewed public service broadcasting very much in 
terms of arguments to do with public utilities; so for instance, 
it looked at broadcasting in relation to the other monopolies in 
coal, electricity, gas and transport. In particular, the 
committee examined the question of public control, and considered 
the idea of strengthening the boards and giving them a more 
, business-like characterl(Beveridqe report, 1951: 164). 
During the Reithian years broadcasting had been viewed as 
a public service because of the public service ethos as well as 
the institutional nature of the corporation itself. However, 
although public service broadcasting was not historically 
dependent on the monopoly, or indeed on the BBC, once the 
monopoly was ended broadcasting's relationship to the notion of 
public service became much more problematic. Broadcasting was no 
longer tied to a single public service corporation and although 
the Television Act of 1954 instituted the independent Television 
Authority (ITA) as a public authority, ý: he introduction of the 
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profit motive and the end of the monopoly meant that there was 
growing confusion as to what constituted public service 
broadcasting. 11 
The Pilkington committee (1962) was the first committee of 
inquiry after the monopoly had ended, and this was reflected in 
its approach to public service. Pilkington was in effect fighting 
for a lost cause. It pleaded for a continuance of the old ways 
and stressed the fact that both the BBC's Charter and the 1954 
Television Act referred to the public service trinity of 
information, education and entertainment. Pilkington argued that 
the public service concept had always envisaged a 
service comprehensive in character and that the duty of the 
public corporations had been, and remained, to bring to 
public awareness the whole range of worthwhile, significant 
activity and experience (1961: 9). 
Most importantly the committee stressed that the concept had 
never been one which had been carved up by the various dif f erent 
interest groups in society (as was the case with some European 
public service broadcasters). 
The Annan report of 1977 signalled important changes f or the 
public service concept; changes which were developed further by 
the Peacock committee in 1986. Annan's approach, it was argued, 
was reflective of the fact that there had been significant 
developments in society. In particular, the committee had f ound 
itself faced by hostile interest groups - commercial and cultural 
- opposed to the current system of public service broadcasting 
and the cultural elites which were perceived to be in control. 
In effect the idea expressed in the Pilkington report, that 
public service should not be shared out by groups with 'a claim 
to communicate', was no longer tenable. 
12 This was and remains a dif f iculty with the notion of 
public service broadcasting. Public service programmes are, for 
example, to some extent what the broadcasters tell us they are; 
and as Annan pointed out in 1977, it is difficult to imagine a 
programme which does not inf orm, educate or entertain in some 
way. 
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By the 1970s therefore, the concept of public service 
broadcasting had begun to mutate. In Annan's view the Reithian 
idea of public service could no longer be accomodated. It was a 
rejection of the idea that social and moral objectives could be 
formulated, agreed and imposed on broadcasters and the public, 
or that broadcasting was af orm of social engineering. At the 
same time, Annan (perhaps naively) found it hard to imagine 
programmes which did not in some way inform, educate or enrich 
their audiences - in other words, programmes which were not 
public service in orientation. 
The committee also rejected the view that the real issue 
facing public service broadcasting was 'control' or 
accountability or that the problem was that broadcasters 
possessed overweening power to 'set the agenda, or define 
reality, . Public service broadcasting was reformulated as 'good' 
broadcasting, of which there were four requisites - flexibility, 
diversity, editorial independence and accountability. 
In the past, said Annan, a commitment to public service had 
sprung from a 
clear sense of what culture should mean. This was 
interpreted before and immediately af ter the war largely 
through the eyes of an intelligentsia within the BBC who 
shared the assumptions of those educated at oxford and 
Cambridge. But once commercial television was 'introduced the 
kind of broadcasting which both Reith and Pilkington 
advocated shrivelled. It was no longer possible to treat 
broadcasting as setting exemplary standards and providing 
cultural guidance from which the individual could learn to 
interpret and come to terms with his enviroment. Loyalty to 
the idea of public service gave way to a loyalty to the 
concept of professionalism (1977: 80) 
Annan didn't think that this was entirely unproblematic, 
indeed it criticised the BBC for what it described as 
organisational failure; and greater public accountability was 
stressed as the means of redressing the balance. 
In many ways therefore, the Peacock committee was building 
on changes of emphasis set down almost a decade earlier; and as 
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we have seen, Peacock offered a deceptively simple definition of 
public service broadcasting: simply any major modification of 
purely commercial provision resulting from public policy' (1986: 
130); and as we have seen, this definition fails to describe the 
complex ways in which public service broadcasting has been 
understood since its inception in 1922. 
This question will be explored more fully in Chapter Four, 
but for now we turn to the way in which public service in its 
next significant phase became linked to the development of public 
corporations. 
3.4 The growth of public corporations 
By the early 1930s some important developments had occurred 
in the way the public service concept was understood. In 
particular it was increasingly linked to the growth of public 
corporations, which were the dominant form of administering 
public utility services. 
Public corporations, had been developed in spite of the 
views expressed by the Report on the Machinerv of Government 
(1918) that Parliamentary accountability ought to be protected 
at all costs. Instead, political expediency and the 
practicalities of managing the public utilities in the national 
interest combined to encourage the growth of semi-autonomous 
bodies, boards and public corporations. More generally, as one 
contemporary commentator suggested, public corporations had not 
developed because of abstract principle, but because Parliament 
had been 'confronted with a practical situation in urgent need 
of amendment'; namely the demands of advanced monopoly 
capitalism, increasing competition and the globalisation of 
markets (T. H. O'Brien, 1937: 293). These conditions had led to 
the view that modern nations would need to rationalise their 
economies in order to compete on world markets and combat 
unemployment. The public corporation was conceived as one method 
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by which the needs of a rational, efficient economy as well as 
a democratic society could be fulfilled. 
Public corporations attracted considerable academic interest 
in both Britain and the USA (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 
W. A. Robson, 1937: Terence O'Brien, 1937: Lincoln Gordon, 
13 1938). As the conviction grew that the state should be 
responsible for relieving economic distress as well as for the 
commercial and industrial future of the country, public 
corporations began to be regarded by politicians of all shades 
of political opinion, as the most important institutional 
mechanism for securing the public interest in the economy and 
society. 
The Conservative Party has not only approved the principle, 
but has been responsible for the creation of the 
Metropolitan Water Board, the CEB and the BBC. Conservatives 
often argue that the public utility trust will protect 
investors from the arbitrariness of future governments and 
safeguard commercial management. The Liberal Party has 
declared that the public trust constitutes the ideal form 
of public utility control and was responsible for the 
creation of the PLA. Liberals discover in the public utility 
trust a reconciliation of public ownership with efficiency 
of performance and enterprise (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 
54). 
3.5 Public corporations and the public utility trust - 
questions of accountability and efficiency 
The simplest definition of a public corporation is a body 
incorporated by Act of Parliament, Royal Charter or other 
instrument of government endowed with powers and duties to 
provide goods or services'(Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political 
Science, 1991: 509). It differed from the two other main forms 
13 These writers examined a wide range of public service or 
public utility organisations including the Port of London 
Authority, the Forestry Commission, the Central Electricity 
Generating Board, the London Passenger Transport Board, the Coal 
Mines Reorganisation Board, the Agricultural Marketing Boards, 
the organisation of the Co-operative movement, the Post Office, 
and the BBC. 
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of public administration in which power was either vested in a 
minister or in a local council elected by voters for a limited 
area: 
The essence of the concept of the public corporation is that 
it is not accountable to a minister f or its day to day 
operations and therefore not answerable to Parliament in 
detail f or those operations, nor is it directly accountable 
to the electorate (Blackwell Encvcloi: )aedia of Political 
Science, 1991: 509). 
The public corporation was a variable constitutional form 
and was developed not only in Britain but in Victoria, Australia 
(where it was claimed as a significant contribution to state 
socialism, cf. F. W. Eggleston, 1932) as well as in the United 
States. President Roosevelt, for instance, when recommending the 
formation of the Tennessee Valley Authority to Congress in 1933, 
referred to it as a 'corporation clothed with the powers of 
government but possessed of the flexibility of a private 
enterprisel(Blackwell Encvclopaedia of Political Science, 1991: 
509). 
in the USA there had been a continuous and extensive 
political and economic debate about how to achieve the right 
balance of regulation; this was partly because of the American 
system of judicial supremacy and independent regulatory 
commissions (which were in marked contrast to the British 
tradition of parliamentary omnipotence) . For this reason the USA 
had developed concrete legal definitions of public service, while 
in Britain these had simply not developed in the same way. For 
example, Parliament did not have to satisfy the courts that 
certain conditions existed before public intervention was 
recommended. 
Until recently, the orthodox view has been that Britain 
lacked the kind of concrete analysis of public service that had 
been forged in the USA. However, as we shall see, this was simply 
not the case. In Britain by the middle of the 1930s public 
service wa's as concrete in theoretical terms as it was in 
practical. 
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Public corporations were extremely flexible in their 
structure and appeared in a variety of dif f erent forms. Some were 
a mixture of commercial and municipal undertakings, some were 
statutory companies under regulatory control, others were public 
authority undertakings or public utility trusts. (Marshall. E. 
Dimock, 1933: 28). Many were known as mixed- undertakings' 
comprising of private and public capital. Some public utilities 
were owned by private individuals (such as ferries) but these had 
largely disappeared by the 1930s. All however, had one thing in 
common, a strong public interest rationale. Using this schema, 
the Post office was a public authority undertaking, the railways 
statutory companies under regulatory control, and the Central 
Electricity Board and the BBC were public utility trusts. 
The power to establish public utilities lay with Parliament 
but it was Ministers who had developed important powers as a 
result of these new duties. Powers to set up public utility 
authorities were derived from Special Acts of Parliament, General 
Acts, orders in Council, Provisional Orders and Special Orders. 
In the case of the last two, Parliament had to conf irm the action 
with the appropriate government department. 
The principle method of creating a public utility was 
through the use of Special Acts, which were also known as Private 
Bills. These consisted of hearings before a select committee; and 
if the application was accepted an Order by Parliament was 
essentially a formality. This type of legislation conferred both 
a franchise and set down regulatory standards. General Acts 
authorised the carrying of public service undertakings without 
the necessity of special sanction. This power was given to the 
municipalities by the 1875 Public Health Act in order to 
establish water and gas supply where there was none. The London 
Passenger Transport Board, the Central Electricity Board and the 
Port of London Authority, were all similar cases. Clause Acts 
developed so that large groups could be adopted on bloc without 
having to pass act after act (Marshall. E. Dimock, ' 1933: 29). 
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Orders in Council was the procedure where companies were 
formed by Royal Charter as an exercise of the Royal Prerogative. 
The Privy Council authorised the incorporation on the advice of 
the minister concerned and with Cabinet approval. Until the 
creation of the BBC in 1927 this had not been used for many 
years. Provisional Orders were often used as a substitute for 
Private Bill procedure. The company or public authority went to 
the appropriate government department, where after a number of 
hearings and investigations, powers were granted or refused. The 
minister's action was later confirmed by Parliament as a matter 
of course'. Special Orders were similar to Provisional Orders 
except that they were a special administrative procedure employed 
by the gas and electriciy companies. Prior to the Electricity 
Supply Act of 1919 these would have been considered by 
Provisional order procedure or by action of Parliament. 
Parliament retained the right to reconsider these Special Orders 
but never did so. 
Pressures of 
, 
time and lack of expertise meant that 
increasingly Parliament had found itself delegating powers of 
control to the administration; as a result success for potential 
applicants became increasingly dependent on positive departmental 
reports. (Dimock, 1933: 30, citing W. Ivor Jennings, 'The Report 
on Ministers' Powers', Public Administration, Volume X., 1932: 
333 and W. A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, chpts iii, 
vi, London, 1928). This also led to a highly centralised system, 
one in which local authorities were largely stripped of their 
autonomy, despite the fact that there was widespread support for 
municipal ownership of the utilities. Contemporary observers 
argued that limited companies operating under a limited monopoly, 
such as, water, tramways and gas, were rather inconsistent in the 
services they offered, but that electricity, being a 'public 
service, offered consumers safer and cheaper services' than 
either gas or water (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 41-44). Public 
utilities therefore, offered distinct economies of scale when 
they were centralised as well as offering a national service. 
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Public utility trusts included the Port of London Authority 
and the London Passenger Transport Board. These were created by 
Parliament, which defined the principles of their conduct, 
stipulated the methods of choosing directors *and exercised 
ultimate control over their actions by means of the right to 
revise the terms of the Act under which the Public Trust was 
created; however, the internal management of these trusts was 
wholly independent. 
Public trusts took several forms. The Port of London 
Authority (PLA) for instance, had been established by Parliament 
in 1908 after five successive different forms of organisation had 
been attempted (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 46-47). 14 As a public 
trust it was distinctive because of the fact that its board 
members were elected (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 47). 15 The PLA's 
board had impressive financial responsibilities but had been 
criticised for being slow in action and administration, and for 
dues and charges which were oppressive,: and although, it had 
fulfilled 'the intention of Parliament that it should improve the 
Port', the contradiction between its commercial functions and its 
public trust status remained (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 48). 
The London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) was also a 
public trust, and was created to deal with London's transport 
problems; in particular, haphazard planning, narrow streets, the 
growth of the motor car and a growing population on the periphery 
(Dimock, 1933: 49). " Public control of London transport was 
14 Forty per cent of British trade passed through the PLA at 
this time and it was the largest of sixty ad hoc authorities 
administering harbours and docks. out of 177, ten were 
administered by government departments, forty-three by local 
authorities and sixty by ad hoc trading (that is, not for 
profit). 
15 These included the following: traders. paying dues 
(elected) - 17; wharfingers - 1; payers of dues; owners of river 
craf t; the Admiralty; Ministry of Transport; LCC; Corporation of 
the City of London and Trinity House. 
16 Nine million people lived in a 25 mile radius of Charing 
Cross. 
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first attempted under the 1924 London Traffic Act which 
restricted the number of buses for hire on certain streets. 
However, it wasn't until 1933 that the LPTB became a public 
trust. 17 
The establishment of the LPTB however, raised some important 
political questions about the nature of public utilities. Both 
Conservatives and Labour were unhappy with the way London's 
transport had been organised. Herbert Morrison (1933: 161-162) 
for instance, argued that the LPTB destroyed public 
accountability and invited lbackstairs, influence. 
At the same time many senior Labour members believed that 
the LPTB was preferable to any existing public commercial 
undertaking, although some were increasingly critical of the 
inadequacy of labour representation on the board and the 
insufficiency of public control. Their view was that the public 
trust might be a step towards socialism but the current form of 
control was not very desirable. 
17 The Road Traffic Act of 1930 imposed further restrictions 
and Private members' Bills in 1928 and 1929 attempted to 
coordinate transport under a joint unified management controlled 
by the principal combines. This was killed by a Labour-Liberal 
coalition at the third reading. Liberals wanted municipal 
ownership and operation whilst Labour wanted national control 
under a public board. In 1931 a Labour Bill almost made it onto 
the statute books - then the Government fell. All three parties 
favoured coordination but disagreed on the method of control 
which should be established. When Parliament met in the Autumn 
of 1932 the National Government secured permission from the House 
to bring Labour's Transport Bill at the next session, where only 
a final reading would be allowed. When the Bill was passed it 
differed from the original bill on the question of public 
control. The Minister of Transport was to set up a body called 
Appointing Trustees, which was to be responsible for electing the 
board instead of the minister. This body was to include the 
chairman of the LCC, a representative of the London Advisory 
Committee, the chairman of the London Clearing Bankers, the 
president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the 
president of the Law Society. However, unlike in the original 
bill, none of these were to be responsible to the Minister of 
Transport and disputes were to be taken to the Railway Rates 
Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 51-3) - 
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However, not all socialists were fearful of the erosion of 
Parliamentary accountability; some believed that financial 
autonomy for public corporations was 'wholly desirable' because 
it was a way of circumventing Treasury parsimony and that the 
relinquishing of Parliamentary control over day-to-day issues was 
an 'immense advantage' on technical issues, even if some poltical 
control was theoretically required . It was suggested that a 
system of advisory committees or 'efficiency audits, through an 
Audit Commission could best deal with this problem (W. A. Robson, 
1937: 364); and indeed, in the case of the BBC, advisory 
committees were routinely considered a means of improving the 
Corporation's relationship with its listeners. However, the BBC's 
committees fell short of offering listener representation and 
critics argued that they were overly dominated by producers, and 
vocational interests when 'control in the public interest was an 
essential precondition for the successful operation of a 
boardl(W. A. Robson, 1937: 364). 
The question of how to exert political control over public 
corporations was a complex one and was central to discussions 
about public services and on what basis they ought to be 
delivered. Increasingly it was suggested that the representation 
of the public's interests could be improved if rule by 'experts' 
or 'men with experience' (but not financial interest) and in the 
appropriate field, could be established. These experts were to 
be men with no political outlook (so MPs were excluded) but 
possessing of a 'broad' interest (W. A. Robson, 1937: 370). Experts 
could ensure efficient public services, because 
successful public services are more fully measured by human 
equations, by the calibre of the men who run them, than by 
numerical averages (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933.: 305). 
This idea of rule by experts was in contrast to Herbert 
Morrison's view for instance, that union representation on the 
boards of public bodies like the LPTB would improve political 
control. It was a conflict at the heart of Labour and indeed, 
democratic politics; raising the question of how the public 
interest was to be best articulated, through mechanisms which 
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created consumer sovereignty (as suggested by the Webbs) or by 
imposing worker control (as suggested by the guild socialists) . 
The Labour Party largely conf irmed its position with its 
resolution at the 1933 Party Conference that workers in 
'socialised industries, should have an effective share and 
control through representation on the boards of such industries' . 
Supporters of rule by experts, an essentially Fabian idea, were 
highly critical of this and thought it could not be pursued 
without endangering the efficiency of the enterprise and the 
interests of the consumer'(W. A. Robson, 1937: 370) 
Equally, it was thought that public corporations would be 
able to achieve public and political legitimation if their role 
was understood in terms of national needs. So for example, the 
CEB could be justified on the grounds that it was a source of 
national fuel and power supply, and broadcasting on the grounds 
that it was an element of national education. It was the task of 
the expert, the man of technical and financial ability, to 
understand and interpret this national interest, to Ideal with 
the appropriate independence of spirit with Parliament and other 
public bodies, as well as to judge between conflicting public 
views of the public interest in the servicel(T. O'Brien, 1937: 
297). Increasingly this was what was meant by public service . 
Decentralisation of power away from Parliament and elected 
representatives had huge political implications and would af f ect 
the way British democracy developed. For instance, nominal 
ministerial jurisdiction over the CEB was exercised by the 
Minister of Transport, while the Postmaster General acted in a 
general supervisory capacity towards the BBC. However, theirs was 
an lex-officio duty, with no direct, continuous control'. This 
erosion of ministerial responsiblity ran 'counter to the 
traditions of the British administrative system' and although not 
everyone believed that this fact ought to 'be taken as a 
condemnation of it, the implications were of great concern 
(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 60). 
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Some argued, f or instance, that although public bodies were 
still subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and Parliament 
remained in the position of ultimate control, there had been a 
huge shift in power: 
Parliament has in effect abnegated the right to have a 
Minister of the Crown always available on the Treasury bench 
ready to answer questions concerning the day-to-day 
administration of the service. It has renounced the 
opportunity normally provided by the Estimates for obtaining 
information on and a critical discussion of, every item of 
expenditure and revenue relating to the socialised service. 
It has denied itself of the privilege ... of compelling a minister to resign, or indeed, of destroying the government 
(W. A. Robson, 1937: 377). 
Parliament, it was thought, would need to establish greater 
supervisory functions and ministerial influence would have to be 
restricted to major questions of policy and appointments; hence 
the stress on advisory committees, annual Parliamentary debates, 
annual reports and efficiency audits to provide an 'informed, 
critical and disinterested' evaluation of these services. 
Ultimate government control, it was believed, could be easily 
reasserted during times of emergency, or in the case of abuses 
of power or dereliction of duty; (W. A. Robson, 1937: 381-382). 
Other commentators were concerned that in Britain 
regulation alone had not proved a conspicuous success I and that 
some industries, such as gas and the railways, would probably 
need to move towards some form of state ownership and unified 
administration since Parliament had shown a 
marked preference for some form of non-profit making 
enterprise either closely or loosely within the framework 
of the government, and hence free from detailed regulation, 
to the private company subject to restrictions and 
regulations which issue from government departments 
(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 307). 
The history of regulation in Britain can be contrasted to 
the USA where 'public utility commissions are expected to act as 
umpires in the clash of interest between the producer and the 
consumer' and where regulatory officials were considered special 
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guardians of the consumers'. Furthermore, 
the British public is notoriously fearful of monopolies, but 
the government has usually adopted the management's rather 
than the consumer's viewpoint; the American consumer is not 
particularly frightened by monopolies but he expects the 
public official to fight the utilities. [Public opinion in 
Britain] does not play an appreciable part in public utility 
regulation, but in America it is a force of considerable 
magnitude (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 309). 
In Britain I in place of vigilance there is what might be 
called collaboration' -a business for business sake attitude. 
Sir Cyril Hurcomb of the Ministry of Transport wrote: 
the hand of a regulating department should not and need not 
be heavy or blighting in its touch. It can, and should be 
a supporting hand... (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 307-308). 
Equally, in the USA it was easier and cheaper f or consumers 
to bring about investigations of public service companies. where 
in Britain an irrate consumer was likely to write to the local 
paper, his US cousin could contact the Public Service Commission, 
attend a protest meeting and so on. Twenty complainents, f or 
instance, could initiate a formal investigation. 
In Britain however, many believed that the establishment of 
public corporations would require clearer guidelines for control 
by the state. For instance, G. D. H. Cole in The Next Ten Years in 
British Social and Economic Policy (1929: 136) had suggested a 
unified agency within central goverment to deal with public 
utilities. Certainly it was felt that the granting of monopolies- 
and other forms of privilege could only be justified on the 
grounds that the national interest was being well served and the 
benefits passed on to the consuming public. Although it was also 
understood that where monopoly had been substituted for 
competition then 'paternalism instead of economic laws must 
operatel(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 315). 
Finally, there was also conflict on the question of how to 
value industries taken into public control, as well as the issue 
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of the burden of debt on newly f ormed trusts. Valuations imposed 
by Parliament had the virtue of def initeness and aI lack of 
fluctuation, but they also imposed a great deal of power upon the 
experts, the I arbitrators and engineers I; although, some were 
grateful that this approach had kept the utilities out of the 
courts and away from 'judicial logicl(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 
54) . Equally, there was the problem of the use of some public 
corporations as a method of indirect taxation. In the case of the 
BBC f or instance, the Treasury was exacting large amounts of 
revenue via the licence fee and it was argued that large prof its 
earned on a service wherein monopoly and other f orms of privilege 
had been granted was a clear case of anti-social exploitation 
(W. A. Robson, 1937: 383 and Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 304). 
By the late 1920s public corporations in Britain were 
increasingly viewed as more effective than any ministry of state 
f or the management of a publicly owned industry or services; 
while central government was seen as unsuitable for the efficient 
management of commercial enterprises and ministers were too 
subject to political pressures. Supporters of the corporation 
form of management stressed their independence and flexibility; 
and argued that management of these bodies, freed from the 
obligation of the management of a private company to maximise 
profits, would run certain key industries more efficiently and 
in the social interest. 
Boards were also seen as one way in which the increasing 
demand for workers' control could be dealt with. Direct worker 
management was viewed as incompatible with the normal structure 
of a ministerial department (and politically unacceptable to 
many) whereas the corporation offered the minister the 
opportunity of appointing people of different interests to the 
board charged with the management of the industry (Blackwell 
Encyclopaedia of Political Science, 1991: 510). 
Public corporations also of f ered governments distinct public 
relations advantages with their stress on consumer welfare. After 
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all, this was the first time that governments had had to actively 
seek consent f or their policies f rom the mass of the people. For 
the consumer however, the public corporation offered a degree of 
social justice by promising a system which would deliver fair 
prices and universal service. 
Although corporations were to some extent seen as a response 
to the dominance of monopoly capitalism and the demise of the 
influence of the small business; the decision as to whether a 
particular industry should be taken into public control was not 
based on any inherent quality such as natural monopoly but was 
a case of 
legislators establishing more complete regulations over 
businesses which the voters fear will injure their interests 
if public regulation is not sufficiently exercised 
(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 23). 
It was also the case that because public opinion was playing 
a more inf luential role in policy f ormation, public utilities 
could be created 'whenever Parliament choses to designate it as 
such or when the degree of regulation has reached the point where 
public opinion acting through Parliament, regards the undertaking 
as peculiarly a public servicel(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 25). 
In other words, public opinion as much as monopoly was 
responsible for the establishment of public corporations. 
Given that public corporations were acceptable to the three 
major political parties, each found that, regardless of 
ideological differences, they could view them as the 'necessary 
step in future reconstruction'. Differences tended only to arise 
about the nature and degree of the control. This was not to say 
that this constituted evidence of political consensus. On the 
contrary, the public corporation was viewed differently by each 
party. The point was that each party could accomodate the public 
corporation to their own particular vision of the future. Thus 
Conservatives were comfortable with a pragmatic approach and 
hoped that public corporations would be able to combine the 
advantages of monopoly without relinquishing all of the benefits 
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associated with private enterprise; and Liberals saw them as 
instruments to improve working conditions and to promote 
citizenship in a mass democracy; while Labour believed they were 
a step along the road to socialism: 'from public service it is 
not a great step to state trust'(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 35- 
36). 
The public corporation idea also appealed to the 
parsimonious nature of the Treasury. After World War One 
reconstruction of industry had been necessary but expensive; the 
fact that public corporations were self-financing and would not 
burden the taxpayer, was highly attractive to government. Thus 
for example, in 1922 and in 1954 when the Treasury might have 
been called upon to find money for the developing broadcasting 
infrastructure, the corporation model was easily adapted to the 
specific conditions required. 
As f ar as broadcasting was concerned, the idea of the public 
corporation also suited a number of important interest groups. 
For instance, the wireless industry sought a form of trade 
protection; the press feared competition from the broadcasters; 
and performers feared loss of employment and an attack on their 
conditions of work. Finally, the BBC as a public corporation 
appealed to the Post Of f ice because it had been reluctant to 
indulge in any further expansion of its administrative functions. 
The Post Office was already a huge organisation much criticised 
for its commercial activities, and was therefore, not keen to 
extend them. Furthermore, the Post Of f ice would have f ound it 
politically difficult to continue to exercise public control over 
broadcasting if it had remained in private hands. The public 
corporation was the obvious solution. 
Several other factors helped facilitate the acceptability 
of the public corporation. Firstly, the Parliamentary machinery 
was already in place to secure public control of key industries . 
orders in Council were used to set up the BBC and General Acts 
to set up the Central Electricity Board, the London Passenger 
78 
N 
Transport Board and the Port of London Authority. 'The existence 
of this machinery reduced the necessity of a wide ranging public 
or parliamentary debate on the principle of public ownership - 
instead, public ownership expanded incrementally piece by piece 
using existing Parliamentary rules. 
Secondly, in Britain there was a long history of autonomous 
and semi-autonomous forms of government which could be traced 
back as far as Tudor times and to institutions like the National 
Gallery and-, the British Museum (W. A. Robson, 1937: 398) . 
Britain's imperial history also meant that there was considerable 
administrative and governmental experience of such institutions; 
thus public corporations could always be viewed as I traditional I. 
Finally, the public corporation was a pragmatic and flexible 
institution which made it highly adaptable to new conditions. 
In the 1930s support for public corporations was ultimately 
reinforced by economic and political conditions, especially the 
depression and the need to deal with mass unemployment; 
increasingly governments came to the conviction that much could 
be achieved by a large scale re-equipment of industry and the 
adoption of modern production and distribution techniques (Sidney 
Pollard, 1979: 309). 18 
The political advantages of the public corporation were 
many. They pleased a number of influential groups in society. 
Investors (when a private industry was taken into public 
ownership) got a good return for their money, managers were able 
to achieve objective efficiency,, customers got good service at 
18 In fact, the period was characterised by the deployment 
of a range of protective and financial measures from government 
to industry; producer marketing boards were set up to provide a 
'statutory and inviolable monopoly' along with commodity 
commissions for wheat, sugar and livestock. By the outbreak of 
war in 1939 therefore there was hardly an agricultural product 
not the subject of a subsidy, and public ownership had extended to the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) and British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) . In this way the gap was effectively closed between government and the business community (Sidney Pollard, 1979: 43-44). 
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af air price, and workers gained more control over their working 
environment. -They were also extremely flexible and could be 
adapted to suit a range of industries and services. 
There were also some major difficulties with them. Most 
importantly there was a lack of democratic accountability to 
Parliament, because of the freedom they enjoyed from the rigors 
of day-to-day scrutiny by a minister. In particular, they were 
vulnerable to interest group pressure and personal influence and 
often failed to address the issue of consumer representation. 
Equally they risked becoming dulled to public need and costs were 
likely to rise (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 303). Financial 
autonomy and access to funding for capital projects were seen as 
essential requirements if the corporations were to be successful, 
and these of course, were rarely forthcoming. For example, the 
relationship between the Treasury and the BBC. 
Concluding remarks 
Crucially, the growth of the public corporation reflected 
the growing shif t of power towards the administrative arm of the 
state and the extent to which administrative and scientific' 
techniques of planning, organisation, management and production 
had become increasingly central to the running of a modern 
industrial democracy. 
At the same time, contemporary commentators, writing in 
journals like Public Administration were beginning to construct 
a theory Of public service. This theory might be I empirical, 
pragmatic and relativist' but it was nevertheless 'capable of 
true appraisall(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 301). Public service 
had a dual character. On the one hand it was located in the 
behaviour and ethical outlook of individual administrators and 
civil servants, men with their cultural background, broad 
outlook, art of management' . On the other it was located in 
public service institutions like the Civil Service, the BBC, the 
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CEB or LPTB. 
For these commentators 'public service traditions' were not 
to be equalled and 'public utility executives and others like 
them in the Civil Service and Parliament' were considered to 
'comprise the best part of an aristocracy which had its roots in 
the public service traditions of the privileged classes and the 
cultural opportunites of Oxford and Cambridge, . It was also 
claimed that public service had enabled the British aristocracy 
to survive because it had developed a philosophy which 
recognises that privilege means responsibility, and because 
'public service [was made] the dominant incentive' (Marshall. E. 
Dimock, 1933: 319). Public corporations however, failed to 
adequately balance the need for independence with accountability; 
and this has been an enduring problem for the BBC. 
The development of public corporations needs therefore, to 
be understood within the context of a long-standing debate about 
organisational forms, a debate which has sometimes surfaced as 
an 
argument about efficiency versus democracy, sometimes as one 
of public interest versus private financial interest. At 
times it has been variously fought out in terms of state 
control versus individual liberty, the rights of majorities 
against those of minorities, or of socialist principles 
versus practical success (Caroline Heller, 1977: 5). 
In this period the argument emerged as a conflict between 
those for whom Parliament was accepted as supreme and those for 
whom the idea of efficiency in management was what mattered most. 
Thus, although support for maintaining Parliamentary 
accountability had been reaffirmed on many occasions (from the 
1914 McDonnell Commission on the Civil Service, to the Haldane 
Committee on the Machinery of Government in 1918 and the 
Bridgeman Committee on the Post Office in 1932) the development 
of public corporations contradicted the very principle itself. 
In that sense the dominance of public corporations were a 
legacy of politicians from the left and right thinking in terms 
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of 'national development' and facing what they believed to be 
were the 'realities of advanced capitalist society in the early 
part of the twentieth century' (Caroline Heller, 1977: 6-7). This 
development represented a loose consensus about the usefulness 
of public service institutions; a consensus of opinion which was 
prepared to jettison the principle of Parliamentary supremacy for 
administrative efficiency and notions of national development. 
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Chapter Four 
Public service broadcasting and the BBC as a public 
corporation: 1922-27 
Public service broadcasting in Britain emerged therefore, 
during a period when the dominant f orm of public service 
institution was the public corporation, and in the context of a 
growing acceptance that the public utilities (as well as some 
departments of state like the Post Office) were both the 
embodiment of the idealised public service institution as well 
as the mechanism by which the ethos of public service was to be 
diseminated throughout the state and even industry. 
The Post Office, although not a public corporation, was an 
important institution in this process; the process whereby public 
service as both an institutional form and as an ethical or 
practical way of doing things, was gaining wide acceptance. 
However, although the establishment of broadcasting as a public 
service (particularly prior to 1926) owed much to the influence 
of Post office thinking, John Reith, the first director-general 
of the BBC, also played a leading role in moulding broadcasting 
along public service lines. 
It was also the case however, that Reith drew heavily on the 
pre-existing debate about what constituted public service and how 
it might be achieved. 1 Not only were there a set of well 
rehearsed academic arguments about the philosophy of public 
service, but because of the nature and origins of the concept it 
was also widely understood and had much support in Parliament and 
of course, the Post Office itself. Reith was not therefore, a 
, latter-day Archimedes, rushing off without his towel to set up 
1 This debate was articulated by the newly f ormed Institute 
of Public Administration (with its critique of public services like the Post Office, the Civil Service and the public utilities 
of gas, electricity and water) cf. Chapter Three. 
83 
something called public service broadcasting between a late 
breakfast and an early lunchl(Ian McIntyre, 1993: 128). 
4.1 The birth of public service broadcasting 
In his memoirs, Into the Wind (1949), Reith claims that at 
the first meeting of the first broadcasting inquiry (known as the 
Sykes Committee) he offered a 'personal opinion - broadcasting 
should be conducted as a public service and under public 
corporation constitution. It was not the 1925 Crawford Committee 
which coined either idea or expression, (J. C. W. Reith, 1949: 90: 
cited by Ian McIntyre, 1993: 128). 
While it is quite true that the Crawford Committee did not 
coin the phrase 'public service broadcasting, neither did Reith. 
Furthermore, there is no record of Reith having made this 
particular comment in the minutes of the Sykes Committee; 
although his 1924 book, Broadcast Over Britain, uses such phrases 
as the Broadcasting Company regards itself as a public service 
and is catering for the public interest (Reith, 1924: 57) and the 
, organisation is being conducted on the lines of a public 
service, the maximum benefit to the maximum being kept in 
viewl(J. C. W. Reith, 1924: 64). This suggested that at the very 
least Reith expected his audience to understand what was implied 
by 'public service lines'. 
As McIntyre and Briggs have pointed out, the phrase 'public 
service broadcasting' belonged to the American wireless pioneer 
David Sarnoff, who in June 1922 noted that broadcasting 
represents a job of entertaining, informing and educating the 
nation, and should therefore be distinctly regarded as a public 
service . Sarnof f had gone on to advocate the setting up of a 
'Public Service Broadcasting Company or National Broadcasting 
Company' (Ian McIntyre, 1993: 129 citing G. L. Archer, 1931: 31. 
Also in Asa Briggs, 1985: 18). 
In f act by November 1923, Reith was proclaiming that the 
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Broadcasting Company, with its commercial obligations to 
shareholders and British wireless manufacturers, was 'actuated 
by definite policy and ideals, consistent with which we are 
determined to make the broadcasting service of as widespread 
interest and application as possible. The BBC is a public utility 
servicel(Ian McIntyre, 1993: 130). It is clearly the case 
therefore, that Reith was using the language of a pre-existing 
public service philosophy to describe the nature of broadcasting 
as a public service. 
However, while public service broadcasting was a reasonably 
coherent philosophy in 1926 (a non-profit-making monopoly with 
a programme service animated by high standards and available 
throughout the nation); as Scannell has noted 'with the passing 
of time the concept has become more and more obscure'(1991: 4). 
This has been for two key reasons. Firstly, broadcasting 
continued to expand and develop its area of operation so that the 
old, Reithian description of public service no longer fitted the 
changed reality; and secondly, because of the failure to analyse 
the development of public service broadcasting in terms of the 
wider debate about public service in general. As Scannell states, 
the crucial event during the Sykes committee deliberations was 
the definition of broadcasting as a public utility whose future 
should be discussed as such'(1991: 6). 
The birth of broadcasting in Britain has of course, been 
well documented by the historian Asa Briggs (1961; 1965; 1985); 
however, Briggs tends to describe the emergence of public service 
broadcasting in terms of a response to a set of technical and 
financial conditions. He describes, for instance, how between the 
1890s and 1913 it became increasingly obvious to entrepreneurs, 
inventors and even the British government that wireless telephony 
had the potential to be more than a system of point-to-point 
communication; it could be developed to broadcast information and 
entertainment. 
Marconi, the electronics firm, were at centre stage of this 
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technological drive, although Briggs concedes that their ef forts 
were accompanied by civil servants who were 
men ... more interested in order than in profit. Market forces were not to be allowed to operate unrestrained (Asa 
Briggs, 1985: 10). 
In fact, this desire for bureaucratic order dovetailed 
neatly with government attempts to secure control over the 
airways' for reasons of revenue and the communication of 
official, including naval and military business'(Asa Briggs, 
1985: 11). 
If wireless developed around the twin poles of amateur 
enthusiasm and increasingly powerful business interests, 
international pressures also played their part. For instance, 
there was growing resentment that European wireless stations were 
delivering a service, which ought to be provided national ly3; 
while the experience of American wireless development also 
impacted on the British scene. 4 In particular, the American 
experience of chaos of the ether, provided a powerful incentive 
for Britain to regulate wireless development; and visits by 
British visitors to the USA in this period served to conf irm the 
I First with the 1869 Telegraph Act, followed by the 1904 
Telegraphy Act and between 1905 and 1914 the development of a 
licence system for wireless enthusiasts. 
3 Briggs cites a petition delivered by Wireless World in 
December 1921 demanding action (1985: 16-17). 
4 Wireless stations in the USA had mushroomed without any 
control but by 1922 regulation began to be enacted. Although 
British and American broadcasting developed very differently, the 
classic definition of broadcasting as a public service was, as 
stated earlier, coined by David Sarnoff, the commercial manager 
of Marconi USA. 
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need for regulation. 5 
By May 1922 it was clear to the government that broadcasting 
would need to be regulated. Marconi had a number of stations 
operating but there was concern from politicians and British 
wireless manufacturers, that it should not be allowed to develop 
a commercial monopoly. ' 
This was the outcome of a long running commercial and 
political battle between Marconi and the British government. In 
1919-20 for instance, the Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee 
[Cmd 777], had produced a report, which had considered the 
implications of giving permission to a commercial company 
(Marconi) to construct an Empire-wide wireless system for 
I strategic and commercial I reasons. The committee (made up of 
senior Post Office officials and engineers, politicians and the 
military) had been told to consider the question on 'technical 
grounds I because the issue of I State-ownership versus private 
ownership of Imperial wireless communication, was not within 
their terms of reference(Cmd 777: 70-82); however, the 
implication of the report's deliberations was that only a state 
monopoly could satisfactorily protect the commercial and 
strategic interests of the Empire as well as the bureaucratic 
interests of the Post Office. 
5 Godfrey Isaacs of Marconi and F. J. Brown, assistant 
secretary at the Post Office, both visited the USA between 1921 
and 1922, and in April 1922 the Postmaster General declared to 
the House of Commons: 
It would be impossible to have large numbers of f irms 
broadcasting. It would result only in a sort of chaos, only 
in a much more aggravated f orm than that which arises in the 
United States (Asa Briggs, 1985: 20). 
6 Though Briggs says that F. G. Kellaway, the Postmaster 
General was not opposed to the idea of a monopoly per se - just to a Marconi monopoly (1985: 26). 
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The Committee had concluded that if Marconi were given the 
opportunity to construct such a service, then an unfair 
commercial advantage over 'state-owned Imperial Atlantic Cable 
and the State-owned Pacific Cable but also the existing telegraph 
systems of the various governments of the Empire, would ensue; 
and that it would I leave no room for any further wireless service 
in or from the United Kingdom, (Cmd 777: 82). Furthermore, a 
commercial monopoly would hamper competitive activity and 
discourage technical research, as well as depriving the services 
and the Post Office of their best engineering personnel (Cmd. 777: 
83). 
Finally, it was suggested that in order to I secure ef f icient 
working, an Imperial system, by whomsoever provided, must be 
protected from interference from other sources and must therefore 
be, a practical monopoly. But a state monopoly of this kind would 
not preclude private enterprise in other spheres of wireless 
activity' for instance, manufacturing concessions and long 
distance traffic (Cmd 777: 83). Clearly technical 
considerations I were def ined very broadly and embraced political, 
economic and social considerations. 
In April 1922 the influential Wireless Sub-Committee made 
its report; a report which reflected the views of'the Treasury, 
the Foreign Of f ice, the India Of f ice, the Colonial Of f ice and the 
Board of Trade in its demand for a single wavelength, strict 
controls on hours of broadcast, the rights of government to 
broadcast its own communiques when and if required, and a ban on 
advertising. The Post Office's view was rather different, and on 
May 4 1922 Kellaway, the Postmaster General, announced in the 
House of Commons that British firms would be allowed to apply for 
permission to launch a limited number' of stations - in other 
words, there would be more than one frequency on offer. 
During May 1922 the various wireless manufacturers, in a 
series of meetings at the Post Office, hammered out their plans 
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f or a British broadcasting service. ' In the end however, they 
agreed that there should be just one broadcaster. On May 25 it 
was announced that this organisation should be called the British 
Broadcasting Company and by the end of the month agreement had 
been reached which satisfied all parties within the wireless 
trade. 8 Parliament was a little more difficult to convince, 
though only marginally; some MPs made speeches about free trade 
and there was a general concern about the potential problems of 
allowing a private company what amounted to a monopoly. However, 
The Manchester Guardian editorialised that while there were 
difficulties associated with monopoly 
broadcasting is of all industries the one most clearly 
marked out for monopoly. It is a choice between monopoly and 
confusion (Asa Briggs, 1985: 33). 
Thus was British public service broadcasting born. 
Government wanted to guarantee control over it but not pay for 
it; and the British wireless manufacturers wanted to secure the 
home market f rom, f oreign competition. The public interest was on 
the agenda but mostly as a sop to the amateur wireless 
enthusiasts. Briggs suggests that in the May meetings the 
question of public representation on the BBC board of directors 
was mooted, but the minutes of these meetings have not survived. 
The press - naturally anti-monopolistic - were generally 
compliant - they could see that in a situation where broadcasting 
was in competition with newspapers, it would be simpler dealing 
7 These included the 'Big Six' - Marconi, Metropolitan- 
Vickers, Western Electric, Radio Communication Company, General 
Electric Company, British Thomson-Houston Company - as well as 
smaller companies like Burndept Ltd. Briggs says that although 
there was a discussion about the management and number of the new 
station or stations, there was a sense that the major decision - that there should be a single management structure - had already been taken by the largest companies (Asa Briggs, 1985: 29-30). 
8 Briggs says that the first set of negotiations had been 
about the problems of business interest and the second the 
problem of the public interest, and that neither were 'easy to 
define to everyone's satisfaction' (1985: 32). However, all 
contemporaneous accounts of these meetings have been lost. 
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with a single company than an entire industry. ' 
In November 1922 the BBC began broadcasting. This event was 
followed by the fall of the Liberal Government and its 
replacement by the Conservatives. Fear that this would jeopardise 
the company's position proved unfounded, and indeed, the new 
Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, emerged as one* of the first 
political leaders to appreciate the importance of an effective 
broadcast persona (Asa Briggs, 1985: 38). 
In Parliament however, MPs were becoming increasingly 
concerned about the status and operation of broadcasting. Some 
were concerned about the legitimacy of allowing the BBC to 
broadcast without Parliamentary consultation or scrutiny and 
demanded that the Postmaster General take full control of the 
airwaves or the whole of broadcasting will fall to pieces as an 
education and an amusement to the people of the country' 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Moore-Brabazon, 19 April 1923, Hansard, 
Volume 162: 2441). For others the issue was the monopoly' 
(whether one existed and whether the Postmaster General had the 
right to create one) or the issue of payment for licences. 
These complaints rumbled on in the Commons until April 19 
1923 when the Postmaster General, William Joynson-Hicks, 
announced that he was I instituting the strongest committee I can 
get in order to consider the whole question of broadcasting' 
(Hansard, Volume 162: 2441). This committee became known as the 
Sykes Committee after its chairman Major General Sir Frederick 
Sykes and was to set the tone for all subsequent inquiries into 
British broadcasting - in particular it was a catalyst for 
setting down on paper what in future would be considered as be 
public service broadcasting. 
9 The broadcasting monopoly worked in the press Isf avour in 
other ways. For instance, it made the job Of imposing tight 
restrictions on news and sports coverage very much simpler. 
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4.2 Broadcasting as a public utility or public corporation 
The Sykes Committee ([Cmd 19511) held 34 meetings, examined 
32 witnesses and reported to Parliament in August 1923. While 
there was considerable confusion over the issue of the status of 
the commercial broadcasting company and its relationship to the 
government, as early as 1923, broadcasting was assumed to have 
qualities which required that it be treated as a public utility. 
This was almost certainly due to the interventions of three key 
committee members; Sir Henry Bunbury (Comptroller and Auditor 
General of the Post Office and guiding light at the Institute of 
Public Administration), John Reith (at that time general manager 
of the BBC) and Charles Trevelyan (Labour MP and Fabian) . For 
instance, it was Trevelyan (not Reith) whose opinion that the 
broadcasting service should be operated by the Post Office as a 
public service was added to the final document (Svkes report, 
1923: Appendix). 
In a section of the report entitled the 'Future of 
broadcasting as a public utility, broadcasting was described as 
a unique medium; it was a single voice reaching out to thousands 
of listeners, there were possibilities of an imperial or 
international service in the future, it was cheap and its power 
was described as 'holding social and political possibilities as 
great as any technical attainment of our generation'. For this 
reason it was understood that control 
over such a potential power over public opinion and the lif e 
of the nation ought to remain with the State and the 
operation of so important a national service ought not to 
be allowed an unrestricted commercial monopoly (Sykes 
report, 1923: 18). 
However, commercial monopoly was the key phrase, because in 
fact the committee 'held that the State must regulate 
broadcasting, though it should not itself operate the 
broadcasting stations'(Svkes report, 1923: 45). The report fell 
short however, of suggesting that there should be a monopoly in 
broadcasting; although BBC representatives (including Reith) 
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believed that there was a de facto one. Post office officials, 
on the other hand, stressed that the goverment ought to be free 
to consider alternatives. 
The committee also rehearsed the argument that because of 
spectrum scarcity the airwaves must be regarded as a 'valuable 
form of public property, and those permitted to use them would 
need to be subjected to the safeguards necessary to protect the 
public interest in the future I (Sykes report, 1923: 18) . The bulk 
of revenue for broadcasting would be collected by the state and 
ultimate responsibility for the service would rest with the 
Minister responsible to Parliament, the Postmaster General. More 
crucially, however, the committee proposed that a Broadcasting 
Board be established with an independent chairman and twelve 
committee members chosen f rom I public lif eI. The suggestion was 
that these might be drawn from the TUC, the Post Office, the 
press and the County Councils Association so that the public's 
complaints and proposals could be addressed and from whom the 
'public would derive confidence in the servicel(Sykes report, 
1923: 19-23). However, the report's definition of 'public life' 
reflected the narrowness of the political elite. 
Echoing the Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee of 1919- 
20 the Sykes report was at some pains to underline the fact that 
the principle of public control did not automatically imply state 
control; indeed, the report suggested that there should be 
'considerable latitude in deciding by whom broadcasting should 
be operated'(Sykes report, 1923: 23). Equally, control did not 
necessarily imply direct state intervention, though some degree 
of management of the service was considered desirable. 
By making a distinction between public control and state 
control the principles on which public service broadcasting was 
based were established: broadcasting was too important to be left 
to the free market but it was equally undesirable for the 
government to directly operate a broadcasting service; therefore, 
it was in the public interest that broadcasting be operated under 
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'government licence' but not by a government department. 
Government control would however, be definite in character' 
because it would be secured through the licence fee (Sykes 
report, 1923: 26). Other forms of finance were considered (for 
instance, through direct taxation or advertising) however, the 
former was a problem because non-listeners would be paying for 
the service, and the latter unacceptable because it would lower 
standards and make the service unpopular' (Sykes report, 1923: 
28). 
The service envisaged was a universal one, it would bring 
within the reach of broadcasting I the greatest number of people I; 
and comprehensive in terms of subject matter of an 'educative 
nature': to include entertainment, announcements of event of 
, universal public interest', important statements by government, 
debates in Parliament and other public bodies, speeches, 
lectures, sermons, information of value to the commercial public, 
weather forecasts, sporting intelligence and police warnings 
(Svkes report, 1923: 19-28). 
For Sykes the establishment of a Broadcasting Board was 
central to the attempt to secure the public interest in 
broadcasting (although one committee member thought that a panel 
of 'experts' rather than a board was desirable, and of course, 
Charles Trevelyan envisaged broadcasting run by the Post office 
as a public service). In the event it was Trevelyan's idea for 
broadcasting to be run as a public utility which was finally 
adopted in 1926, and not the idea of the independent Broadcasting 
Board with its stress on catering for the 'goodwill' of the 
public. 
In 1923 broadcasting was already understood in terms of 
public service arguments, although the precise method for 
delivering the service had not been agreed. The proposed 
independent Broadcasting Board, and the fact that it was not 
adopted, emerge as important steps in the process by which public 
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service broadcasting was established. The board had been a clear 
attempt to construct an institution through which the Public 
could directly express its interest in the service; however, 
limited the definition of representative' was. In fact, Sykes' 
most important recommendations were not put into action and it 
took another committee of inquiry, Crawford, to engineer the kind 
of public service institution acceptable to the key players in 
the decision-making process - in this case the government, 
Parliament, the Post Office and the BBC itself. In this process 
the interests of the public as such were increasingly 
marginalised. " 
By the time the Crawford Committee convened in 1926 the idea 
of an independent board had been shelved; and the public service 
idea in broadcasting had become inextricably associated with the 
experiment in public utility corporations at the expense of a 
system, which in theory at least, might have been more sensitive 
to public taste. " 
Between December 1925 and February 1926 the Crawford 
Committee, was given the task of considering the future of 
broadcasting with a view to making recommendations for 
legislation. In July 1926 the goverment reported to the House 
of Commons that it intended to take up Crawford's 
recommendations, that the BBC should become a public corporation. 
" In the wake of the Sykes report the BBC under Reith began 
to set up advisory committees in religion, spoken English and 
music, while the public remained unenthusiastic about the new 
service, which was considered too highbrow. Reith however, was 
unimpressed by the criticism. 
" This idea of the independent board surfaced in 1977 
(Annan) when there were calls by the Labour Party and the 
Standing Conference on Broadcasting for an Executive Broadcasting 
Commission to improve the channels of accountability between 
public and programme provision; and again in 1986 (Peacock) when it was recommended that in the move towards a full and 
satisfactory broadcasting market'(full freedom of entry for 
programme makers, multiplicity of channels, pay-tv) a Public 
Service Broadcasting Council would need to be set up to protect 
Public service programming (Peacock report, 1986: 159-165). 
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Viscount Wolmer, the assistant Postmaster General, speaking to 
the House in the following Parliamentary session, supported the 
move with the following speech: 
We are proposing no new thing because what we are doing is 
simply providing that a monopoly service should be subject 
to some government control ... I think there is general 
agreement that you have got to have a monopoly in 
broadcasting, and that the British system is a great 
improvement on what obtains in America... once you are 
committed to a monopoly, you are necessarily committed to 
some form of government control. We see that in every branch 
of public life - from gas companies for instance, to the 
Post Office itself - and what we are doing at the present 
moment is establishing something which is no more 
socialistic that the Port of London Authority. 
Wolmer believed that this state of affairs would continue 
for some time because 'we have not yet arrived at a condition of 
affairs where listeners can select their programmes with 
sufficient accuracy to enable that degree of competition to 
exist I (Hansard, Volume 199, Supply Day debate on Post Of f ice 
Estimates, 15 November 1926: 1563-1644). 
Reith had another explanation for the need to ensure 
centralised control in the hands of a disinterested body as the 
basic principle of the future; this was I security' . In his 
opinion the Broadcasting Company had created a national asset 
at once too powerful and too delicate to be allowed to retain a 
constitution which others might choose to operate on other lines 
and with other objects, (J. C. W. Reith, 1928: 40). It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that the experience of the General Strike 
in May 1926 had alerted Reith in particular, and politicians in 
general, to the importance of maintaining ultimate political 
control over broadcasting; although the Strike also elicited from 
Reith the classic statement of the case for broadcasting to be 
independent from government: 
The BBC has secured and holds the goodwill and af f ection of 
the people. It has been trusted to do the right thing at all 
times. Its influence is widespread. it is a national institution and a national asset. If it be commandeered or 
unduly hampered or manipulated now, the immediate purpose 
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of such action is not only unserved but prejudiced. This is 
not the time for dope, even if the people could be doped. 
The hostile would be made more hostile from resentment. As 
to suppression, from the panic of ignorance comes far 
greater danger than from the knowledge of facts. If the 
government be strong and their cause right they need not 
adopt such measures... (Ian McIntyre, 1993: 143, citing 
Reith's summarised diary 6 May 1926). 
The decision to turn the BBC into a corporation was broadly 
welcomed in Parliament, with the exception of Lieutenant- 
Commander Kenworthy MP, who argued that the extension of the 
wireless monopoly would rivet the country for another ten 
years ... the commissioners will be there for ten years... 
Even if they are archangels ... there will be the atmosphere of the Civil Service gradually developing in the 
broadcasting service. However well the Civil Service can run 
the Post Office and however well the Civil Service could, 
I believe, run the mines of this country, and many other 
great monopolies, the last thing they ought to have anything 
to do with is art, or the entertainment industry, or giving 
news, or an educational service. The service is going to be 
controlled by the Government. 
In his view the monopoly ought to have been broken into two 
or three companies to prevent goverment interference (Hansard, 
July 14 1926: Volume 198: Post Office Estimates Debate: 473). 
In general therefore, where there was criticism of the monopoly 
it was less on the grounds of the value of competition, and more 
to do with the maintenance of free speech (R. H. Coase, 1950: 141) 
In 1928 for instance, Reith described how criticism of the 
BBC Is monopolistic character had by 1925 'practically disappeared 
in the light of public knowledge of the Board's policy (of public 
serviceP. For Reith it was also the case that the 'notion once 
plausible enough to attract a measure of support, that programme 
quality would be improved if several broadcasting organisations 
were allowed to compete for public favour was no longer taken 
seriously (J. C. W. Reith, 1928: 40). 
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4.3 The BBC and the Post Of f ice - experiments in public 
service 
As we have seen, the transformation of broadcasting from 
private company to public corporation was a relatively painless 
process. For example the government was able to argue that 
because the Broadcasting Company had operated as a public 
service, then the transformation to public corporation was, as 
Wolmer had intimated, 'no new thing'. All that was new was the 
confirmation that the BBC was in possession of a monopoly of 
broadcasting. 
During the Sykes committee this issue had provoked a great 
deal of argument; with the Post Office reluctant to acknowledge 
that a monopoly might be in operation, and the BBC keen to 
extract an acknowledgement that this was the reality of the 
system. By 1925/26 however, the general distaste for monopolies 
was set against a growing and powerful consensus (which included 
Parliament, government, wireless manufacturers, the press and 
'public opinion') that broadcasting could not continue as it had 
been and that it was desirable for it to remain under public 
control. This decision was not made on economic g rounds (on the 
understanding that natural monopoly was an instance where 
competition would not work), or indeed, on technological grounds 
to do with spectrum scarcity; instead it was essentially an 
administrative and political decision. 
The Post Of f ice had noted that the basis of the original 
licence to broadcast had been the limited number of wavelengths; 
however, limited spectrum was not the only justification. There 
had also been a desire to cater for unremunerative districts, to 
facilitate simultaneous broadcasting (which would allow for 
better programmes at less expense) and because it made 
administrative sense; quite simply it was easier to apportion the 
licence fee to one organisation rather than several. This 
arrangement also allowed the broadcasting company to afford 
better technical staff, so that'better programmes resulted and 
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because it facilitated the broadcasting of special functions like 
speeches. There were also savings in overhead charges. Minimal 
stress was put on the desire to 'prevent overlapping' or etheric 
chaos (which had in fact been the dominant argument) and none on 
the need to exert political control over a potentially dangerous 
medium (19 November 1925: Minutes of the Crawford Committee). 
The Post Office, was however, firmly against the BBC 
continuing to broadcast without a change in its constitution. 
Equally, it was opposed to running the service either itself or 
allowing another government department to assume the 
responsibility. This was for a number of reasons: firstly, the 
Sykes committee had already dismissed the idea and secondly, it 
considered government departments to be entirely unsuitable for 
organising programme production. Thirdly, its view was that there 
would be serious problems of financial and political control if 
Parliamentary criticism of broadcasting was allowed and MPs were 
bombarded for improved services. Perhaps most importantly 
however, was its view that the role of the Post Of f ice was to 
provide the means and not the matter of communication 
(19 November 1925: Minutes of the Crawford Committee); and Briggs 
notes that the Post Office had already decided upon this course 
of action before the Crawford Committee met in November 1925 (Asa 
Briggs, 1985: 86). 
However, although there was agreement that broadcasting 
ought to be considered a public service and take the form of a 
public corporation, public service institutions could take many 
f orms; and it was on this important detail that Reith parted 
company with the Institute of Public Administration orthodoxy 
(cf. A. J. Waldegrave, discussion in response to G. H. Stuart 
Bunning's paper 'The Theory of Post Office Policy', Public 
Administration, Volume IV, No. 1,1926: 24-40). 
Reith argued that he had became convinced that the BBC's 
status ought to be changed because broadcasting was a public 
service and not a competing commercial company; and that it had 
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been on these grounds that he had persuaded the BBC board to 
support him. However, the lack of a commercial element was not 
viewed as an essential principle of the public service ideal by 
contributors to Public Administration. For example, the Post 
Of ice was a public service institution (although not a public 
utility organisation) and despite being a department of state 
also supplied commercial services to the public. 
the citizen must pay for services rendered ... and in some 
cases the services are competitive and the demand for them 
is elastic ... especially... telephones and telegrams. These 
are factors which clearly establish the commercial character 
of the Post Office (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1933: 121). 
Thus, the Reithian requirement that the BBC as a public 
service broadcaster, needed to be non-profit making, was less an 
essential principle of the public service ideal, than a political 
decision about the way in which public service broadcasting as 
a specific entity ought to be conducted. In this respect public 
service broadcasting was different from the broader principle of 
public service. 
The wider philosophy of public service, for instance, 
allowed for a greater degree of flexibility of organisational 
forms than Reithian public service broadcasting would allow. For 
example, it was argued that the Post Office's activities as a 
public service fitted into three different possible 
interpretations of the public service concept. Firstly, the 
principle that a public service could, in some circumstances, be 
an instrument of taxation ie. make a large profit; secondly, that 
a public service should be provided where it was required, even 
if it made a financial loss, as with the telegraph service (in 
other words, cross-subsidization was to be approved). Thirdly, 
that a public service could be provided on a commercial basis, 
just making a reasonable margin of profit; thus demonstrating 
that it was the flexibility of the 'public service, ideal which 
accounted for its popularity and usefulness (A. J. Waldegrave, 
discussion in response to G. H. Stuart Bunning's paper 'The Theory 
of Post Office Policy,, Public Administration,. Volume IV, No. 1, 
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January 1926: 24-40). 
In many respects however, the Post Office as a public 
service shared many similarities with public service 
broadcasting. A key phrase used by Bunbury for instance, was 
'service to the consumer'. This was the test by which it was 
believed Post Office policy ought to be measured, and the 
strategy which would, in Bunbury's opinion, bring universal 
benefits in the shape of a service 'within the reach of those who 
otherwise would not be able to af f ord it The Elements of Rate- 
Fixing for Public Utilities', Journal of Public Administration, 
Volume 111,1925: 53). 
It was Bunbury for example, who had established the 
principle that provision should be based on need; a principle 
adopted by Reith for public service broadcasting. Reith had noted 
later that 'one of the dangers to which public service working 
is specially exposed is misinterpretation of the word efficiency. 
The absence of profit-making stimulus and bankruptcy risk' sets 
up the idea that unless those on the outside personally see to 
it efficiency will not be maintained' . But, it was also the case 
that it was not that easy to I set up a proper criterion of 
efficiency, and misunderstanding of it in the past had led to the 
neglect of the 'human element in the machinery... there must be 
justice, but there must not be laxity -a fair day's work for a 
fair day's pay' ('Business Management of the Public Services', 
Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 27). 
Bunbury had given this issue thorough consideration in a 
1925 paper on the 'Elements of Rate-Fixing, in the Post office 
and public utilities. He had contrasted the idea of the 
'accounting cost of the service' with the idea of the 'value or 
economic cost of the service,; the former referred to actual 
costs and the latter to the value of the service to the consumer. 
For Bunbury however, accounting costs were a 'delusion and a 
snare' and Post Office tariffs ought to be set at an 'economic 
cost' or at a rate that I the traf f ic would bear I. In other words, 
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the idea of the economic was to do with the value of the service 
to the consumer and not about securing high 15rof it margins 
(Volume III, No. 1,1925: 50-53). 
Bunbury was also responsible for stressing the importance 
of cross -subs idisation as a principle of public service. He took 
the view that public utilities could be useful for creating and 
nurturing new services and suggested that this approach would 
enable services which had begun by being unremunerative to become 
remunerative. 
Telephones af ford a good example of this principle. All 
progressive telephone administrations carry their service 
into rural and outlying districts which are in no sense 
renumerative to them at the start, but which they believe 
will become [so) in due course ('Elements of Rate-Fixing in 
Public Services' Journal of Public Administration., Volume 
111., 1925: 56). 
This was not an argument for un-economic state subsidies; 
for in Bunbury's opinion, both publicly and privately owned 
utilities should abide by the same principles according to the 
laws of economics ('Elements of Rate-Fixing in Public Services', 
Public Administration., Volume 111., 1925: 58). Instead it was 
an argument which gave support to the principles of universal 
service and the need to establish fair costs for consumers. In 
short, universal service had social and economic benefits. 
The key issue here was public opinion. If the public wanted 
lunremunerative service to be given, then the public will 
probably have itself to assume the responsibility for the 
service'. Whether it was 'economically justifiable' to give such 
a service Bunbury believed that 
it depends upon circumstances. The service ab a whole must 
pay its way... [and] unrenumerative parts of the service must 
not threaten the service as a whole, rates charged must not 
be less than the consumers can afford to pay, and the 
provision of the service must be necessary in order to 
maintain a reasonable standard of amenity. 
The Post Of f ice Is rural service was an example of a service 
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unlikely to be remunerative, and although such services should 
not be allowed to threaten the rest of the Post office's 
activities, such a policy was Ia proper and necessary consequence 
of the statutory monopoly with which Parliament has entrusted the 
Postmaster General I (I Elements of Rate-Fixing in Public Services 
Journal of Public Administration, Volume 111,1925: 58). 
Public service, as it related to the Post off ice, and public 
service as it related to broadcasting were therefore, legitimated 
by arguments to do with the social benefits of public ownership. 
However, just as it was possible to discern the links between the 
public service idea in the operation of the Post Office and the 
BBC, it was also the case that they shared similar problems. 
These included the problem of too much bureaucracy where 'it was 
easy for people to lose sight of their main purpose'; the problem 
of restraint on innovation, a lack of respect for the public so 
that staff were often impertinent and incompetent' and a sense 
that the institution itself was more important than the public 
('Elements of Rate-Fixing in Public Services', Journal of Public 
Administration, Volume III, No. l,. 1925: 58). 
In structural terms there was also the problem of the way 
in which the Treasury used the Post Office and the BBC as a form 
of taxation. In the case of the Post Office there was a tendency, 
during national crises, to use the price of postage to raise 
large revenues, which is what had occurred during World War One 
('The Theory of Post Office Policy,, Public Administration, 
G. H. Stuart Bunning, Volume IV, No. 1, January 1926: 24-30). 
Meanwhile the BBC's licence fee had been used by the Treasury as 
an instrument of taxation, at the same time that the Corporation 
was starved of the money it needed for capital developments such 
as high power stations (J. C. W. Reith, 'Business Management of the 
Public Services I, Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,193 0: 
22). 12 
" Of the ten shillings subscribed by the listener only 
seven shillings reached the BBC; twelve and a half per cent went to the Post Office for administration of the licence, while the 
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As far as the Post Office was concerned these criticisms 
were part of a long running debate, during which demands were 
made either for the greater accountability of the Post Office to 
Parliament, or that the Post office should become a public 
corporation. Reith argued for instance, that 
many of the activities now carried out by government 
departments (should be) brought away from the Civil Service, 
and still more direct from Parliamentary influence. I 
consider a body, constituted much as the Broadcasting 
Corporation, to be suitable for the conduct of public 
services such as posts, telegraphs and telephones, pensions 
and insurance, power, transport and mines (, Business 
Management of Public Services', Public Administration, 
Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 30). 
This was a debate which culminated in 1932 with the 
Bridgeman Report in which the idea of setting up the Post Office 
as a public corporation was finally rejected, the principle of 
Parliamentary accountability reaf f irmed, and the telegraph, 
telephones and mail services were merged. These developments did 
not please future Labour Prime Minister, Clement Atlee MP, who 
was in favour of a Telephone and Telegraph Board which with 
considerable powers of independent action 'would do the 
trickl('The Bridgeman Committee', Public Administration, Volume 
X, No. 4, October 1932: 355) 
As far as broadcasting was concerned, in 1930 Reith, in an 
uncharacteristic fit of modesty, admitted that the story of the 
BBC was indeed one whereby I policy and circumstances I and not his 
own individual genius, had come together to I impose a public 
service character on to an organization of definitely commercial 
form, and how such an organization - so far as its working, and 
even its position vis a vis the individual consumer - was able 
to pass over into the public service form without break of 
continuity'. This continuity had been provided by the concept of 
the public interest, since it was the consumer who was implicit 
Treasury kept ten per cent on the first million licences, twenty 
per cent of the second million, thirty per cent of the third 
million and forty per cent of the fourth million. 
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in the whole conception of public service' and 'benefit to the 
consumer is the starting point of the whole problem, ('Business 
Management of Public Services', Public Administration, Volume 
VIII, No. 1,1930: 16). 
Nevertheless, the early constitution of the BBC had been 
'wrong', even though in practice it had worked I excellently, . It 
was wrong because it left listeners almost entirely in the hands 
of the company (which in effect meant in the hands of the 
wireless trade) ; and because only a breach of licence could bring 
an action by the Postmaster General, and there had been no way 
for him to ascertain whether programmes were reasonably 
satisfactory' or not ('Business Management of Public Services, 
Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 17). 
Despite this, he was also certain that at 
no times were the interests of the public or the interests 
of Broadcasting in general perverted to the hypothetical 
interests of the wireless trade. Never was a decision made 
which did not have regard primarily to the interests of 
Broadcasting; that is the same as saying the interests of 
the public ... Broadcasting was administered, as a public 
service from first to last under the Company ('Business 
Management of Public Services, Public Administration, Volume 
VIII, No. 1,1930: 18). 
Furthermore, he credited the Postmaster General amongst 
others, f or his I insistence on unif ied control I. It was this, 
which had, in his opinion, led to the success of broadcasting in 
Britain. He believed that the Postmaster General, and the others 
involved in the company's establishment, had been under some 
pressure to allow more than. one broadcaster; however, 'they 
worked systematically for one, and in the end they got it' 
('Business Management of Public Services', Public Administration, 
Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 18). 
Of the constitution which replaced this early, defective 
model, Reith argued, it was a type of ten used for public or 
quasi-public services. He thought it may or may not be 
successful, and echoing Bunbury, thought it was probably 
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'inevitable in [the] circumstances where State funds for 
launching or purchase are not available' ('Business Management of 
Public Services, Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 
19). 
more importantly however, the changeover from private 
company to public corporation had left the: 
administrative system and the policies ... unaltered. The fundamental prinicple of public service, deliberately 
adopted under the old constitution, and the determination 
with which it was prosecuted, decided the change which came. 
Under the old system, broadcasting had grown into a force 
of the first magnitude. That it should be defined merely as 
a vehicle of entertainment had never been accepted here. 
Conscious social purposes had been given to the exploitation 
of the new medium without, however, overlooking the 
importance of good, healthy and satisfying entertainment. 
The stewardship had been interpreted as carrying the 
responsibility of contributing constantly and cumulatively 
to the intellectual and moral well-being of the community. 
A fresh tradition of public service had been founded. A new 
national asset had been created ('Business management of 
Public Services, Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1, 
13 1930: 20). 
The public service broadcasting system did have some flaws; 
in particular, broadcasting found itself 'playing second fiddle' 
to the military when it came to the allocation of frequencies 
because of the continuing power that the Postmaster General had 
over the allocation of licence fees. This was because in some 
ways the Corporation's licence from the PMG is distinctly a one- 
way document. This is the natural outcome, on paper, of the 
13 Reith pointed out that the new broadcasting corporation 
was not simply a national asset in ethical or cultural terms but 
that the state had benefitted financially from the transfer. For 
instance, it had collected E2,925,000 in licence fees and only 
El, 786,000 was paid over to the company. The state also collected 
income tax on the annual surplus carried over for development. 
It also made money (f or the Post Of f ice) through the use of 
telephone lines for the I simultaneous broadcast network' . Finally it made money on the transfer of assets from company to 
corporation; as well as the revenue earning capacity of the 2,178,000 licences in force, a publishing activity worth at least E100,000 a year plus and expert staff and organisation (Volume 
VIII, No. l: 20). 
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statutory principle that the right to transmit wireless signals 
is a State prerogative, and is only exercised by other parties 
in the capacity of concessionairesI(IBusiness Management of 
Public Services,, Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 
22). 
Of the system in general however, he was fully supportive, 
arguing: 
I uphold the monopoly system, subject naturally to certain 
safeguards in the public interest. In some circumstances it 
is essential; in others, at least highly desirable; its 
absence is often unfortunate and even disastrous ... One hears a good deal that is absurd about the benefits of competition 
as a stimulus to ef fort. Some advantages of competition are 
obvious; at least equally obvious in my view, much more so, 
are its disadvantages in waste, undercutting and 
overbidding ... The very fact of monopoly is a stimulus, or 
at any rate it is so to the right kind of people ('Business 
Management in Public Services', Public Administration, 
Volume VIII, No. 1: 23). 14 
This statement was similar in substance and tone to one made 
by R. G. Hawtrey in 1926, who argued that public utilities were 
services where 
competition would be wasteful, while if left in private 
hands a monopoly would, or might be, burdensome to the 
consumer; therefore the State steps in and takes the 
monopoly to itself in order to secure the customer against 
exorbitant charges ... A prof it is not by any means essential; it may be in the public interest that some services should be run at a low cost (discussion following presentation of 
'The Theory of Post office Policy, by G. H. Stuart Bunning, 
Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 1,1926: 34). 
" Reith noted for instance that the BBC's problems in this 
respect were special to broadcasting, but only up to a point: 
'There was a policy of idealism even under the old commercially 
constituted regime' . He was aware that the notion of idealism was 
often ridiculed, but was certain that 'to 'give the public what it wants' as the saying is, a dangerous and fallacious policy, involving almost always an under-estimate of * 
the public's intelligence and a continual lowering of standards. Thus, 
paradoxically, it turns out to be not the monopoly system but the 
competitive system that is obliged to play for safety ... it is not insistent autocracy but wisdom that suggests a policy ... of giving people what you believe they should like and will come to like' (Volume VIII, No. l: 23-24). 
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Reith himself linked public service broadcasting with other 
branches of public service activity by acknowledging the 
contributions made by the Institute of Public Administration; ` 
concluding that while it was I impossible to serve God and Mammon' 
it was at least as difficult and vexatious to serve public and 
shareholders together' ('Business Management of Public Services', 
Public Administration,, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 24). 
In particular, he argued that Sir Henry Bunbury's 
Idesiderata on the control and management of public utility 
services I (Introduction to the Institute of Public Administration 
Summer Conference, Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 4, 
October 1926) had been 'fully comprehended' by the BBC's current 
constitution. These desiderata were: freedom from political 
interference in the management as distinct from general policy; 
disinterestedness and expertness; and Ian area of operation which 
is economically the right area'. To these Reith added two more 
criteria of his own: equitable and adequate financial 
arrangements and monopoly; and in his view there was 
'considerable interaction between these essentials - for 
instance, between monopoly and a rightly chosen area for its 
operation between expertness and disinterestedness' ('Business 
Management of Public Services', Public Administration, Volume 
VIII, No. 1,1930: 25). 
Where Reith's idea of public service parted company with 
Bunbury's however, was over the question of accountability. 
Bunbury recognised the need for a definition of spheres of 
activity' for representatives and for officials but Reith was 
concerned by the implications of this. In his view it would be 
11 Reith referred to one of your 1926 speakers' who had 
stated that competition was only best for the community up to a 
point; and another who referred to economists who now believed 
that the waste which resulted from unlimited competition was best 
abolished and replaced by monopoly under proper safeguards (Volume VIII, No. l: 24). Clearly Reith was well aware of the kinds of debates which had been going on in the journal. 
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difficult to exaggerate the importance of freedom from political 
interference in management as distinct from policy... I consider 
it most undesirable to have elected representation on the 
governing body of the organization to which the conduct of a 
public service is committed. Elected representatives ... should 
certainly be able to control policy, but only policy in a wide 
sense of the term' ('Business Management of Public Services', 
Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 26). 
Reith also raised the issue of the expert versus the 
generalist by arguing that 'disinterestedness is implicit in the 
idea of the non-profit making public corporationl(Volume VIII, 
No. 1: 28). Disinterestedness was at the heart of the decision to 
appoint Governors who were not experts or specialists, or 
specifically associated with broadcasting work, unlike in other 
countries. Reith admitted that there was room for manoeuvre on 
this question of expertness, believing that the crucial point was 
the position of the chief executive, for if the constitution be 
such that he has large powers, subject only to trustee 
supervision, then I think it is clear that he should be a general 
man and not an expert. If on the other hand, the chairman is the 
mainspring, then... [he] ... may well be a specialist, ('Business 
Management of Public Services', Public Administration, Volume 
VIII, No. 1,1930: 29). 
Finally Reith turned to the question of national 
broadcasting arguing that the British system of self- 
containedness under a State appointed controlling body tends to 
be copied more and more' and that 'no area less than that of the 
nation is really and truly a good unit f or broadcasting. I am not 
suggesting that this would hold good f or any and every public 
utility, but I do suggest that it should be the exception, rather 
than the rule, for any field less than the national field to be 
taken as the uni tI. In thi s way, I wi th admini s trat ive effici ency 
and public safeguards both provided for, we really come down to 
defining monopoly, that much abused expression, as the sole and 
completely inclusive management of the utility within the 
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economically right areal('Business Management of Public 
Services', Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. 1,1930: 30). 
Concluding remarks 
It is clear that Reithian public service broadcasting 
derived the greater part of its inspiration from the pre-existing 
philosophy of public service. Equally evident is the extent to 
which it was the bureaucratic and administrative interests of the 
Post off ice which helped legitimate broadcasting as a public 
service. 
The emergence of public service institutions like the BBC 
also underlined the extent to which the principle of state 
intervention had become less politically controversial. Indeed, 
a new principle had been established; one that asserted the view 
that in some areas rational administration (and sometimes the 
public or national interest) were best satisfied by public 
control. Control did not mean however, some kind of despotic 
government interference (even if critics have accused governments 
of this in relation to the BBC); control was about management. 
In effect therefore, broadcasting was largely understood as an 
administrative problem which needed to be managed by the state 
(but not directly by it); and public service and public 
corporations were viewed as a managerial solution to a political 
problem. 
Public service institutions were however, not a universal 
panacea to the difficulties of administration. In particular, 
public corporations like the BBC had underdeveloped mechanisms 
of public accountability, and were instrumental in the creation 
of a 'public service elite'; this elite increasingly failed to 
either represent the various listening (or viewing) I publics I nor 
was it able to keep abreast with changing social and cultural 
developments. 
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However, Bunbury' sI desiderata on the control and management 
of public utility services, which had included freedom from 
political interference in the management as distinct from general 
policy, disinterestedness, expertness, and Ian area of operation 
which is economically the right area, (to which Reith had added 
equitable and adequate financial arrangements and monopoly) 
continued to animate public service broadcasting even when the 
monopoly was broken in the 1950s. 
However, Reith's focus on the need for equitable and 
adequate financial arrangements, contain a warning for the future 
of public service broadcasting. Part of the reason why public 
service broadcasting has been able to survive has been its 
ability to respond to changing circumstances; this flexibility 
has partly been a result of the f act that each of the main 
broadcasters have been able to develop autonomous financial 
arrangements; the BBC had the licence fee, ITV the lion's share 
of advertising, and Channel Four was 'protected' by its financial 
arrangement with ITV. Sinc the late 1980s however, this balance 
has been under attack, and the future of public service 
broadcasting will depend upon the ability of policy makers to 
create conditions which will lead to 'adequate finance, in the 
1990s and beyond. 
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Chapter Five 
Public service, public service broadcasting and the question 
of efficiency 
By the 1920s, public service theorists were arguing that if 
public service institutions, as exemplified by public 
corporations, could deliver their services efficiently (both in 
human and technical terms) then the fact that they undermined 
democratic accountability, and the supremacy of Parliament, could 
be effectively overlooked; that efficiency could be an 
, alternative to control' (Sir Henry Bunbury, 'Efficiency as an 
Alternative to Control,, Public Administration, Volume VI, No. 2, 
1928). 
However, this idea that it was acceptable or desirable for 
efficiency to replace political control or accountability was 
highly controversial and part of a longer term political debate 
about how mass industrialised democracies ought to be organised, 
and in whose interests. In fact, the idea of administrative 
ef f iciency was not a new one. From 165 B. C. Chinese officials had 
been I selected by examination and Chinese administration was 
familiar with notions of seniority, merit ratings, official 
statistics and written reports' (Martin Albrow, 1970: 16). 
However, the question of whether efficiency could, or should, act 
as a substitute for accountability was a problem for modern 
democratic societies, and in particular a problem for the 
operation of public services. 
The goal of ef f iciency in the management of public services, 
has been further complicated because historically there has been 
little agreement on what efficiency might entail. For some 
efficiency was used to extol the virtues of state control (for 
example Reith argued that centralised, monopolistic control of 
broadcasting was more efficient than competition); for others 
efficiency implied the need for market forces and for stringent 
fiscal measures (Peacock report, 1986). However, by the 1920s 
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public service theorists were interpreting efficiency as having 
a clear social or human dimension; so that an efficient service 
was one which served the public interest. This was to be 
particularly true of public service broadcasting; although, in 
communications (the mail, telecommunications and railways) 
efficiency was, as we shall see, viewed rather differently. 
5.1 Efficiency in communications 
Efficiency had been an important rationale in communications 
from the early days of the Royal Mail to the era of 
telecommunications. However, in the case of the Post Off ice and 
the Royal Mail the emphasis was on economic efficiency - how to 
provide a cost effective service which was also able to 
distribute low cost benefits to the greatest number of 
subscribers as possible - rather than the non-economic concepts 
of public interest which were associated with the-establishment 
of broadcasting. 
Debates about efficiency had also been dominant in 
telecommunications since the late nineteenth century, and in both 
cases these arguments about efficiency in communications engaged 
with debates about the relative merits of the state and monopoly 
as opposed to the private sector and competition, in the 
efficient management of the service. In telecommunications these 
debates survived privatisation in the 1980s and have remained at 
the heart of the wider debate about public service (Nicholas 
Garnham, Mathieu Joosten and Jenny Owen, 1994: 41). 
Telecommunications policy was initially shaped by the 
experience of Indian colonial administration. Here a state 
controlled telegraph monopoly was defended on the grounds of 
efficiencies stemming from unified control and planning and the 
externalities which flowed from low tariffs and thus 
affordability. By the time the Telegraphs Act (1863) was passed 
a number of characteristics of a public service had been agreed 
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upon. These included non-discriminatorary access, uniform 
published tariffs, rate averaging, tariff regulation and 
affordability. 
As far as the telegraph was concerned the decision to 
nationalise as a state monopoly was taken on the grounds of 
business pressure, and not ideological preference. Business 
argued for instance, that under the control of the state the 
telegraph would develop a national infrastructure and be able to 
compete on international markets, as well as provide affordable, 
universally available service. The stress however, was on the 
very public nature of the service to be undertaken. 
Telephony developed in a climate where efficiency arguments 
were used to justify intervention on economic and political 
grounds. Initially however, telephony was viewed almost as a 
luxury, one which ought to be regarded as a normal commercial 
business, whether run by the state or not. This was unlike postal 
and telegraph facilities, which because of their public 
importance, could be provided (at least in part) out of tax 
revenue. There were therefore, important distinctions to be made 
between different public services - some ought to be profit 
making, some need not, and control by the state was not the 
deciding factor. 
This was an important point as f ar as the development of the 
theory of public service was concerned. For example, it was 
considered quite acceptable f or public services like the Post 
Office to operate, to some degree, as commercial organisations 
without compromising their public service character (G. H. Stuart 
Bunning, 'The Theory of Post Office Policy'' Public 
Administration, Volume IV, No. 1, January 1926: 24-40). 
This mirrors current debates about the public service f uture 
of the Post Office and the question of the BBC's commercial 
activities. Some have argued for instance, that commercial 
interests are incompatible with public service; however, in the 
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1920s it was accepted that some public services would have a 
commercial element and this was not incompatible with the idea 
of regulation in the public interest, or indeed public ownership. 
5.2 National efficiency and imperialism 
At the turn of the century ef f iciency was also linked to 
support for imperialism; and while imperialism and the Boer War 
were to split the Fabians and I divide the Liberal Party into 
fragments' (Carole Seymour-Jones, 1993: 245) the idea of 
efficiency remained important and one which was used to 
legitimate Britain's imperial role. Sidney Webb for instance, 
coined the term 'national efficiency'(1901) and advised the 
Liberals to become a party of National Efficiency; a party which 
could 'clear the slums, abolish sweated trades, eliminate 
inefficiency in government, restore British commercial supremacy, 
adopt policies of ref orm. in housing, sanitation, poor law and 
education, and ensure the rearing of an Imperial racel(Harold 
Perkin, 1989: 158). 
In 1902 the Webbs set up the Co-Ef f icients Dining Club, 
which it was hoped would be the think-tank behind this new party 
of national efficiency. The club was composed of 'experts 
sympathetic to imperialism, (Carole Seymour-Jones, 1993: 260) but 
didn't survive Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign of 1908. ' 
Later the Webbs were to back the Liberal imperialists, known as 
the 'Limps, and who included Lord Roseberry, H. H. Asquity, 
R. B. Haldane and Sir Edward Grey. This Liberal League, a party 
within a party, lobbied for a combination of imperialism and 
1 These were R. B. Haldane for law, Sir Edward Grey for 
foreign policy, H. J. Mckinder (the inventor of geopolitics), Sir 
Clinton Dawkins for finance, W. A. S. Hewins, director of the new 
London School of Economics, Leopold Maxse editor of The Nation, 
a patriotic journal, Carlyon Bellairs for naval questions, 
Leopold Amery of The Times for army reform, William Pember 
Reeves, agent general of New Zealand for the colonies, Sidney 
Webb for local government, H. G. Wells for literature and Bertrand 
Russell for science (who left repelled by their imperialism). 
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social reform, as did Conservative politician and Colonial 
Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, who was in favour of using 
imperialism (tariff reform and imperial preference) to unify the 
empire and provide the finance for social reforms such as old age 
pensions. 
The concept of national ef f iciency had great merit from the 
point of view of all political parties. Conservatives viewed it 
in terms of social stability, to prevent discontent and 
revolution and a means of protecting private property; Liberals 
saw it in moral and technocratic terms, as the right of every 
citizen to the basic necessities of life, to protection from the 
more harmful effects of industrialisation and urban life, to a 
fairer start in education and health. This was not simply because 
it was more just, but for the sake of the economic, political and 
military survival of the nation (Harold Perkin, 1989: 139-140). 
National efficiency also appealed to the self-interest of 
all three major classes. 
To the traditional landed class and its military off -shoots, 
worried lest an urbanised industrial society should not be 
able to defend itself against the vast conscript armies of 
the continental powers, it offered an answer ... To the 
capitalists concerned about the declining competitiveness 
of British industry and trade and the increasing bitterness 
of industrial relations, it offered the prospect of fitter, 
healthier and better trained and educated workers, and the 
hope of more harmonious conditions in the workplace. To the 
working class it offered a larger and more rapid progress 
towards social improvement an a fairer society than they 
could have achieved by their own unaided efforts (Perkin, 
1989: 159-160). 
Prior to the outbreak of World War One theref ore, ef f iciency 
was understood in terms of national survival as well as social 
reform. The war had ushered in a greater degree of state control 
and national efficiency, than had existed before, but most of 
these measures were reversed in 1918. However, by the 1920s the 
idea of ef f iciency had been absorbed more completely into the 
political mainstream and was increasingly associated with the 
developing philosophy of public service. 
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5.3 Efficiency and public administration 
In 1923 Lord Haldane's opening presidential address to the 
Royal Institute of Public Administration described British public 
administration philosophy as 'a science and an art' . For Haldane, 
the appeal of a public service career was 'performing service to 
the public', while the stated aim of the newly launched Journal 
of Public Administration was to be the I ef f iciency of public 
services and the efficiency of public servants' (Journal of Public 
Administration, 1923, Volume 1, No. 1: 3). 
Haldane argued that in administration 'what must be sought 
is efficiency and economy', but that these ought to be measured 
in terms of human consequences as well as economic ones. 
Administration is the product of civilization. We must act 
like the captains of industry ... but without relying solely 
or even mainly on the profit motive, as they do, because 
there are powerful incentives such as patriotism and honour 
which can be made to have an even greater appeal (journal 
of Public Administration, 1923, Volume 1, No. 1) 
This peculiarly British definition of efficiency has been 
described as 'cultural-humanistic' as opposed to the American, 
which is viewed as 'computer-behaviourall (Marshall. E. Dimock, 
1978: xii). The British perspective was liberal, because it 
depended on ideas of rationality in both the administration and 
the citizenry, because it 'put its trust in democracy, and 
, distrusted the expert'; and because it focused on the efficacy 
of 'reserved' power as opposed to concentrated power; and was 
, underpinned by a faith in the power of improvisation and self- 
reliance and a trust in character and honour more than 
techniquel(Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xii). 
The American approach on the other hand was much influenced 
by F. W. Taylor's influential ideas about scientific management. 
In the USA public administration had tended to look for 
, scientific, solutions to the problems of administration and 
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2 industry. In other words efficiency bore a greater relationship 
to the need for economy and for commercial considerations. This 
was different from Britain where there was an attempt 
to unite scientific thinking with ethical thinking; the 
British administration was not either a science nor an end 
in itself, instead it was a means of achieving a higher form 
of civilisation by upholding the ethic of service to the 
community (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 11) 
This was not to say that the British were never concerned 
by narrower and more technical definitions of economy and 
ef f iency, because clearly they were. It was just that in Britain 
the context was different. In the United States, the goals of 
economy and efficiency were seen as synonymous with scientific 
management and the country had been pervaded by an efficiency 
craze'. 
In Britain in particular, the goal of technical or 
productive efficiency had come up against the obsession with 
bureaucracy. In this sense the British had an alternative 
'craze'; the fear of bureaucracy (R. M. Thomas, 1978: 19) .3 
ironically it was partly due to the fear of bureaucracy that more 
mechanistic approaches to efficiency were suppressed and 
humanistic ones embraced. 
2 In the USA F. W. Taylor is credited with establishing the 
scientific study of business administration with his book The 
Principles of Scientific Management (1911). In Britain on the 
other hand there was much scepticism about the possibility of 
purely scientific responses to human problems. Cf. Harry 
Braverman and the industrial pessimists cited in Collins et al., 
The Economics of Television, London, Croom Helm., 1987. 
3 The war on 'red-tape, is revived from time to time, most 
recently in the 1980s and 90s under the Conservatives - The latest attempt was led by the deputy prime minister, Michael Heseltine 
in August 1995, in an attempt to boost the Conservative's 
standing in the opinion polls. More generally, however, the 
distrust of bureaucracy can be linked to the long-term debate 
aobut the role of the administration in modern states and the 
threat they pose to democratic accountability. 
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5.4 Efficiency in public services 
Sir Henry Bunbury, writing in a special edition of Public 
Administration, devoted to a discussion of the question of 
efficiency in public services, wrote that the issue of efficiency 
versus 'control, or political accountability was the most 
important element of British administration theory ('Efficiency 
as an Alternative to Control', Public Administration, Volume VI, 
No. 2,1928: 97). Bunbury believed that in the USA the debate was 
understood in terms of integration versus disintegration; ' and 
in his view, both systems carried a risk. In the case of the 
integrationists, there was the possibility of a paralysis of 
initiative and enterprise; and in the case of disintegrationists, 
the evils of political graft' must be avoided ('Efficiency as 
an Alternative to Control,, Public Administration, Volume VI, 
No. 2,1928: 98). 
Bunbury believed that control could operate in three main 
ways. It could be protective, that is external to the unit which 
it operated, balancing one lot of users against another; it could 
be co-ordinative, by securing consistency of performance; and it 
could be directive by being concerned with efficient performance 
and right decisions. Bunbury's main concern was with this latter 
area, of securing good organisation, efficient performance and 
right decisions ('Efficiency as an Alternative to Control,, 
Public Administration, Volume VI, No. 2,1928: 98-9). 
For Bunbury the key issues were firstly, whether efficiency 
or orderliness can be bought at too high a price and is not a 
4 Integration was the idea of administrative hierarchy and 
disintegration the view that administrative units operated 
independently subject only to their responsibility to the 
electorate. An example of integration was a Medical officer 
responsible to his Medical Council. An example of disintegration 
was a Medical Officer elected to his post for five years and 
answerable to the electorate at the end of this period. Advocates 
of the latter believed it exemplified the theory and practice of 
American political thought which abominated hierarchy and that it was also more efficient ('Efficiency as an Alternative to 
Control', Public Administration, Volume VI, No. 2,1928: 98). 
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primary desideratal and that it results in too much control. He 
did not think efficiency and accountability were incompatible, 
just that sometimes it was a question of either or and not both 
at the same time (Ibid: 96). And secondly, there was the question 
of a definition of efficiency. In the USA efficiency was linked 
to scientific management and engineering conceptions of 
efficiency; in British public services efficiency was also 
measured by the use of 'objective standards' however, there was 
also an element of 'personal judgement' and 'argument and 
observationl(Ibid: 99-103). In short, Bunbury appeared to take 
the view that there would be more efficiency with less control. 
Using the example of the relationship between Parliament, 
the government and the BBC, Bunbury argued that 'here we have a 
definite experiment in relaxing Parliamentary control, and if it 
is to succeed it can only be through the proved efficiency of the 
Corporation in discharging its functions, (Ibid: 104-105). In 
other words that a loss of Parliamentary control over public 
services was acceptable on the grounds of efficiency. 
Other contributors to the debate about efficiency in this 
1928 edition of Public Administration were more cautious than 
Bunbury. A. J. Waldegrave for instance, feared that the loss of 
accountability, even if there were efficiency gains, would lead 
to authoritarianism; quoting William Blake, he argued that 'hell 
is inhabited by those who having no passions themselves, spend 
their lives curbing and governing those of other people, 
(discussion following presentation of Sir Henry Bunbury's paper, 
'Efficiency as an Alternative to Control,, Public Administration, 
Volume VI, No. 2,1928: 112). Others pointed out that support for 
more efficiency did not mean support for the American system of 
scientific management which was 'machine like in conception and 
in-human in its operation' (Mr Elvin of the National Union of 
Clerks in discussion following presentation of Sir Henry 
Bunbury's paper, 'Efficiency as an Alternative to Control', 
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Public Administration, Volume VI, No. 2,1928: 113). ' 
Some disagreed with Bunburyl s view that there would be more 
efficiency with less control. Mr Platts, the County Clerk from 
Cornwall, thought that the English Civil Service was efficient 
because there was control, and J. H. Rothwell, Town Clerk of 
Brighton, thought that Bunbury was giving too much credit to 
American ideas, but that in local authorities too much control 
had resulted in the inhibition of initiative (discussion 
following the presentation of Sir Henry Bunbury's paper, 
'Efficiency as an Alternative to Control,, Public Administration, 
Volume VI, No. 2,1928: 106). 
Meanwhile, Mr Elvin of the National Union of Clerks argued 
that scientific management was only 
there as a means to an end and that end was not the well- 
being of the worker. I feel strongly that we shall never be 
able to get the ideal of ef f iciency until the individual 
worker feels that his task is one on which he can 
concentrate his very best, and that by accomplishing it 
successfully, he is rendering the best service to himself 
and to the community (Ibid: 113). 
Thus, even those who were sceptical about the techniques of 
scientific management and the dangers of efficiency displacing 
political accountability, were nevertheless motivated by the 
ideal of efficiency; however, it was an efficiency which was 
understood in human terms, an efficiency measured by the extent 
to which it fulfilled, firstly, the individual and secondly, 
provided a service to the community. 
Mr Masters of the Indian Civil Service made the same point: 
The development and expression of personality in a man' s 
daily work are of vital importance... in the civil or 
' Bunbury disagreed. He believed that scientific management 
had moved on from being the simple invention. Of engineers 
('Efficiency as an Alternative to Control', Public 
Administration, Volume VI, No-2,1928: 115). 
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municipal services people could feel that their employment 
was not merely a means of earning a livelihood but was also 
a service to the community (Ibid: 113). 
Sir H. J. Wilson, writing about trade unions and efficiency, 
concluded that in general trades unions had helped promote rather 
than retard efficiency, by improving personnel, wages and 
conditions of employment, as well as influencing methods of 
production and changes in technique (Ibid: 116). 
It was argued that efficiency in the pottery, printing and 
tinplating industries, had been improved because of the flowering 
of Joint Industrial Councils and similar bodies. In Flour Milling 
for instance, a Technical Education Committee, a Factory 
Committee and a Dermatitis Committee had been set up; and the 
London Bus Service had developed Garage Committees (Ibid: 117). 
in the Civil Service, on the other hand, wage councils or Whitley 
Councils were believed to be responsible f or creating within 
I departments a team spirit and a sense of unity which cannot fail 
to promote efficiencyl(Ibid: 119). 
It is impossible not to see the hand of Fabian socialism in 
this particular view of efficiency. Beatrice Webb had been a 
member of the 1917 Reconstruction Committee and of course both 
Webbs were career committee members. Leonard Woolf recalled a 
lunch with the Webbs during which Beatrice talked incessantly 
and every tenth word was committee. She has apparently succeeded 
in inventing a committee for babies, a committee for the 
disabled, and a committee for the dead' (Carole Seymour-Jones, 
1993: 294 citing The Diarv of Virginia Woolf, Volume 1: 74). 
Two considerations lay behind Bunbury's support for public 
utility organisations; firstly, efficiency and secondly, the fact 
that 'public opinion is unwilling, whether wisely or unwisely to 
leave the provision of key services of modern industrial lif e to 
uncontrolled economic forces' ('The Economic Regulation of Public 
Utility Services', Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 3,1926: 
208). However, he remained concerned about the lack of 
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competition within the utilities themselves and how this absence 
related to questions of control by or accountability to 
Parliament. 
Private enterprise, Bunbury believed, was useful in the 
initial stages of an enterprise and running the inevitable risks 
of the development period (as in the case of broadcasting); 
however, after this state or municipal ownership and operation' 
produced the 'best service to the community' ('The Economic 
Regulation of Public Utility Services', Public Administration, 
Volume IV, No. 3,1926: 214). 
Subsequently, the success of a public service was to be 
measured by questions of cost, quality and efficiency; and at an 
Institute of Public Administration Summer conference in the same 
year, he outlined the four desiderata for a good public utility 
authority. These were freedom from political interference in the 
management of the utility as distinct from general policy, 
disinterestedness, expertness and an area of operation which was 
, economically the right areal(introduction to the IPA Summer 
Conference 1926, Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 4,1926: 
6 283). 
A good public utility authority, it was also agreed, would 
take into account consumers' interests and perhaps, involve 
labour representation; although conference members agreed that 
, there was little or no advantage in an adequate representation 
which cannot carry with it a real responsibiity, . Equally, there 
was a need for such organisations to have 'autonomous 
finance... subject to the condition that there must be an external 
financial control, (Public Administration, Volume IV, No. 4,1926: 
284). 
I Bunbury did not specify what these areas were, however, he 
made it clear that while a pre-condition of monopoly was not 
necessary, public opinion ought to be in favour of them. In 
Reith's 1930 contribution to Public Administration, 'The Business 
Management of Public Services1he based his arguments about the 
BBC on Bunbury's four desiderata (Volume VIII, No. 1). 
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In another special edition of Public Administration in 1929 
the management of public utility undertakings was given 
consideration by Neville Chamberlain MP (and future Conservative 
Prime Minister), J. H. Broadly, Ernest Bevin (General Secretary of 
the Transport and General Workers' Union) and Sir Henry Bunbury. 
Again, efficiency was linked to public service. Chamberlain, for 
example, accepted that efficiency in a public utility undertaking 
may not be measured simply by cost alone, however, he also 
stressed the need for management to be fully in control of 
finances ('The Management of Public Utility Undertakings', Volume 
VII, No. 2,1929: 105). Meanwhile Bunbury summarised the concerns 
which lay at the heart of public service philosophy: 
How is protection of the interests of the consumer best 
attained? How can public control and enterprise of 
management be reconciled or are they incompatible? What are 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of control by 
contract or control by regulation? Within what limits and 
on what principles should the policy of making the fat 
traffic pay for the lean be followed? Should public 
enterprise aim at profit or at giving service at cost? In 
what conditions is it economically advantageous to provide 
public utility services at less than cost? By what means can 
satisfactory relations with the consuming public best be 
cultivated or maintained? What are the various means of 
securing continued efficiency of performance? ('The 
Management of Public Utility Undertakings', Public 
Administration, Volume VII, No. 2,1929: 111-112). 
Furthermore, Bunbury concluded that although. the solutions 
to the problems which faced public utilities might differ they 
will probably be f ound to rest on principles which are in the 
main common to all of them. That is what we mean when we speak 
of the science of public administrationl(IThe Management of 
public Utility Undertakings, Public Administration, Volume VII, 
No. 2,1929: 112). 
For Bunbury the core principle was efficiency and this was 
linked to 'public goodwill, which implied the cultivation of 
excellent public relations: I the ultimate test of success is not 
that the public should be well served, but that it shall know 
itself to be well served, (Ibid: 114). Three lines of action were 
123 
necessary to procure the public's goodwill. Firstly, the public 
needed to be informed and educated as to the conditions under 
which the utility operated - this included its general policy, 
technical developments and improvements. 
Secondly, there needed to be a definite machinery for 
dealing with the public, for I ascertaining what the public wants 
(or more precisely, various sections of it) want, and in what 
respects the service given falls short of its desires; and for 
giving consideration to its complaints, especially where there 
is a monopoly - for in such a case, nothing undermines public 
confidence in it so much as its apparent inaccessibility,. 
Thirdly, every rank and grade of the organisation needed to 
consciously try to win the goodwill of the public although this 
is a purely personal obligation; it may be encouraged but it 
cannot be organised or departmentalisedl(Ibid: 115). 
Public goodwill encouraged efficiency because it had a 
positive effect on the organisation and on management's 'liberty 
of action and enterprise, which as a public concern was normally 
constrained in some wayl(Ibid: 115); and service at cost should 
be the aim in public utilities, but profits could no longer be 
the sole test of efficiency, and other ways of measuring 
7 achievement would have to be found. Equally, financial rewards 
were considered as only one element which helped keep workers 
satisfied. Referring to the 'new science of personnel management' 
Bunbury suggested that they also needed to obtain a sense of 
achievement and the knowledge of what has been achieved by the 
organisation of which he forms a part, (Ibid: 117). 
Bunbury also warned against overloading 'the promotion 
machine as an incentive' to workers; and seemed to be suggesting 
some kind of social wage when he criticised the I traditional plan 
7 Either comparison with past performance or with the 
performance of others; hence the need for data and statistics and 
the general standardisation of statistical forms (I The Management 
of Public Utility Undertakings', Public Administration, Volume 
VII, No. 2,1929: 117). 
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of an exclusive time-wage [which] is defective and inadequate'. 
in his view public utilities ought to find some means of giving 
their 'servants an interest in achieved results. Not in 
profits ... but 
in the general ef f iciencyl (Ibid: 118) . In other 
words, efficiency in public services was not about making profits 
but to do with expressing the general good or interest of the 
whole community or society. 
For other contributors efficiency was rdlated to the 
, service rendered and the cost, which in turn was linked to the 
, area problem'; that is whether utilities ought to be controlled 
locally or centrally. The view was that greater economies of 
scale could be achieved through centralised amalgamations because 
the 'pooling of resources, would allow the 'consumer [to] secure 
a service which meets all his needs, . This process, argued 
Broadly, was already occurring in the electricity, water and gas 
industries, and it was 'public opinion' which ought to be taken 
to be a fair index of the efficiency of an undertaking' 
(J. H. Broadly, 'The Management of Public Utility Undertakings', 
public Administration, Volume VII, No. 2,1929: 122-125). 
'Pressure from the community and efficient service, and the 
continuous pressure of the workplace f or improvement in their 
property and standard of living, were Ernest Bevin's solutions 
to the management of public utilities; however, he was less 
enthusiastic than Bunbury about the extent to which utilities 
ought to be open to continual scrutiny, calling it unfair to the 
management and the operatives I. In his view I it should be the 
duty of all parties to give of their best service to make the 
concern a successl('The Management of Public utility 
Undertakings', Public Administration, Volume VII, No. 2,1929: 
132). 
125 
5.5 Broadcasting and efficiency 
The debate about efficiency in public services has been an 
enduring one; and the fortunes of public service broadcasting 
have been much affected by government approaches to public 
service in general. Thus in the 1980s, the way of thinking which 
led to the privatisation of public utilities, was also being 
brought to bear on public service broadcasting. In particular, 
this was a set of ideas which proselytised an efficiency which 
was based less on the 'human factor' and increasingly on economic 
definitions. 
In the 1980s this definition of efficiency in public service 
was applied to both the BBC and to ITV; and indeed, because the 
BBC was relatively more difficult to deal with, it was ITV with 
its public service style regulation, which was the first to be 
affected. This process began with the auctioning of the ITV 
franchises in 1991 and had been preceded and accompanied by the 
, efficiency, drive within independent television. This was a 
period characterised by large scale redundancies and stream- 
lining of the sector. In the BBC there was a corresponding drive 
for efficiency, which had accelerated in the period prior to 
Charter renewal in 1996; this culminated in the imposition of 
producer Choice in 1991. This stress on economic efficiency was 
partly a response to the increasingly competitive multi-channel 
broadcasting environment and partly a response to wider political 
developments. 
If efficiency has been an enduring goal and a defining theme 
f or the public service concept, it has also, as we have seen, 
undergone many transformations since the 1920s; and the example 
of broadcasting of f ers an excellent case study in the way the 
debate about efficiency has developed. For example, in the 1980s 
and 90s the idea of efficiency in broadcasting implied the 
imposition of market f orces and a greater competitive climate in 
the public sector. In 1923 however, the Re-port of the 
Broadcastinq Committee (Sykes Report) [Cmd 19511 described an 
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, efficient and attractive, service which seemed to imply a public 
monopoly of broadcasting. For example, Sir William Noble of the 
British Broadcasting Company, suggested that it was 'far better 
for the public to have one broadcasting station rather than two 
in an area, and it is also more economical 1 (8 May. 1923: Minutes 
of the Sykes Committee). 
Reith was also steeped in these kinds of arguments about 
efficiency. For instance, during World War One he had been sent 
to the USA by the Ministry of Munitions to take charge of the 
inspection of small-arms contracts and to oversee the production 
of rifles; and it was during this period that he had become 
acquainted with US management techniques and had his f irst taste 
of managing labour relations (Ian McIntyre, 1993: 64-5). After 
returning from the USA Reith was employed as general manager of 
the Beardmore engineering works at Coatbridge and 'plunged into 
a course of reading on psychology with special emphasis on 
industrial efficiencyl(Ian McIntyre, 1993: 98). 
Reith's conception of management was not enti. rely technical 
however, and although he was concerned to improve discipline 
(introducing a highly unpopular time clock) he also arranged for 
their to be I carrots as well as sticks ... Lectures and dances were 
arranged and there were concerts and football matches'. He also 
pursued the interests of his staff in the local community by 
trying to-secure council housing for some of them. It was this 
management technique of strict discipline allied with special 
privileges, which would stay with him for the rest of his life 
(Ian McIntyre, 1993: 99-100); but was also entirely 
characteristic of the public service approach to efficiency. 
Not surprisingly the debate about efficiency (what it was 
and how to ensure it) permeated the early discussions about 
broadcasting. Efficiency, it seemed, could also be applied to 
broadcast content, in particular to news and t* he control of 
, improper, material. For example, during a discussion about a 
proposal to create a 'committee of interests' concerned with 
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news, Charles Trevelyan asked A. M. McKinstry of the BBC what the 
company's position was on the question. MCKinstry stated that on 
principle there was no objection but in practice, and as a matter 
of business, it 'would destroy the responsibility attaching to 
the management by the officials of the company, and you would 
tend in that way to prevent ef f icient broadcasting, (8 May 1923: 
Minutes of the Sykes Committee). 
In this context therefore, efficiency referred to the 
autonomy and professionalism of the broadcaster and the need to 
resist interference in the operation of broadcasting by 
particular interest groups. In other words, it was the BBC which 
should decide on matters of content and questions of editorial 
control; there could not be rule by committee of interested 
parties. ' 
Trevelyan responded that broadcasting was in a different 
position from the press, 'with the press the public has choice - 
hence public concern at the fact that you control the whole 
output'. McKinstry argued that this was the reason why 
broadcasting ought to keep away from controversial matter, 
particularly political matter. Trevelyan countered by saying that 
perhaps the public would like to hear both sides of the issue on 
the 'great public questions' and 'that if you are going to 
exclude everything which everybody thinks is doubtful you are 
going to make yourselves very dull and I am wondering what kind 
of satisfactory public control there might be over broadcasting 
without interfering with what you are doing? ' Noble's response 
to this was that in his experience it is this kind of control 
which leads to inef f iciencyl (8 May 1923: Minutes of the Sykes 
Committee). Thus for Noble, if inefficiency implied public 
control, then efficiency suggested the freedom of management to 
operate on their own terms without interference; while for 
Trevelyan efficiency implied the opposite. 
8 This was the principle. In fact the BBC continued to take its news from the press until 1928. 
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Efficiency arguments were also used by representatives of 
powerful press interests to support the continued reliance of the 
BBC on the press for its news. Lord Riddell the Vice chairman, 
and T. W. McAran, the secretary, of the Newspaper Proprietors' 
Association, argued against the idea of broadcasters organising 
their own newsgathering, in the belief that it would prove too 
expensive, would result in 'creaming, and be less efficient than 
the press. In this case efficiency was used to justify an 
absence of competition. The main objection was that a BBC in 
control of its own news would adversely affect newspaper sales; 
in particular the press monopoly of sports and racing coverage 
(29 May 1923: Minutes of the Sykes Committee). 
As Noble had suggested efficiency also implied not upsetting 
the government by broadcasting politically controversial matter. 
For instance, in a discussion about whether or not the 
Broadcasting Company was a de facto monopoly, Noble argued that 
not only did he think that the Post Office had not been serious 
about offering more than one licence to broadcast (although Post 
office representatives denied this) but he believed that 'while 
the Broadcasting service was efficient no Postmaster General 
would think of granting any similar licences to anyone else'(8 
May 1923: Minutes of the Sykes Committee) . The implication being 
that the broadcasting of non-controversial matter was proof of 
the BBC's efficiency,. 
Demands for a more technical definition of efficiency came 
f rom the representatives of the National Association of Radio 
Manufacturers who said they were interested in the 'provision of 
efficient' and 'ever improving quality of broadcasting'. They 
linked this to the necessity of having the proper revenues which 
would allow them the necessary plant development for the 
broadcasting of public entertainments and events of public 
interest' (15 May 1923: Minutes of the Sykes Committee) . However, 
efficiency, or adequate financing, was also the means by which 
a public service could be guaranteed; so once again there was the 
sense that efficiency implied public investment of some kind. 
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Reith also mobilised efficiency arguments to justify keeping 
broadcasting in 'one pair of hands'. He argued that centralised 
control was a 'very great economy' and that it 'simplifies 
policy'. For Reith efficient service achieved better terms for 
the programme providers but more importantly of f ered I centralised 
control I where nothing happened without Head Of f ice knowing about 
it, which meant that there were administrative and censorship 
advantages'. For Reith efficiency was reducible to this notion 
of control - control within the administration. itself - and 
I control I by the government of broadcast content. Reith believed 
that this unity of control, would be lost if there were more 
than one company involved in broadcasting (14 June 1923: Minutes 
of the Sykes Committee) ; however, by control he meant management 
by a corp of professionals or experts, it was not an argument in 
favour of autocratic rule by the state. 
The Sykes committee concluded its deliberations with the 
suggestion that the Wireless Societies should not have direct 
access to the BBC in terms of programme provision, and that the 
control and sanction of the broadcasting system should be in the 
hands of a public authority - the Post Of f ice - so that all 
stations should continue to be licenced by the Postmaster 
General. Under 'present conditions' the committee opined 
, efficiency is best secured by there being only. one operating 
organisation, although it did not rule out future licences being 
granted if they were to prove Idesirable'(26 June 1923: Minutes 
of the Sykes Committee). - 
Three years later, the meaning of efficiency underwent 
further transformation. In 1925 the Crawford committee was 
convened to consider the future of the BBC in terms of its 
, management, control and finance,. Post Office representatives, 
in a summary of broadcasting since 1922, suggested that the basis 
f or the original licence to the BBC, had been based less on a 
desire to control content - the efficiency of Reith - and more 
to do with technical and economic definitions of efficiency. The 
Post Office claimed that the decision to offer only one licence 
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had been made because of technical limitations to do with the 
number of wavelengths available, the desire to cater for 
unremunerative districts, to prevent overlapping, to facilitate 
simultaneous broadcasting which would allow for better programmes 
at less expense, because it was easier to apportion the licence 
fee, because it allowed the company to afford better technical 
staff so better programmes resulted, because there would be 
savings in overhead charges and because it facilitated the 
broadcasting of special functions like speeches (19 November 
1925: Minutes of the Crawford Committee). The issue of the 
control of content was assiduously avoided. 
The Crawford committee recommended that the Broadcasting 
Company ought to be constituted as a public corporation with the 
, status and duties, of a public service because it would enjoy 
more freedom and flexibility than a ministry of state, 
particularly in the area of 'public taste and necessity' 
(Crawford report., 1926: 340). The report stressed however that 
, it must be remembered that the State is authorising individuals 
at their free will to use a monopoly vested by Statute in the 
whole Community. Moreover, the State safeguards the listener 
against exploitation, takes steps to maintain the efficiency of 
the service and also exercises its regulative powers without 
which broadcasting would be thrown into chaosl(Crawford report ,, 
1926: 334). In this case therefore, the requirement that the 
broadcaster be efficient related to the need for political 
accountability. 
By 1926 efficiency in broadcasting had become more clearly 
linked to the idea of the state as an enabling f orce and the 
stress, at least in theory, was on its ability to protect the 
consumer or listener from 'exploitation'. This was a new 
departure. During the deliberations of the Sykes committee 
efficiency had been seen in terms of the need to control 
politically sensitive content, and the need to get the balance 
right between control by the government and the autonomy of the 
broadcaster. By 1926 however, these concerns had been absorbed 
131 
and dealt with by the idea of the positive state, a state, which 
through the mechanism of the public corporation would allow the 
necessary degree of control over content as well as autonomy f or 
the broadcaster; a state of af fairs proven by the BBC Is perceived 
loyalty during the 1926 General Strike. 
After the establishment of the BBC as a public corporation 
the use of the concept of ef f iciency to legitimate the public 
control of broadcasting was used less frequently. Increasingly, 
technological arguments about the availability or shortage of 
spectrum, were used instead. However, the decision to allow the 
BBC to develop the new technology of television in 1935, was 
justified on the grounds of an economic definition of efficiency. 
For instance, the possibility that private enterprise might play 
a part in developing television was considered by the Selsdon 
committee but rejected on the grounds that it would involve a 
, departure from the principle of having only a single authority 
broadcasting a public sound service on air,; and because the 
process of 'adoption' of the television , 
companies by the BBC, at 
a later date, would prove too costly (such an outcome, the report 
implied, was inevitable). In short, it was decided that it was 
, in the public interest that the responsibility Would lie with 
the BBC' (Selsdon report, 1935: 933). 
From this period onwards the BBC's monopoly was defended on 
the grounds of an economic or technical efficiency. In 1951 for 
instance, the Beveridge Committee argued that television should 
remain in the hands of the BBC on the grounds of the likely 
expense in administration, engineering and research if two public 
corporations were to conduct television broadcasts; as well as 
delays in the development of the service (Beveridcfe report, 1951: 
48-49). In fact, the arrival of commercial television in 1954-5 
was instrumental in delivering quick, cheap and technologically 
adequate television to a mass audience, material proof that 
efficiency arguments were no longer sufficient to justify the 
continuation of the monopoly. 
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In 1962, a third television channel became available, and 
the Pilkington Committee explored what it called the purposes 
of broadcasting' in order to assess which broadcaster ought to 
be allocated the new frequency. The report argued that one of 
the difficulties of judging both the BBC and the ITA was that in 
neither case was there a direct financial relationship between 
broadcast output and the viewer. Therefore, for the Pilkington 
committee, broadcasting profitability could not be the test of 
, efficient, performance. 
Instead it was suggested that there was a need for criticism 
from outside to be brought to bear by some other means; in short 
interventions by the Governors of the BBC and the Members of the 
iTA were necessary in order for broadcasters to have access to 
and be able to interpret public opinion. In this case therefore, 
efficiency was to do with broadcasters fulfilling the purposes 
of broadcasting I (which had already been defined as having a moral 
or social purpose) and not to do with profitability or economy. 
Indeed, Pilkington made a scathing attack on the ITV companies 
f or its commercial success in delivering audiences to advertisers 
but for not delivering the moral or social purposes of 
broadcasting. 
By the 1980s efficiency was increasingly related to 
technical and economic arguments about the end of spectrum 
scarcity, rising costs in broadcasting, questions of broadcasting 
finance and choice for viewers as consumers. The 1986 Peacock 
committee was concerned that the allocation of spectrum by 
governments encouraged the least efficient use of*it and argued 
that if the present method of granting access to the radio 
spectrum can be shown to increase the costs of broadcasting to 
an extent which is significantly detrimental to viewers and 
listeners, then clearly this matter must be closely investigated' 
(Peacock report, 1986: 30-31). 
Peacock maintained that there were inherent weaknesses in 
both ITV and the BBC. In the case of the BBC the main 
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difficulties were the absence of consumer sovereignty and of 
market signals which only direct payment f or programmes could 
establish; the vulnerability of the system to political pressurel, 
trade union and special interest group influence; the BBC's 
administrative structure, which generated tensions associated 
with large corporations organised on hierarchical lines and the 
unpopularity of the licence fee. ITV was also vulnerable to 
special interest group pressure, the method of allocating 
franchises was unsatisfactory, as was the method of regulating 
schedules, programme content and the IBAI s power of veto. In 
peacock's view public service had an 'endemic weakness in the 
control of cost and the pursuit of efficiency, and there was no 
accounting procedure which could substitute for the direct 
pressure of a competitive market (Peacock report, 1986: 132). 
Peacock noted that it had received a large number of letters 
and memorandum on the subject of improvements in efficiency and 
concluded that as far as the BBC was concerned the public had 
a right to expect that broadcasting services should be provided 
at the lowest possible cost compatible with the provision of a 
service of high quality, (Peacock report, 1986: 120). For this 
reason, it was suggested that the BBC (and indeed ITV) ought to 
take more notice of performance indicators, since there was 
evidence of over-manning and wastefulness in both organisations. 
Equally, it was considered to be the job of the broadcasting 
legislators to isolate the objectives of broadcasting so that the 
broadcasters could become more rational and efficient (Peacock 
report, 1986: 120-123). 
Concluding remarks 
As we have seen, efficiency was an extremely flexible notion 
and its definition depended on who was using it at any given 
time. Sometimes it referred to econ 
, 
omic productivity or financial 
economy, sometimes to service to the community or to pride in 
one's work or one's institution; sometimes it meant both. 
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By the 1920s it was increasingly understood that the 
efficient society was one where craftmanship and creative 
expression played a significant role; where it was considered 
that administration should render a service to the community by 
supplying the public with quality goods at a reasonable cost and 
by stimulating social and educational activities in every 
locality; and where the happiness and well-being of the worker 
were provided for through the supply of non-economic incentives 
(R. M. Thomas, 1978: 22-24). 
Efficiency intersected with other key debates; not least the 
question of how well suited public service forms of management 
were for the administration and management of industries or 
departments of state within democratic societies. In the case of 
broadcasting in particular, efficiency was tied to arguments 
about the role of the expert or professional; so that an 
efficient performance by the broadcasting organisation was judged 
by the extent to which the broadcaster was allowed to do its job 
of interpreting the public interest, unfettered either by 
government restriction or indeed, interference from the general 
public. 
The idea that broadcasting was saf e in the hands of its 
public service elite has of course been repeatedly challenged; 
and public service in general, with its exhortations to duty and 
service, has been accused of reinforcing existing inequalities 
(Raymond Williams, 1958: 316 and Harold Perkin, 1989). Williams 
in particular, has denied that the ideal of service is free of 
sectional interests, arguing that service to the community was 
offered up to the working classes as an 'interpretation of 
solidarity' which was no 'substitute for the idea of active 
mutual responsibility, or class solidarity. For Williams the idea 
of service was fundamentally reactionary, an example of 'false 
consciousness' because it prevented people from questioning the 
way society was ordered and in whose interests. 
On the other hand, the idea of efficient experts has also 
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been used in public service broadcasting to protect broadcasting 
from unwarranted government interference in both content related 
and organisational matters; to that extent the privileged elite, 
the guardians of broadcasting (both broadcast management and BBC 
Governers and ITC Members) have sometimes been able to insulate 
broadcasting from the abuse of power; although increasingly 
critics have argued that instead of articulating the public 
interest they have become overly interested in representing the 
interests of their respective institutions. 
More recently efficiency arguments have been used to 
undermine the legitimacy of public service institutions. For 
example, although during the 1970s the Left became highly 
critical of public service broadcasting, the critique was one of 
failure to represent the interests of all classes in society and 
for a lack of public accountability. The Right, on the other 
hand, attacked public service institutions on the grounds of 
their inefficiency. This attack effectively broke with a 
consensus of opinion about the necessity of public utilities 
operating along public service lines; and more specifically it 
broke with the concept of social efficiency which since the 
nineteenth century had been 
the standard argument for state intervention in public 
health, factory reform, slum clearance, poor law, medical 
treatment, state education, workmens I compensations and the like (Harold Perkin, 1989: 155). 
This was an argument which had associated social efficiency 
with the notion of human waste, and which, although it began as 
a domestic concern to save money and talent, by the turn of the 
century had become a matter of 'international economic 
competitiveness and military survivall(Perkin, 1989: 155). 
Thus, although by the 1920s efficiency was commonly 
understood in its widest sense of economy and service to the 
community, the problems related to the assertion that efficiency 
could be an alternative to control' were never satisfactorily 
addressed, either by politicians or 'experts' like Sir Henry 
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Bunbury. It was an ommission which allowed the Right to attack 
public service institutions with impunity, on the grounds of 
economic and ' 
technical inefficiencies; and during the 1980s 
exposed the theory of public service to the political wilderness. 
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Chapter Six 
Public service broadcasting and accountability 
Questions of accountability and access have 'always lain at 
the heart of the public service tradition, and a key principle 
of public service broadcasting has been 'its independence from 
other sources of political and economic power, (Nicholas Garnham, 
1989: 26). The issue of accountability in broadcasting has also 
raised questions about the status and calibre of those experts 
and officials who interpret and regulate but who are not 
politically accountable. In broadcasting this has been a debate 
between the view that it is the job of elected representatives 
to interpret and regulate, against the conviction that a 
professional elite with specialist knowledge will lead to the 
best kind of service. 
The debate about the role of the expert was not however, a 
twentieth century invention. At the end of the eighteenth century 
for instance, the political philosopher Edmund Burke, mourned the 
passing of the gentleman administrator and the coming of the 
, sophisters, economists and calculators, (Roy McLeod, 1988: 1). 
while by the nineteenth century the expert had become a key 
figure in the changes accompanying the overhaul of the Victorian 
civil service and government machine, and experts were viewed 
with a combination of suspicion and missionary zeal. on the one 
hand they were feared for their tendency to promote a narrow, 
technical view of the world, and on the other they were viewed 
as a necessity for a modern, industrialised society. 
Although the argument about the need f or trained experts in 
the management of public affairs is mostly associated with 
Fabianism, it was a widely held conviction; and by the early 
twentieth century the debate was increasingly about the role of 
the civil servant or official in the modern, industrial and 
expanding state. Within the Civil Service it was a debate which 
pitched the idea of the technical knowledge of the specialist or 
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expert against the generalist, commonsense knowledge of the civil 
servant, but it was not always clear how the two dif f ered in 
practical terms. More importantly however, the debate was 
indicative of the extent to which the state and public service 
institutions relied on this class of individuals to broker the 
relationship between governors and governed. 
.0 
6.1 Experts and account 1 Ity 
In broadcasting it was the Sykes committee (1923) which 
first mooted the idea that broadcasting ought to be run by a 
panel of experts', although at this early stage in the history 
of wireless it was not clear who might constitute an expert, 
other than the people who were already responsible for it (the 
wireless manufacturers, engineers and Post Office personnel) . The 
BBC's board of governors was envisaged as a group of trustees 
of the national interest, in broadcasting, to provide the link 
between broadcasters and the interests of the public. This goal 
was almost immediately subverted by Reith and although the 
Beveridge Committee attempted to recreate the governors 'as an 
independent institution with their own secretariat and research 
arm. In the end this solution was rejected in favour of 
accountability via a, form. of market competition by the creation 
of ITVI (Nicholas Garnham, 1989: 27). 
In the 1930s experts were defined as 'men of experience,; 
this could be experience of business, education or even the 
trades unions, but generally not politicians (W. A. Robson, 1937: 
370). In practice however, rule by experts involved the 
representation of various interests on the boards of public 
corporations. 
On the other hand, although the suggestion (made by the 
Sykes committee) that broadcasting ought to be run by experts did 
not gain much overt support; to some extent broadcasting 
exemplified rule by men of experience,. For instance, 
broadcasting regulation has been shaped by the successive 
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interventions of broadcasting committees of inquiry filled with 
'experts' of one kind of another, although MPs have also always 
been well represented. 
During World War One the idea of 'knowledge brought to the 
service of power' effectively created a permanent. place for the 
specialist and expert classes of the civil service. This image 
was of a narrower, more technical professional, who answered to 
'generalist, professional civil servants'; and it was an image 
both taken f or granted and mistrusted by public, politicians and 
scholars (Roy McLeod, 1988: 1-2). 
By the 1920s the image of the expert, both 'canonised and 
criticised' was well established. Balfour summarised the 
position: 
I often think it a beneficient arrangement of our mundane 
affairs, that absolute government went out just when the 
experts came in. It would be an awf ul thing to have an 
absolute Governor who was an expert (Roy McLeod, 1988: 1: 
citing W. M. Short (ed) Arthur. J. Balfour as Philosopher and 
Thinker, London, 1912: 539) 
The question of the role of the expert in the civil service 
and the public corporation raises some important questions about 
the nature of accountability within modern governments dominated 
by an instrumental rationality. This has been a matter of concern 
for most of the twentieth century. The fear is that the public 
interest, the interest of individuals, will be compromised by the 
unaccountable national interest' of the expert; and that 
administrative growth and expertise are not a progressive force 
but a potentially dangerous one (Roy McLeod, 1988: 8). 
This perspective f inds its clearest expression in Harold 
Perkin's The Rise of the Professional Society: Enqland since 1880 
(1989) where Perkin suggests that democracy has more to fear from 
the power and influence of the professions and experts than it 
does from the state. For example, in his view, the influence of 
experts and expert-administrators has threatened to sever the 
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democratic link between Parliament and people; a particular 
problem for public service organisations like the public 
corporations. 
It was within the Parliamentary machinery that the influence 
of the expert or professional was most felt. On technical or 
scientific matters MPs were at the mercy of the advice they were 
given and increasingly Parliament became less able to frame law 
which could meet every contingency; thus legislation increasingly 
contained clauses which implicitly empowered specialists to 
determine what was best for any given case (Roy McLeod, 1988: 
13). As the state expanded its sphere of influence it was 
inevitable that the delegated legislation would'be needed and 
that to keep itself informed, Parliament would require special 
advisers and even some extension of the Committee system . 
indeed, this has been a continuing problem for representative 
democracies - how knowledge is to be made available to 
legislators so that they can frame the best kind of law. I 
By the early 1930s the debate about experts and officials 
and their relationship to the public was dubbed by Herman Finer 
as I the problem of the twentieth century' (I Of f icials and the 
Public', Public Administration, Volume IX, No. 1, January 1931: 
23). In Finer's opinion this was because of the growing contact 
between state and individual in modern industrial societies; the 
increasingly ineffective nature of Parliament as a representative 
body as opposed to an instrument for guiding' the executive, and 
because of the changing nature of state activity'(Ibid: 24). 
Finer was concerned for instance, that civil servants 
should have a 'dynamic ethic, based on Ia deliberately inculcated 
scheme of beliefs about the debt owed by individual men and women 
to the society where service is their purpose, and these beliefs 
1L To some extent this is the point of the 1995 Nolan 
Committee on Standards in Public Life - to redefine the proper 
limits of knowledge and influence on MPs in an increasingly 
compleýr. society. 
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must be held with a religious intensityl('The Civil Service and 
the Modern State,, Public Administration, Volume VII, No. 4,1929: 
331). He foresaw a time for instance, when 'we shall all be civil 
servants, living in a civil servant state' and thus if society 
'comes to rely on the civil servant in this way, a complex 
network of rights and duties will need to be constructedl(Ibid: 
332). 
E. J. Foley, stressed the issue of how the public interest was 
to be articulated as relations between the civil service and 
industry and the industrial sphere of the state widened. In his 
view, this was a process which had been gaining ground since the 
1840s and had resulted in the substitution of the idea of the 
state as authoritarian, with the idea of the state as a public 
service, . This had occurred because the 
industrial revolution had 
drawn people into larger and larger aggregates which gave rise 
to greater demands for education and health services (, officials 
and the Public', Public Administration Volume IX, No. 1,1931: 15- 
18). 
Foley argued that legislation had gone the same way with 
laws no longer maintaining rights or forbidding wrongs, but 
focused increasingly on creating new organisations for public 
services and on the regulation of the relations of those citizens 
with those organisations; now 'authority, or democracy is coming 
to mean only the influence of expert knowledge or of common 
agreement'. Foley located this process of change in the role of 
the official since the 1833 Factory Act which had created a 
system of Factory inspectors (from aloof participant to 
increasingly dictatorial) . It was this, in his opinion, which 
paved the way for the creation of the 'expert': 
[it] brought into the relations between government and industry the independent, impartial person, tending on the 
one side to advise the government what it could reasonably 
require from the industry, and on the other to interpret to industry what was couched in the ambiguous language of legislation, the necessity of securing certain public interests, (Ibid: 18). 
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To these writers the modern official was the 'outstanding 
creation of Victorian capitalist democracy, without whom 
'political democracy as we know it would be impossible, 
(W. A. Robson, 1937: 12). However, they also acknowledged the 
dangers of a civil service based on and reflecting the social 
structure and economic inequalities in our society' (W. A. Robson, 
1937: 16). It was argued for instance, that a massive 
contradiction had been created whereby people of working class 
origin had opportunities to serve in politics but not in 
officialdom; where the administrative class was dominated by 
oxbridge graduates, and the chief officers of local authorities 
were required to be doctors, lawyers and engineers. In 
particular, there was concern that London University social 
science graduates, especially from the London School of 
Economics) were missing out career opportunites (W. A. Robson, 
1937: 17). 
The role of officials was thought to be vital since Britain 
appeared to be drifting towards 'government by commission'. The 
success or failure of this project, it was thought, would depend 
on whether the 'same degree of devotion to duty, public spirit, 
integrity and competence ... without the spur of ministerial 
control I could be evoked (W. A. Robson, 1937: 27). The neutrality 
of the public service was seen as essential' and demanded 
employees who were 'constructive' but not politicised. This was 
linked to arguments about the need for open and competitive 
recruitment procedures, for only these could guarantee the 
highest standards of service and f ulf il the meritocratic aims of 
democracy in the second quarter of the twentieth century (W. A. 
Robson 1937: 28). 
Just as efficiency had been seen as an alternative to 
control, the expertise of officials was understood to have the 
same function: the establishment of professional standards would 
render the need for public accountability obselete. However, in 
order to be politically acceptable, public service organisations 
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themselves would have to become more representative. Thus, during 
the 1930s an attempt was made to secure more equitable methods 
of recruitment and in the case of the BBC less formal and more 
realistic arrangements for public criticism (Herman Finer, 1937: 
149-160). 
6.2 The professional social ideal, 'governing institutions, 
and accountability 
The historian Harold Perkin has identified this period as 
characterised, not by the philosophy of public administration or 
public service, but by the 'professional social ideal' and the 
emergence of a 'professional society, (1989). Professional 
society developed at the beginning of the twentieth century when 
the ideals and attitudes of a caste of professional experts, who 
were more than a new class, began to 'permeate society from top 
to bottom' . These 
ideals were based on the idea of I trained 
expertise and selection by merit, and emphasised 'human capital 
rather than passive or active propertyl(Harold Perkin, 1989: 3- 
4). 
Professional society was different from class society 
because the professional social ideal cut across old notions of 
class and hierarchy; and in principle, at least, the benefits 
were available to all (Harold Perkin, 1989: 8). Professional 
society was also responsible for the growth in the importance of 
the state since it was not a class society in the traditional 
sense ... but a collection of parallel 
hierarchies of unequal 
height, so that the inequalities and rivalries of hierarchies 
came to predominate over those of class' (Harold Perkin, 1989: 9). 
The key conflict of professional society was therefore, one 
of competition between rival interest groups, particularly 
between public sector professionals and private sector workers; 
as the public sector demands more public resources the private 
wants limits placed on these in order to keep taxation levels 
low. Meanwhile, these conflicts were increasingly mediated by the 
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state (Harold Perkin, 1989: 10). 1 
In the twentieth century however, the logic of professional 
society has been more than the 'culmination, of trends which 
characterised the industrial revolution (increased urbanisation, 
rising standards of living, growth in the scale of organisation 
and concentration of both businesses and trade un , 
ions); in fact 
the rise of the scale of organisation in modern society has been 
not the cause but the effect and symptom of the rise of a 
much more complex, interdependent society [and] the 
connecting link between industrial and professional society 
is the familiar principle of the division of labour, which 
Adam Smith saw as the key to the wealth of nations in 1776 
(Harold Perkin, 1989: 25). 
Indeed, the emergence of professional society has both 
contributed to the struggle f or income, status and power between 
classes, and been the means of resolving that conflict (Harold 
Perkin, 1989: 116). In this sense public service can be 
recognised as having a key ideological role to play in the easing 
of class conflict. The professional class has not been directly 
involved in the struggle f or a share in the proceeds of material 
production, and therefore its role has consisted of being able 
to persuade the other classes that they needed it at all. It has 
been the success of this strategy (when it has succeeded) which 
has helped to raise the professional class above the economic 
battle and has given it a 
stake in creating a society which plays down class conflict 
(in the long if not the short term) and plays up mutual 
service and responsibility and the efficient use of human 
resources (Harold Perkin, 1989: 117). 
' Both groups have used the rhetoric of class struggle to 
disguise the extent to which professional elites have come to 
dominate society. In f act, both groups are dependent on the 
patronage of the state for their very existence. The 'free 
market' depends on the state to impose rules and regulations, 
without which it could not function freely ('to get goverment 
off our backs I) and the public sector is financed by it. For that 
reason, it could be argued that public sector professionals who 
service the welfare state have the greatest stake in defending 
its continuing survival (Harold Perkin, 1989: 10-17) 
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Service in the professional society is therefore, a national 
and cultural ideal, not a class ideal, and in the nineteenth 
century was promoted through the public schools and universities 
(Harold Perkin, 1989: 120) . The conviction was that 'professional 
service was in every way superior both to endowed idleness and 
to what was regarded as money-grabbing'(Harold Perkin, 1989: 
119) ;3 and the existing ideals of the professional classes (the 
notion of the 'English gentleman' and the 'gospel of work') were 
transformed into variants of the professional social ideal. 
For example, the notion of the gentleman underwent a process 
of metamorphosis; from the touchy aristocratic notion, to 
something more solid and bourgeois, and the notion of work from 
something anathema to a 'true gentleman' to something which had 
, replaced the cult of leisure as the main justification of 
wealth, power and success in life,. In this way, both the notion 
of the gentleman and the notion of work were transformed from 
aristocratic to middle class concepts (Harold Perkin, 1989: 121). 
However, in the twentieth century, professional and 
entrepreneurial aspects of the professional social ideal began 
to diverge, and the gentleman came to be 
defined by his fine and governing qualities, his cultural 
education, intellectual interests and qualities of 
character, which rose above mere money making, while the 
work permissable to him was narrowed down to professional 
or public service to society, the state or empire, to the 
exclusion of 'money grubbing, industry and trade (Harold 
Perkin, 1989: 121). 
While, the implications for public policy and social reform 
were profound: 
principles of competition, individualism and laissez-faire, 
which for the capitalist class and the early classical 
economists had achieved the status of laws of nature as 
3A view supported by Martin Weiner (1988) who suggests that 
it was the dominance of anti-industrial, aristocratic attitudes 
in British public schools in the nineteenth century, which 
account for the disdain with which industry continues to be held. 
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inexorable as the law of gravity, came progressively to be 
questioned by professional social thinkers, civil servants 
and even economists, and their restrictions and reservations 
found their way into legislation, over the protests of the 
business class (Harold Perkin, 1989: 121) 
The ideals underpinning professional society became 
widespread, and regardless of political party, 'consistently 
applied the tests of justification by service to society and, in 
one form or another, of the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, to the analysis and criticism of contemporary 
societyl(Harold Perkin, 1989: 123). 
Thus by 1914 Britain was coming under the increasing 
influence of the professional expert with his belief in 
, contingent property justified by service to society and in 
social efficiency for the benefit of the whole nation'; ideas 
which were permeating the consciousness of other classes and the 
policies and administration of government (Harold Perkin, 1989: 
169). Politicians gradually committed 'government into the hands 
of experts' which ensured that the twentieth century was not the 
century of the plain man but the century of the 'professional 
expert who 'knows best, what is good for him' (Harold Perkin, 
1989: 170). In short, even before the First World War put the 
cohesion of class society to the test, it had begun to go into 
crisis, and the solutions which were found to deal with this 
state of affairs were generally provided for by the professional 
experts. 
The notion of the professional social ideal offers 
therefore, a critical analysis of the concept of public service; 
one which stresses the self-interest of professionals as opposed 
to the view (articulated in journals like Public Administration) 
that public service is inherently disinterested and that 
administrators are generally inclined to act in the public 
interest. The professional society analysis views the 'public 
service' activities of the professional classes as a method by 
which professionals have actively sought to develop a society 
suited to their own interests, and not the wider public interest; 
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in this process the notion of public service has been 
specifically used to justify the self-interest of professionals. 
This critique of public service is largely shared by Keith 
Middlemass (1979) and Raymond Williams (1959). Middlemass for 
instance, argues that during World War One the 
relationship between the political nation and the real 
nation altered profoundly. The implicit contract between 
them was sharply redefined in circumstances of extreme 
crisis ... over and above the venerable 
debates about the 
nature of compulsion in society, the political nation was 
faced with a distinct conflict between its conception of 
national interest and what it discovered public opinion 
desired; and to avoid political breakdown was consequently 
forced to f ind ways of maintaining its authority and the 
national interest which that implied, by fresh compromises 
(1979: 14). 
For Middlemass the ideology of public service was precisely 
this kind of compromise and served to explain why the social 
lesions of the first three decades of the twentieth century 
(class warfare of 1911-14, troop mutinies of 1919, strikes of 
1921 and 1926, political crisis of 1931, the depression and the 
Second World War) did not lead to revolutionary change as on the 
Continent. Contrary to the received view, government in the 
inter-war years was not slothful in planning or weak in the 
execution of policies I; instead, the period 1916-26 witnessed Ia 
new form of harmony in the political system,, a consensus which 
was to last until the 1960s (Keith Middlemass, 1979: 18). 
In this period British governments made the avoidance of 
crisis their first priority; they abolished thomas Hobbes' 
, natural anarchy of competing wills, not by invoking authority 
but by the 'alternative gratification and cancelling out of the 
desires of large, well-organised, collective groups to the 
detriment of individuals, minorities or deviants'. In this way 
only minorities were made resentful, and as Party and Parliament 
declined in governing importance, economic conflict diffused and 
Conservatism and Socialism joined in a common reformist policy 
(Keith Middlemass, 1979: 19). 
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As a result, a 'triangular pattern of cooperation between 
government and the two sides of industry emerged, and that far 
from being interest groups, these became I governing institutions I 
(Keith Middlemass, 1979: 20). Equilibrium was maintained because 
these governing institutions came to share some of the political 
power of the state. This 'corporate bias, was not the full 
blooded corporatism of Fascism, or indeed what he describes as 
the naive corporatism, of the industrial theorists of the 1930s 
and 40s, which centred on the idea of a National Industrial 
Council and would have shackled industry formally to government, 
without resolving the tensions between them. Instead, by 1922 it 
had become clear that a sufficient number of union and 
employers' leaders had accepted the need for formal political 
collaboration with the state'; and as a result the 
municipalities, the churches, professional men and the voluntary 
bodies had become governing institutions with a share of state 
power (Keith Middlemass, 1979: 20-21). 
In order to become governing institutions however, they had 
to accept some fundamental national aims' and abandon, in 
practical terms, the ideology of class conflict'; this led to 
a 'political contract, between all the players, a contract of 
secrecy (Keith Middlemass, 1979: 21). Thus, long before 1945, 
Parliament had 'ceased to be the supreme governing body and 
became instead the electoral source of the majority which 
provided the party element in government'. The so-called 
, neutral' element in the state apparatus had also changed; this 
was the 'quintessentially late Victorian, theory of public 
service which 
had reached its apogee in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Constitutional historians took for granted that men in government service - the If it and proper persons I- were 
classless (in the sense of remaining impartial in all 
conflicts) and conscious of party, if at all, only in their 
private lives. Modified to meet twentieth century 




if Parliament and Parliamentary decisions were no longer the 
only or even the most direct source of power, the theory 
became a tautology: neutrality could be defined as 
congruence with the aims of the state, as perceived and 
defined by the same experts and public servants (Keith 
Middlemass, 1979: 23). 
For Perkin and Middlemass therefore, public service is 
essentially a reactionary ideology, which has eroded 
parliamentary accountability and papered over the cracks of 
inequality and class conflict in British society. 
6.3 Public service broadcasting and accountability 
In broadcasting accountability has generally referred to the 
role of the governors and their relationship to the management 
of the BBC and to the public; as well as to the Members of the 
ITC (or ITA/IBA), the regulator of commercial television (both 
ITV and Channel Four), and their relationship to the public. More 
recently, questions of accountability have also concerned two new 
regulatory bodies - the Broadcasting Standards Council and the 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission; while in film the new 
statutory status of the British Board of Film Classification 
raises similar issues. 
The issue of accountability has been a contested aspect of 
public service broadcasting since the birth of the BBC. In 
particular the question has been how to achieve a satisfactory 
relationship between broadcasters and the public in the absence 
of precise methods for measuring 'consumer satisfaction'. 
In 1923, for instance, the Sykes committee recommended that 
the public control of broadcasting could be best achieved by 
setting up a Broadcasting Board with an independent chairman and 
twelve members from public life. 
Broadcasting may be expected to become of great national 
importance as a medium for the performance of valuable 
public services. It is essential therefore, that permission 
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to transmit and the matter to be transmitted should be 
subject to public authority (Svkes report, 1923: 23). 
Board members were envisaged as trustees for the national 
interest; and it was thought that they would be directly involved 
in representing the public's interest in broadcasting. Sir Henry 
Bunbury, for example, argued that broadcasting was Ian obligation 
and not a right'. In other words, broadcasters had 
responsibilities to the public and those responsibilities were 
more important than any 'right' to broadcast (8 May 1923: Minutes 
of the Sykes Committee). 
These proposals were not enacted and by 1926 attention was 
focused on the structural form that the broadcasting organisation 
ought to take. In Parliament there was less concern with the 
problem of accountability and more concern with the issue of the 
content of broadcasting; with questions of bias and controversy. 
Subsequently, the rights of listeners and the duty of the BBC to 
the public became rather obscured. This despite the fact that 
in this same period broadcasting had developed from a minority 
to a mass service (Crawford report., 1926: 348). ' 
The 1926 Crawford Committee had recommended that a public 
corporation replace the existing broadcasting company. This 
particular f orm was chosen on the grounds that such a body would 
enjoy more freedom and flexibility than a government department 
because of the variable demands of public taste and 
necessity'(Crawford reportJ 1926 : 340). 
Crawford had rejected however, the idea of a representative 
board of governors, as was the case with some other public 
corporations like the Port of London Authority. Instead it was 
thought to be suf f icient that the governors should be persons of 
judgement and independence, free of commitments, and able to 
inspire confidence by having no other interests to promote other 
4 In March 1922 7,690 licences had been issued. This had 
risen to 1,840,268 licences by January 1926. 
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than those of the public service. It was suggested however, that 
the governors be assisted by advisory committees acting as 
'advocates' with a duty to ensure programme development, 
scientific progress and research (Crawford report, 1926: 334). 
In reality however, the board of governors, which under the 
terms of Crawford was supposed to promote no other interests 
other than those of the public service, soon fell under the 
Reith's influence, becoming less I trustees of * the national 
interest' [and more] 'creatures of the Director General' (Curran 
and Seaton, 1981: 301). In this period it was eventually decided 
that the minister responsible for broadcasting would only answer 
questions in the House on matters of principle (the detail of 
programmes was to be the BBC's business) and eventually the issue 
of excessive government interference ebbed away (Curran and 
Seaton, 1981: 300). 
Seaton has suggested that lone cause of the collapse of the 
principle of public service 'broadcasting has been the 
deterioration in the relationship between the state and 
broadcasting institutionsl(Curran and Seaton, 1981: 299) and it 
would certainly seem to be the case that there was a greater 
political willingness in this period to view state 'control' as 
the most efficient method of securing the public'interest in a 
particular industry or service. 
Although the Sykes committee had attempted to focus on the 
need for accountability between the broadcaster and the public, 
by 1926 accountability was already being seen in terms of the 
relationship between the broadcaster and the state and the 
broadcaster and politics - perhaps reflecting the highly charged 
political atmosphere of the period; and the issue of the 
relationship between the BBC, governors and public has 
subsequently never been satisfactorily resolved. 
The Ullswater report (1936) focused on the role of the 
governors of the BBC, and although it was agreed that the 
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principle that they should not be representative of specific 
interest groups remained, it was also suggested that they reflect 
the population more accurately. Clement Attlee was instrumental 
in this debate, arguing that governors should be drawn from all 
social classes as it is 'one of the functions of the Board to 
represent the general public, (Ullswater report, 1936: 665). The 
committee also recommended advisory committees be set up to 
represent the listening public - otherwise things were to 
continue in much the same way as before. 
The Beveridge Committee (1951) addressed itself to a number 
of what it called 'fundamental questions' about broadcasting - 
including how to secure accountability. It concluded that the 
BBC's monopoly should continue - mostly on the grounds of 
economies of scale - but recommended greater decentralisation for 
the regions. 
Beveridge was opposed to advertising or sponsorship because 
it would put the I control of broadcasting ultimately in the hands 
of people whose interest is not broadcasting but the selling of 
some other goods or services or the propagation of particular 
ideas' (Beveridge report, 1951: 48-49) . The licence fee was viewed 
as the most desirable method of payment because it distanced the 
corporation from the government and gave it financial 
independence; furthermore, 'the number of licences taken out is 
itself a pointer to the success or failure of the Corporation to 
meet the wishes of the public which it serves' (Beveridqe report, 
1951: 49-50). 
Beveridge examined the question of whether Parliamentary 
control should be more direct, and concluded that although there 
should be more information available to Parliament and the public 
about the corporation's finances, because adequate finance is 
the basis of autonomy', that broadcasting should also have an 
, independence of criticism in Parliament greater than that 
possessed by the authorities concerned with nationalised 
industries such as coal, electricity or transport' since there 
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were dangers involved in too much Parliamentary control 
(Beveridge report, 1951: 51). 
in the committee Is view while competition would lead to the 
lowering of standards broadcasting 'should be regarded as a 
public service for a social purpose and not as the sale of a 
popular commodity,; it was also the case that overzealous 
Parliamentary control could lead to excessive timidity, a policy 
of safety first in programming, and the domination of particular 
political views. For these reasons Beveridge suggested that the 
role of the governors be extended and that there should be a 
Public Representation Service (Beveridge report, 1951: 52) 
The committee rejected however any notion that the governors 
should become more like the board of a nationalised industry: 
The fundamental difference between a broadcasting authority 
and the board of any nationalised industry is that the 
former should not have, as the latter must have, a 
specialised minister able to give directions of policy and 
to answer policy questions in Parliament. The Governors in 
effect must themselves undertake the function of the 
Minister, that of bringing outside opinion to bear upon all 
the activities of the permanent staff, of causing change 
where change is, necessary, of preventing broadcasting form 
falling in any way whatever into the hands of a bureaucracy 
which is not controlled (Beveridqe report, 1951: 52). 
This was to be achieved was by making the governors 'part- 
time, and by increasing remuneration and length of service. 
Beveridge's fundamental attitude to accountability was 
contained in a passage explaining why it rejected the competitive 
market: 
to make broadcast programmes directly and automatically 
dependent on the preferences expressed by listeners would 
be contrary to the pursuit of the highest social purpose of 
broadcasting, which in the last resort is one of 
education... the duty of the broadcasting authority is not 
to please the greatest possible number of listeners but to 
keep open the channel for communication of ideas of all 
kinds, popular and unpopular (we need] competition in 
service, not competition for listeners (Beveridge report, 
1951: 52). 
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Selwyn Lloyds influential minority report challenged 
Beveridge's cultural argument which had focused on the 
difficulties of achieving meaningful levels of accountability 
because of the tendency of the public to seek out less than 
worthy programming. Lloyd's view was that it was possible to 
make a slow transition to a system which permitted commercial 
broadcasting and that this could be strictly regulated. Lloyd 
argued against the implicit paternalism of Beveridge and attacked 
the BBC's monopoly for its size and unwieldiness; for the way it 
hindered developments, and for the fact that it there was only 
one employer who held excessive power. Lloyd did not however, 
focus on the problem of accountability as a justification for 
change (Beveridge report, 1951: 207). 
The story of accountability received a new twist with the 
publication of the Pilkington report (1962). This was the first 
commission of inquiry since Beveridge's recommendations had been 
ignored and commercial television created. Pilkington accepted 
the public control of broadcasting on the grounds that it had led 
to the development of a service 'comprehensive in character, able 
to bring 'to public awareness the whole range of worthwhile, 
significant activity and experience'. Furthermore, in the 
committee's view, public service broadcasting had never been a 
means of communication to be shared out among those with a claim 
to communicate; that is to say, among organisations especially 
qualified to present particular classes of programme item - the 
press for example, or churches or universities. The subject 
matter of broadcasting is, in principle, all-embracing, and both 
the BBC and ITV were to I treat all of it I (Pilkington renort, 
1962: 9). 
I The committee's view was that television broadcasting would 
, be a main factor in influencing the values and moral standards 
of our society, and that therefore broadcasters must 'be in a 
constant and sensitive relationship with the moral condition of 
society ... this gives them a responsibility they cannot evade' 
(Pilkington report, 1962: 15). It was the failure to do this 
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which the committee charged the new ITV. 
Pilkington concentrated on the need for the two broadcasters 
to practice effective trusteeship'. The committee warned that 
they must be free from intervention by the government and also 
able and willing to resist any pressures which would, if yielded 
to, be inimical to 'good broadcasting'. It was the governors 
(appointed by order in Council) and the members of the ITA, in 
whom this authority was invested, and taking up Beveridge's idea 
that the governors were like Ministers, the committee stressed 
that it was up to governors and ITA members to know and interpret 
public opinion, given that neither the licence fee nor 
advertising allowed for a direct relationship between producer 
and consumer. It was also the responsibility of the governors and 
members to have a clear idea of what constituted good 
broadcasting, to approve general policy and to make sure that 
policy prevailed. Furthermore, said the committee, it was in 
their power to appoint key people and in the control of financial 
resources that authority lay. 
In other words it was their duty to 
represent and secure the public interest in broadcasting. 
It is for them to judge what the public interest is, and it 
is for this that they are answerable. They must not do so 
by assessing the balance of opinion on this or that element 
of programme content, and then adopting the majority view 
as their own; for as we have already noted, this would be 
to mistake 'what the public wants, [for the public 
interest] ... they must identify the public interest in broadcasting, defined as the fullest possible realisation 
of the purposes of broadcasting and secure it through 
control of the executive arm (Pilkington report, 1962: 122). 
When the Annan committee convened in 1977 it recognised that 
there had been far-reaching social and cultural changes; people 
'were more critical, more hostile and more politicall(Annan 
report, 1977: 8) ; and in recognising these changes the committee 
found itself re-working the relationship between the 
broadcasters, the 'authorities' or regulators, the state and the 
public. 
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In Annan's view the end of spectrum scarcity and the 
crumbling of the mass audience, would lead in future to demands 
f or a greater variety and number of programmes (Annan report, 
1977: 19-23). However, the committee rejected the idea of access 
programming. The report stated that: 
there was a right to speak in a free democracy, but it does 
not follow from this that there is a right to be listened 
to .... broadcasting 
is not a mass conversation... [it] is in 
f act af orm of publishing; not a dialogue or the equivalent 
of a Witenagemot (Annan report, 1977: 23). 
The report did however, isolate four requisites f or good 
broadcasting - flexibility, diversity, editorial independence and 
accountability. As far as flexibility was concerned, the 
committee argued that the introduction of ITV had done much to 
improve the responsiveness of the broadcasters to popular demand 
as well as greater choice of employment for media workers. on the 
question of diversity, the committee's view was that Britain was 
now multi-racial and pluralist and that the 'structure of 
broadcasting should reflect this variety' (Annan report, 1977: 
30). Editorial independence, it was suggested, was necessary to 
ensure diversity; and Annan recommended that there should 
continue to be a clear differentiation between government and the 
broadcasters; with care taken that interest and pressure groups 
5 
did not exercise excessive control (Annan report, 1977: 31). 
Annan thought however, that editorial - independence 
conflicted with the need to secure accountability'; but it was 
accountability which was the issue of the day. For these reasons 
the committee examined the issue very closely. For instance, The 
There was a great deal of pressure on Annan from a number 
of critics of the media. For instance, David Dimbleby and Stuart 
Hall argued that there had been a loss of nerve on the part of 
the broadcasters and a tendency toward constraint, constriction, 
toward conformity rather than innovation, towards managing 
topics, people and producers. While Anthony Smith argued that 
, if I am free to anything I want to say except the one thing I 
want to say then I am not free'. 
r' This view was given in evidence by the National Viewers 
and Listeners Association and the Labour Party amongst others. 
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Standing Conference on Broadcasting said: 
we mean the right of citizens to check on the services 
provided for them and to see that changes are made if the 
services are unsatisfactory (Annan report, 1977: 33). 
The Social Morality Council on the other hand, saw 
accountability as a three cornered concept which involved the 
Government, the general public and the broadcasters, own 
employees; while Caroline Heller, speaking at the Royal 
Television Society Convention in 1973 suggested a need for 
machinery whereby the public might judge broadcasting policy, 
and possess the means to change it if they didn't like it (Annan 
report, 1977: 33). 
Mary Warnock, the report pointed out (who was a member of 
the IBA) drew a valuable distinction between the 
accountabiltiy of an authority to Parliament and its 
responsibility to the public. An Authority cannot be 
accountable to the public because the public as such has not 
a position of power. What some people mean when they ask for 
greater accountability is greater openness, or readiness to 
listen to suggestions, or willingness to discuss day-to-day 
issues. But, according to Mrs Warnock, others who demand 
that an Authority should be made accountable are in fact 
disguising their hostility to the exercise of authority as 
such whether by a head teacher in a schoool or a doctor in 
a hospital. The notion that everybody can be accountable to 
everyone else is ludicrous; for if that were true everyone 
could exert sanctions against everyone else (Annan report, 
1977: 33). 
The report acknowledged that although this was an 'acute' 
analysis it also neglected the reality that very often the public 
felt 'fobbed off'. This was particularly so when the Minister 
in charge of broadcasting observed the convention of refusing to 
answer detailed questions in the House and referred the issue to 
the BBC or IBA; which meant of course, that there could be no 
public debate on the topic. 
The I authorities' not Parliament, said Annan, were directly 
responsible for their broadcasting services; firstly, producers 
were responsible to their particular authority for their 
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programmes and it was up to the authorities to either stop the 
programme from being transmitted or to def end the producer on 
public interest grounds. Secondly, although Parliament was not 
directly accountable for broadcasting it did receive annual 
reports f rom the authorities which could be scrutinised; and 
furthermore, the authorities were in effect appointed by, or on 
the advice of, the Government which was itself accountable to 
Parliament. 
As far as Annan was concerned accountability existed in the 
f inal instance because if the government considered that the BBC 
Governors or the Members of the IBA were not fulfilling their 
duties: it can initiate a debate in the House of Commons and 
providing it can maintain a majority, can remove and replace 
them. '(Annan report, 1977: 33). 
The committee dismissed calls by the Labour Party and the 
standing Conference on Broadcasting for an Executive Broadcasting 
Commission on the grounds that it would be too unweildy, lead to 
greater political control and would mean a return to the monopoly 
control of broadcasting or a scenario whereby broadcasting policy 
became a football between a number of vested interests'(Annan 
report, 1977: 35). In Annan's view the most important aspect of 
the system was diversity and too much was made of the question 
of accountability (that the governors and members behaved too 
much like executive boards of management and not enough like 
impartial guardians of the public interest). In the committee's 
view there was no inherent contradiction in these roles: 
The Authorities are the guardians of the public interest and 
as such bound at times to intervene, chide or even 
discipline the broadcasters in the public interest. Yet at 
the same time and equally in the public interest they must 
stand up for the broadcasters' independence and defend them 
if they consider that in controversy with Government or with 
pressure groups of one kind or another, the broadcasters are in the right. The public - that is to say - the audience - 
should appreciate and respect the creative potentialities 
and insights of the broadcasters, for the broadcasters are 
the fount of good programmes. The broadcasters should 
respect and respond to the needs and views of the public. 
If they do not, their independence will be challenged and 
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eventually undermined. [They must] inescapably resemble 
Janus. They must face both ways (Annan report, 1977: 35). 
The ultimate responsibilty for what is broadcast lay with 
the Authorities as the mediators between the professional 
broadcasters and the public - they were accountable to 
Parliament, and Parliament was ultimately responsible to the 
electorate. Annan believed that this essentially pragmatic 
approach had stood the test of time and would continue to do so; 
however, it was also careful to stress the need for broadcasting 
organisations to be more responsive to the opinions of the 
audience. 
As well as demands for access programming and greater 
accountability, Annan was also under pressure to consider the 
issue of union representation on the boards of Governors and IBA. 
The committee argued however, that although there was a movement 
towards this in both the private and public sectors, union 
participation in management is different from union participation 
in an Authority which is meant to safeguard the public 
interest'(Annan report, 1977: 46). 
In the committee's view industrial democracy was 
incompatible with public accountability 
since the Goverment's power to appoint and dismiss the 
members of these Authorities is an essential link in the 
chain of accountability. To have half the members of the 
Authorities elected by and answerable to, people working in 
the industry. would be to make the Authorities as accountable 
to the people working in the industry as they are to the 
elected representatives of over 50 million assembled in the 
House of Commons (Annan report, 1977: 49). . 
The broadcasting authorities were different from the 
nationalised industries, said Annan, because 'broadcasting is 
one of the main sources of news in this country and we have no 
doubt that many peoople would see worker participation in the 
Authorities as a major threat to broadcsters, editorial 
independence, (Annan report, 1977: 49). 
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The committee regretted that Parliament did not take up 
pilkington's suggestion that there should be an annual debate on 
broadcasting but noted that there had been a major debate on the 
subject every year since 1969. The BBC told the committee that 
it took a great deal of notice of these and Annan did not think 
this was all 'blarney'. The Standing Conference felt that a 
permanent Parliamentary Standing Committee should be set up to 
allow continuous Parliamentary scrutiny but Annan concluded that 
this was not necessary, that the chain of accountability is 
adequate' (Annan reT)ort, 1977: 51). However, it did not think that 
the relations between broadcasters and the public was so 
satisfactory. Advisory Councils were criticised for being too 
remote from the bulk of the audience and audience research only 
partly fulfilled 'the duty to discover how the public react to 
their programmes'. The BBC's Programme Complaints Commission was 
criticised for its 'lack of public confidence,, the IBA Review 
Board for appearing as judge and jury, and the BBC in general for 
being cavalier, aggressive and arrogant' (Annan report, 1977: 
59). 
Annan recommended therefore that the broadcasters themselves 
should not hear complaints f rom, individuals or organisations who 
felt they had been mis-represented as well as complaints from the 
general public about taste, content or individual programmes. It 
was suggested therefore that there should be a single body along 
the lines of the BBC Commission for all complaints against the 
BBC or IBA. 
A number of organisations suggested the establishment of 
some kind of Broadcasting Centre or Council that would be 
responsive to public opinion. Anthony Smith and Jay Blumler in 
their submission A Pluralist Approach proposed a national 
research centre to counteract the feeling that broadcasting was 
, run like a restricted club'. This was to be open to the public 
as a whole and would be aimed at bringing about changes in the 
behaviour of broadcasting institutions. In another paper Smith 
commented that 'a producer's independence is not a personal 
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privilege. It is a responsibility exercised on behalf of the 
public, (Annan re-Port, 1977: 61). 
Annan argued therefore that in order to ensure both 
flexibility and diversity in broadcasting the duopoly would have 
to be broken, arguing that although both the ITV companies and 
the BBC produced some excellent programmes, on the whole they 
were pursuing similar objectives in similar ways and the effect 
had been to narrow the range of choice for the public. The 
committee said it was not retreating from the view laid down 
by 
pilkington that 'the subject matter of broadcasting is in 
principle all embracing and each of the two public corporations 
is to treat all of it'; instead it was adding maybe, but with 
different emphases and from different standpoints' (Annan report, 
1977: 73-4). 
For this reason the committee recommended that the fourth 
channel be allocated not to the IBA but to an Open Broadcasting 
Authority which would be unlike the existing authorities 'who are 
required to take editorial responsibility for all their 
programmes in order to ensure a proper balance and wide range of 
subject matter in their programming and due impartiality in the 
treatment of controversial matters'. The OBA would operate 
rather differently 'more as a publisher of programme material 
provided by others and be sustained by a mixed source of 
financel(Annan report, 1977: 73-4). The OBA would also have a 
board, appointed by Government and answerable to Parliament, and 
responsible for upholding the public interest. 
With the publishing of the Peacock Report in 1986 the debate 
about accountability was subsumed by arguments about consumer 
sovereignty. Like Annan, Peacock based the changes taking place 
in broadcasting on technological developments like cable, 
satellite and use of the video recorder; and like Annan Peacock 
believed that broadcasting was becoming more like publishing. 
Peacock claimed to champion those viewers who had expressed a 
desire for more choice, who didn't want to be patronised or 
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treated as fodder for advertisers. 
In Peacock's analysis of broadcasting finance the notion of 
the consumer or viewer took centre stage for the first time. In 
the committee's view the consumer was the best judge of his or 
her own interests and this should form the basis of future 
broadcasting policy. 
Critics of the consumer sovereignty approach argued that 
consumers or viewers were rarely able to act in their own best 
interests, hence the need for regulatory intervention. Peacock 
however, believed that consumers were more capable than such an 
analysis suggested - though the committee did fear manipulation 
by advertisers. In essence the committee accepted that 'any 
decision on how broadcasting services should be financed must 
embody value judgements' (Peacock report, 1986: 28-30). Consumer 
sovereignty was not simply about allowing market forces to 
dominate; as far as Peacock was concerned it also embraced the 
idea that ordinary individuals understood that there may be wider 
benefits to the community at large from publicly funded 
broadcasting. 
Accountability for Peacock did not mean boards of control 
as with Annan; instead, accountability was seen in terms of 
f reedom of choice f or the consumer and greater opportunities f or 
programme makers. The committee was deeply committed to the idea 
of viewers developing a more direct relationship with programme 
makers as this was seen as the basis for improving consumer 
satisfaction. The committee believed satisfaction could be 
delivered by new technological developments such as pay-per-view 
which would allow viewers to register their preferences (and the 
intensity of them) directly (Peacock report, 1986: 26). 
Thus accountability lay not in political relationships but 
in economic ones; and the case for regulation lay 'not only or 
even primarily upon spectrum scarcity but upon the lack of a 
mechanism for direct consumer purchase, (Nicholas Garnham, 1994: 
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13) . Indeed, the Peacock committee had recognised that the 
economics of broadcasting were such as to make the existence of 
a full broadcasting market' highly problematic; hence the 
proposal for a Public Service Programme Board, 'set up along the 
lines of the Art Council, to finance public service programmes 
wherever they may be subsequently broadcastl(Nicholas Garnham, 
1994: 18). 
After Peacock the debate about public service broadcasting 
and accountability went into temporary abeyance; the f ocus of 
attention was on the reorganisation of the f inancing of the 
commercial television sector by 'franchise auction'. However, in 
1993 the government published its Green Paper on broadcasting 
(the opening round in the debate about the renewal of the BBC's 
Charter); and in 1994 this was followed by its White Paper, The 
Future of the BBC, (Department of National Heritage, [Cm 2621]). 
Accountability was back on the agenda once more; but the stress 
was on the political rather than than economic nature of the 
relationships involved. 
Organisations like the Consumers' Association responded to 
the Green Paper with enthusiasm. In particular, the Association 
focused on the fact that I increasing importance is being attached 
to the concept of public broadcasting as a public service,; and 
it drew attention to the way in which the Government's Citizen 
Charter initiative, launched in a White Paper in ; July 1991, set 
Ia new framework of concepts of public service based around ideas 
of access, choice, redress and accountability, much of which can 
be held to apply to broadcasting in general and the BBC in 
particular'(1993: 1). These public service concepts were of 
course, not particularly new, but it is noteworthy that the 
consumers' Association should so clearly make the connection 
between broadcasting as a public service and the delivery and 
quality of other public services like energy, public transport, 
telecommunications and the NHS (1993: 2). 
In its review of key consumer concerns about the BBC, the 
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Association noted that the most difficult of these was the 
I accountability of the BBC to bodies representing,. or purporting 
to represent the general public interest and hence the interest 
of consumers' and that most of this issue revolved 'around the 
variety of surrogates which stand between the 13BC and its 
consumers, including various advisory committees, independent 
bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Council, and of course, 
the governors themselves'. These relationships, in the 
Association's opinion, were not working as smoothly as the BBC, 
in documents like Exendincr Choice (1992), implied (Consumers' 
Association, 1993: 10) 
The Association argued that accountability 'is about 
measuring actions against pre-ordained standards, implicit or 
explicit' and that to do this it would be necessary to clarify 
the 'existence of an established framework, setting out who owes 
explanations to whom, and who the key actors are';. 'a set of key 
expectations within this framework,, a common language or 
currency of justification so that discourse can take place'; 
, openness of actions to scrutiny and inspection'; Iagreement on 
what constitutes acceptable performance'; 'agreed systems of 
measurement to establish whether performance is matching up to 
requirements'; and keeping the financial books in order, in a 
narrow but necessary sense of accounting for 
expenditure'(1993: 10). 
By these criteria, the Board of Governors were viewed as 
having an anomolous role - they are 'guardians of the public 
interest in the BBC's broadcasting activities, who have not been 
required to make it clear where their definition of public 
interest was coming from, and who do not in turn have any clear 
lines of accountability for their own performance'. (1993: 11). The 
Association suggested therefore, that if the Board of Governors 
, are going to be trustees rather than managers, they will need 
a new and different remitl(1993: 11). In the Association's view, 
the fact that they had become 'bound up with management decisions 
and staff appointments' over the last twenty years, could make 
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it dif f icult f or them to have a credible role as regulators; 
especially when on occasion they could f ind themselves in the 
position of reviewing their own decisions' (1993: 12) . Equally, the 
Association was concerned that the Governors were drawn from such 
a narrow base. In their view this undermined public confidence 
in the governors' ability to act on behalf of consumers. 
The Association concluded however, that if the BBC had 
clearly established perf ormance standards and monitoring systems, 
which were open to public scrutiny, then the need for governors 
might be diminished. In the meantime, public confidence in a new 
board of Trustees would be greatly increased by an open process 
of selection and scrutiny in which nominees ... could be questioned 
on their appropriateness by the Select Committee on the National 
Heritage I. Likewise, the Association argued for an urgent review 
of the whole of the BBC's advisory committee system, since it 
was not clear what they were required to do, nor how able they 
were to question accepted practice (1993: 12). 
For these reasons the Association saw 'considerable 
attractions in the idea of a single, fully independent 
Broadcasting Consumer Council incorporating the existing BSC and 
BCC and covering the whole spectrum of broadcasting, not just the 
BBC#. Independent of all the broadcasters, its principal 
functions would be to respond on behalf of a clearly defined 
consumer interest, to proposed policy changes, whether by 
government, regulators or broadcasters; to initiate proposals for 
change; to research or commission data and to handle complaints 
from individuals and groups, whether as consumers of programmes 
or the subject of programmes, and to publish the relevant 
findings (1993: 12-13). 
The Association rejected the proposal, raised in the Green 
Paper (1993, paragraph 7.15) for a more wide-reaching Public 
Service Broadcasting Council (PSBC), which would be in receipt 
of the proceeds of the licence fee and responsible for funding 
public service broadcasting on the BBC as well as other channels. 
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In the Association's view this arrangement would not be in the 
interests of consumers; whereas a Broadcasting Consumer Council 
would have a 'positive and creative role, which would allow it 
to interact with the plurality of regulatory authorities and 
oversee on behalf of consumers at large how good a job 
broadcasters and broadcast regulators are doing, and how they 
might better promote the interest of all viewers and 
listeners'(1993: 13). 
The Consumers' Association were not alone in their 
condemnation of the BBC Is Board of Governors. Richard Collins and 
James Purnell have argued that for the BBC to pass the 
'Berlusconi test 7 the role and selection of the governors must 
be changed, and the BBC made more independent of government and 
more accountable to users. Collins and Purnell supported the 
proposal put forward by the Consumer Association for a 
Broadcasting Consumer Council (which was subsequently rejected 
by the White Paper); and considered the possibility of a one- 
stop shop to regulate all broadcasting, including the BBC 
(Richard Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 19-20). In the absence 
of such revolutionary change, Collins and Purnell have further 
suggested that two principles should guide the governors in the 
future: firstly, they should take cognisance that their role is 
to represent the public' and secondly, that the 'public should 
have formal and informal influence over the governors, 
performance of that representative rolel(Ibid: 20). 
Most interestingly, Collins and Purnell locate the future 
role of the BBC's governors in terms of the Labour Party's 
arguments about stakeholding and its conviction that a 
7 In June 1994 the then new Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio 
Berlusconi, claimed that the Italian public service broadcaster, 
RAI, was out of line in its criticism of his government. Despite 
sharp words from various quarters, Berlusconi removed RAI's 
governors and required RAI to carry government-funded 
advertisements for this economic reforms. The 'Berlusconi test, 
is this: would the BBC survive a British equivalent of the 
Italian ex-Prime minister? (Richard Collins and James Purnell, 
1995: 19). 
167 
representative role conflicts with a managerial role (Winninq for 
Britain, Labour Party industrial policy paper: 1994). In the 
authors' view the governors 'will always be too close to be 
impartial - although they do play a regulatory role, representing 
the interests of the BBC's stakeholders'. To avoid this conflict 
they suggest the BBC be reorganised along the lines proposed in 
Winning for Britain, with a two tier board structure, in which 
a supervisory board of non-executive directors sets objectives 
and monitors performance of an executive board with managerial 
freedom'(Richard Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 21). 
Furthermore I the culture of impartiality in public service I 
which 'was thought to guarantee that government appointees would 
exercise power impartially' can no longer be assumed; hence the 
need for informal as well as formal methods of public influence 
to guarantee accountability; the former would include opening up 
the governors to public scrutiny over Performance Indicators set 
by Government, and making governors publicly justify their 
decisions; the latter would include, devolving the power to 
appoint governors to electoral colleges and replacing advisory 
committees with citizens, juries (Richard Collins and James 
Purnell, 1995: 22). 8 
At the time of writing the Broadcasting Bill is making its 
way through Parliament, and save for the merging of the BSC with 
the BCC (but without the teeth envisaged by the Broadcasting 
Consumers Council) the role of the governors remains largely 
untouched by the debate which has raged for the last three years. 
others have noted that the BBC 'is yet to address the problem 
that authority depends on accountability' and that although 
audiences provide one kind of accountability, the 
8 Electoral colleges would devolve power to the public and 
separate it into different constituencies in order to reduce the 
risk of domination by any one group. Citizens, juries would be 
chosen at random f rom the electoral register and would meet 
together to discuss specific issues and draw conclusions (Richard 
Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 23-24). 
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BBC is desperately in need of some clearer supporting 
structure of political legitimacy. It needs impartial 
governors who can be seen to represent the public interest, 
but who will not try to manage the Corporation. It needs 
ways of talking about its programmes that emphasise the 
proper measure of public service broadcasting - real choice 
of programmes, not the same old formulaic ones. It needs 
audience reach and appreciation, not just size. To do this 
it needs more money and more secure funding. It needs ways 
of thinking about its audience more generously. But above 
all it needs political structures that make it visibly 
accountable (Jean Seaton, 1994: 37-38). 
Concluding remarks 
Accountability has been an enduring problem for public 
services in general, as well as f or public service broadcasters, 
because of their relationship to Parliamentary democracy. In 
Britain departments of state are accountable for their actions 
to Parliament via ministers (and the principle of ministerial 
responsibility), and ultimately of course, to the public. Public 
service institutions such as public corporations however, have 
developed an 'arm's length, relationship to Parliament, and this 
has been both a strength and a weakness; a strength because it 
has given them a high level of autonomy and freedom from 
government interference; a weakness because it has led to rule 
by unaccountable elites with agendas which in practice are not 
subject to public approval or disapproval. I 
In broadcasting a central theme has been the 'thorny 
question of the independence of the broadcasters I *(Heller, 1977: 
59) as well as the extent to which broadcasting has increasingly 
laid 'claim to an extra-political power base and, implicitly, to 
a legitimation forged in the market place and independent of 
Parliament I (Heller, 1977: 68) . In other words, broadcasters have, 
under the guise of opposition to government interference, 
suggested that they be responsible to the public without being 
responsible to its rulers, (Heller, 1977: 68 citing IBA evidence 
to the Annan Committee, para 206). 
This development can be seen as part of a much longer term 
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debate about the growing influence of 'experts' or specialists, 
particularly in the case of the growth in semi-autonomous 
organisations. In these kinds of organisations for example, in 
the absence of a meaningful process of - Parliamentary 
accountability, experts' have increasingly assumed the task of 
articulating the public interest; a development which has clear 
implications for democracy and democratic institutions. 
The problem of accountability however, has not disappeared 
in the wake of attempts by government to curtail the scope of the 
state's activities. For instance, in 1979 the Conservative Party 
under the premiership of Mrs Thatcher was elected with the 
commitment to roll back the frontiers of the state', to cut 
public spending and inject market disciplines into public 
services. Public utilities were criticised for their lack of 
efficiency and innovation, and then privatised. There was also 
a strongly voiced commitment to reducing the number of quasi- 
autonomous non-governmental organisations or quangos: I there will 
always be pressure for new bodies, Mrs Thatcher said, 'we shall 
be robust in resisting themi(The Guardian, 19 November 1993). 
In fact, successive Conservative administrations, like their 
political predecessors, have f ound that in complex industrial 
democracies it is extremely difficult to avoid the quango or 
public body with its boards of unaccountable experts. The BSC and 
BcC for example, were created by Mrs Thatcher in the mid 1980s; 
while in the 1990s there has been growing public disquiet about 
the existence of these bodies. Public service institutions like 
the BBC are more complex institutions than quangos, however, they 
too have failed to satisfactorily address the problems of 
accountability. If public service broadcasting is to have a 




The emergence of public service broadcasting was, as we have 
seen, not an historical accident. Public service broadcasting 
grew out of, and alongside, a pre-existing philosophy or ethos 
of public service; later this became linked to the evolution of 
public service institutions such as public corporations. 
By the early 1920s the ethos of public service had emerged 
as both a set of principles, and as a practical code by which 
departments of state and public utility enterprises were 
routinely administered. These principles included the need for 
efficiency (in its widest and non-economic sense), universal 
access, and a commitment to the ideal of a meritocratic society. 
Furthermore, it was argued, public services ought to express the 
community will, be a Icivilising force' and express national 
ideals. 
In this period the principles of public service broadcasting 
were similarly composed. Reith, for instance, had justified the 
BBC's monopoly on the grounds that it was efficient (in the 
widest sense) and broadcasting had been linked to the idea of 
universal service from its very inception. Broadcasting was under 
the control of the Post office, which historically had used its 
provision of a universal service, to legitimate its public 
monopoly of postal services. Universal service was extended to 
the new technologies of telegraph, telephone and broadcasting; 
I 
but in b3ýoadcasting, the idea of universal delivery was uniquely 
linked to the regulation of content in pursuit of political and 
cultural goals. In the 1990s however, it is not clear to what 
extent universal service can be defended as the number of 
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television channels expands. ' 
Reithian public service broadcasting also had a clear 
cultural and moral mission. In Broadcast Over Britain, (1924) 
Reith stated that the unquestioned duty of the educated and 
cultured elite was to enlighten the public as a whole and that 
this involved not I giving the public what it wanted I because If ew 
know what they want, and very few what they need' (1924: 34) . Jean 
Seaton has observed however, that 'the rest of the passage is 
quite as important and far less often quoted'. Reith concludes, 
she notes, that 'in any case... it is better to over-estimate the 
mentality of the public than to under-estimate it'(Jean Seaton, 
1994: 38 citing J. C. W. Reith, 1924: 34). 
In 1930 Reith returned to this theme and argued that to 
, give the public what it wants' almost always involves 'an under- 
estimate of the public's intelligence and a continual lowering 
of standards ... it is not autocracy but wisdom that suggests such 
a policy ... of giving people what you believe they should like and 
will come to like; and he could not understand how this 
statement of BBC policy differed from other branches of public 
service activity (J. C. W. Reith, 'The Business management of Public 
Services', Public Administration, Volume VIII, No. l., January 
1930: 24). 
Public service broadcasting was not therefore, simply the 
result of the establishment of a public service institution (in 
this case, the public corporation). Broadcasting was understood 
to be a public service bef ore the BBC became a public corporation 
1 On December 15 1995 the government published its 
Broadcasting Bill. The Bill, when it becomes law, will relax 
cross-media ownership rules and introduce digital broadcasting 
to Britain. Exploitation of digital broadcasting will create a 
massive growth in the number of television channels available for 
broadcasting purposes - up to 54 new channels by some estimates 
(Evening Standard, 15 December 1995). This will have implications 
as far as the principle of universal access to broadcasting is 
concerned (a principle already breached by Channel Five) . If the BBC, for instance, is allocated a number of digital channels it is not clear on what basis they will be paid for by the consumer. 
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in 1926 and Reith was quite clear on this point; public service 
was an ethos first and an institution second (1924). 
By the early 1920s the essence of the public service 
approach was that 
power corrupts and that the antidote is service, that the 
justification of price is service and efficiency, that 
breach of trust is never forgotten by the public, and that 
a meritocracy is the only sure road to public confidence and 
the firm's survival (Marshall. E. Dimock, 1978: xvii). 
meanwhile Sir Henry Bunbury's 'four desiderata for a good 
public utility authority' - freedom from political interference 
in management as opposed to general policy, disinterestedness, 
expertness and an 'area of operation which is economically the 
right area' - were, according to Reith, fully comprehended, by 
the BBC's constitution, with the addition of equitable and 
adequate financial arrangements and monopoly (J. C. W. Reith, 
'Business Management of the Public Services, Public 
Administration, Volume VIII, No. l. January 1930: 25). 
However, there was a fundamental weakness at the heart of 
public service philosophy and public service institutions like 
the BBC. In the case of public service broadcasting 
accountability was largely sacrificed to the idea that 
broadcasters 'knew best', while public corporations in general 
failed to develop the appropriate machinery to allow for greater 
sensitivity to public opinion. For public corporations in 
particular, the question was whether the principle of 
Parliamentary and Ministerial accountability ought to be 
breached, and whether it was advisable, or indeed, possible for 
boards and corporations to operate in the 'public interest' . 
While for the BBC, the problem of accountability has been a major 
source of conflict since the 1970s; ' and it is a debate which 
2 In this period the Left attacked public service 
institutions like the BBC for their bureaucracy, their 
vulnerability to government interference, and their elitist 
programming, which it was argued, was insensitive to changes in 
public. taste and the nature of contemporary society. 
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continues to animate broadcasters, politicians and academics in 
the 1990s. 
In the 1950s the BBC Is public service monopoly was ended and 
commercial television was introduced; however, the cultural and 
social benefits of the public service idea continued (despite 
fears to the contrary) to underpin British broadcasting in the 
public and regulated private sector. This ability to adapt has 
proved a major strength of public service broadcasting; and 
although it it true that in the post-monopoly 'period public 
service ideas in broadcasting were not always explicit, in 
general there was a sense that broadcasting was a public good, 
that broadcasting ought to be universally available in terms of 
geography, and have universal appeal, in terms of content; and 
that broadcast content ought to possess a certain quality or 
distinctiveness (Broadcasting Research Unit, 1986). Thus the 
arrival of commercial television (ITV) in the 1950s and Channel 
Four in the early 1980s (with its public service remit to cater 
for minorities) eventually came to be viewed as extensions to 
public service broadcasting, rather than a threat to it. 3 
However, public service broadcasting was not without its 
critics, and by the 1970s it was increasingly under attack. 
3 By the 1950s the BBC was credited by some for 
revolutionising the relationship between the state and the arts 
in Britain. It was argued for example, that the provision of 
cultural services was an I essential f eature of the welf are state, 
no less important than education or housing, and that it was the 
role of the state to provide both a living for the artist and to 
cultivate the standard of taste of the people ... providing them 
with intellectual and aesthetic sustenance I (Political Quarterly ', Volume XXIV, No. 4, October -December 1953, Notes and Comments: 
334). While opposition to the introduction of commercial 
television was widespread, individuals and groups as diverse as 
W. A. Robson (1937), Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, the Fabian Society 
Research Group, Brendan Bracken as Minister of Information\ 
during the war, Lord Beveridge (1953) and Herbert Morrison 
(1953), were also arguing that the BBC be broken up. A favoured 
option was for the Corporation to be divided into a number of 
regional and autonomous authorities which would preserve the 
principle of public service intact'. The public service 
principle, was therefore viewed as compatible with the existence 
of Iseyeral broadcasting organs'(Ibid: 336). 
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Firstly, the Left attacked the BBC for its elitism -and domination 
by Oxbridge graduates, its indifference to changes in public 
taste, its denial of access for new production talent and lack 
of accountability; then in 1979 Mrs Thatcher's neo-liberal 
Conservative administration came to power, with a commitment to 
ending the postwar welfare consensus. Almost immediately the 
government embarked upon a policy of privatisation, which was 
largely legitimated by its analysis that public service and 
public service institutions had failed. In the Government's 
analysis, public ownership was inefficient, bureaucratic and 
incompatible with the operation of af ree market; and the BBC in 
particular exemplified this regrettable tradition. 
In the 1980s the twin engines of Thatcherism, and Murdoch' 
combined to sustain 'a ferocious attack on public service 
broadcasting' (Ian Hargreaves, The Guardian, November 22 1993) . 
This attack was accompanied by profound technological changes in 
the sphere of communications. Spectrum scarcity was f ound to no 
longer exist and efficiency had ceased to be defined in social 
terms; it was now a purely economic concept. Increasingly these 
developments were used to argue that a system of public service 
broadcasting was both out-moded and incapable of adapting to the 
requirements of the late twentieth century. 
These neo-liberal critiques of public service and public 
service broadcasting served to confuserather than illuminate the 
public service concept. Firstly, the Conservative suggestion 
that public service institutions (the gas, electricity and water 
utilities, the BBC, and the Post Office's control of telephony) 
were inspired by socialist ideology displayed a poor grasp of 
historical fact. The public service debates of -the inter-war 
years were neither entirely socialist in origin nor completely 
dominated by socialists; in fact, the debates, which coalesced 
around arguments to do with the public ownership of utilities 
were characterised largely by their cross-party appeal 
(C. D. Foster, 1993: 70). 
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For example, the theory of public service drew on both 
socialist and liberal thinking but was essentially a response to 
monopoly capitalism and the increasing demands of 
industrialisation and rationalisation. Thus, the first wave of 
public ownership in the 1920s was set in motion by a Conservative 
Government; ' while liberal individualist arguments about service 
and character were overlaid by Fabian arguments about 'public 
ownership, public accountability and business management for 
public ends' (Stuart Hood, 1986: 56 citing Hugh Dalton, 1935: 
141). 
Secondly, the idea that public service broadcasting was 
incapable of adapting to changed technological circumstances, is 
simply not supported by the facts. Indeed, one of the most 
interesting aspects about public service broadcasting has been 
its ability to adapt. For example, in 1922 the BBC was considered 
to be a public service even though it was operating as a private 
company; the organisation was organised along broadly public 
service lines; the licence fee was in place (making the link 
between listeners and producers), dividends were limited to 7.5 
per cent, advertising was rejected as the method of funding and 
Reith had already begun to establish his own distinctive (albeit 
paternalistic) interpretation of broadcasting as a cultural and 
rnoral activity. 
Since the early 1920s therefore, the public service idea in 
broadcasting has evolved through a number of different stages. 
3: t has been associated with public monopolistic control (the 
4 An acceptance of the need for some public ownership was 
simply a hegemonic value of the age. Even Dicey, the Conservative 
scholar and constitutional historian, who is sometimes credited 
with being the architect of the 'myth' of nineteenth century 
laissez-faire, took the view that the development of corporate 
trade had transformed the abstract priniciple that all 
property ... belongs in a sense to the nation, into a practical 
maxim on which Parliament acts every year with the approval of 
the country. It constantly suggests the conclusion that every 
large business may become a monopoly and that trades which are 
rnonopolies may wisely be bought under the management of the 
state' (A. V. Dicey, 1905: 248 cited by C. D. Foster, ' 1992: 70). 
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public corporation), a public -commercial 
duopoly (BBC. v. ITV) and 
since the arrival of Channel Four in 1982, and satellite and 
cable in the mid 1980s, it has been part of a 'multi-channel' 
system. The introduction of commercial television 
in the 1950s, 
and the arrival of Channel Four thirty years 
later, did not end 
broadcasting's relationship with the public service idea; in fact 
the opposite occurred, and the cultural and social benefits of 
public service (quality, standards, education, universal 
provision) were extended (in varying degrees) to the regulated 
commercial sectors of broadcasting. 
A third confusion has been of longer standing. For example, 
the nineteenth century was not characterised by a commitment to 
unadulterated laissez-faire; and 
indeed, state intervention and 
laissez-faire were less diametrically opposed opposites than 
, constant accompaniments of the basic force - industrial isation I 
(J. Bartlett Brebner, 1962: 200). Contributors to Public 
Administration for example, have concurred that the grounds for 
state intervention in public utilities were related to these 
continuing patterns of industrial 
i sation and rational i sation; 
while the need to exert public control over broadcasting was 
recognised by the Sykes report in 1923. 
Keith Middlemass (1979) draws upon this analysis of the link 
between industrialisation and public service. It is his 
contention that public service is both a powerful ideology and 
a set of institutional arrangements by which British society was 
acclimatised to the massive social and economic change required 
by industrialisation. In ef f ect a new contract was -wrought, under 
pressure from an expanding franchise, between the people and the 
state; the old forms of economic and social life were gone and 
the state was to be increasingly responsible for the new services 
which replaced them. The idea of service' was the glue which 
held this network of contractual obligations together; and 
broadcasting, as one of the culture industries, was part of the 
process by which Britain's 'new' identity was forged. 
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These processes were underpinned by an unassailable belief 
in the future and in progress; and were legitimised by the idea 
of service. The idea of service can be understood 
in a number of 
ways; firstly, it described the relationship of civil servants 
to the state and their obligation to serve the community; 
secondly, it could be understood as an ethic by which the I ruling 
classes' were able to justify their dominance; and thirdly, as 
part of the contract between the mass of people and their rulers. 
For example, public service institutions offered (providing the 
masses continued to accept the capitalist framework) universal 
and efficient services at fair prices. Middlemass (1979), 
Williams (1958) and Perkin (1989) have taken the view however, 
that public service broadcasting, rather than being a genuine 
attempt to create a broadcasting suitable for democracy, have 
simply disguised the real relations of domination in society. 
In fact there were a number of rationales behind the idea 
of the BBC as a public service. The existence of a natural 
monopoly, political pragmatism, non-economic definitions of 
efficiency, public opinion and a belief in the 'public good, all 
played a part in legitimising the state Is continuing involvement 
in broadcasting. Most importantly however, the regulation of 
broadcasting was never justified on the grounds of scarcity 
alone. In fact, regulation was first understood in terms of 
national security (the military always had priority over the 
allocation of frequencies), and in the second, that unlicenced 
and unregulated broadcasting would lead to interference and 
, chaos of the ether' as in the United States of America. 
Thirdly, from as early as 1923, it was considered that 'if the 
ether was occupied we hoped that it would be worthily 
occupied' (Sykes Committee Minutes., 2/5/23) .' In other words 
the regulators were also aware of the need to consider questions 
5 Brown of the Post Office under questioning from Charles 
Trevelyan MP. 
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of content and the social purpose of broadcasting. 
In short, although Peacock's definition of public service 
broadcasting as 'simply any major modification of purely 
commercial provision resulting from public policy, (1986: 130) 
has the virtue of simplicity, it nevertheless fails to take into 
account the specific nature of the major modification, of 
broadcasting which is public service broadcasting. Public service 
broadcasting was, and to some extent remains, much more than any 
major modification of purely commercial provision'. Public 
service broadcasting is a coherent and systematic theory about 
the role broadcasting ought to play in a democratic society. 
From its inception public service broadcasting was 
understood as both an institution and an ideal or ethic; it was 
a resource which went beyond party, was something valuable and 
in the public or national interest; it was a way of doing things 
which market f orces alone could not hope to emulate. Indeed, 
although the rhetoric since 1986 has been one of introducing 
greater market forces and lighter touch regulation in the 
commercial sector, the reality has been continued government 
intervention in the communications f ield, both to impose content 
related rules and to ensure competitive practices. For example, 
the 1996 Broadcasting Bill focuses heavily on the question of 
relaxing the rules on cross-media ownership (which will have the 
ef f ect of increasing concentration of ownership in ITV) , and 
organisations like the Broadcasting Standards. Council and 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission (which oversee 'standards') 
are likely to have their remits consolidated prior to their 
raerger into a single organisation. 
During the inter-war period public ownership had been 
widely supported by the three main political parties and in the 
case of broadcasting, Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals 
shared the belief that broadcasting was too great a 'potential 
power over public opinion and the life of the nation" [to be left 
to commercial forces alone and that control) 'ought to remain 
with the State'(Sykes report, 1923: 18). 
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There have been therefore, two strands to the early history 
of the concept of public service in broadcasting. The first 
relates to public service as a set of ideas, . an ethos, or 
philosophy of public service, and the second, to the emergence 
of a particular kind of institution - the public corporation. In 
essence the public corporation fused with existing ideas about 
public service; although in the early years of broadcasting the 
two were often seen as indistinguishable from each other. 
' 
Public corporations themselves arose f rom the development 
of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies in the late nineteenth 
8 
and early twentieth centuries. This process acclerated in the 
twentieth in response to the demands of post-war reconstruction 
and changing political and economic conditions. The public 
service idea on the other hand, was essentially a nineteenth 
century ethos referring to practices within the civil service and 
Arnoldian ideas of culture and education, which had emerged f rom 
the reforming zeal of the Victorian era (Paddy Scannell, 1989a: 
22-23). 
However, both the public corporation and the concept of 
public service probably shared a common source in the influence 
of the colonial administrative practices of the Indian civil 
service. It was also the case that Britain was not alone in 
developing public corporations and public services; the state of 
7 For instance in the foreword to the 1928 BBC Handbook the 
F, arl of Clarendon, chairman of the board of governors, states 
that the BBC 'has assimilated the British Public Service 
tradition'; while Reith states that public service means 
primarily a standard and an outlook, and only secondarily a form 
of administration'(1928: 32). 
8 There was nothing new in 1926 - the year the BBC 
transferred to public ownership - about the. creation of 
independent boards to administer services of public importance. 
The most obvious examples being the Poor Law Commission (1834) ; 
the public utility companies set up to administer gas, water and 
public transport from the 1840s onwards; and the range of mixed- 
enterprises, which included the Manchester Ship Canal (1891) and 
the Metropolitan Water Board (1902) amongst others (Caroline 
Heller, 1978: 4-5). 
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Victoria in Australia was also at the forefront of this kind of 
thinking, but in Australia public corporations were very much 
seen as socialist entities. 
The ethic of service was also linked to a 'philosophy of, 
public administration which had begun to emerge by the 1920s; and 
public service broadcasting subsequently reflects the influence 
of that dominant perspective (Christopher Hood, 1994: 4). 9 This 
philosophy drew on some of the great liberal debates of the 
previous century (the battle between collectivist or 
individualist conceptions of the state, the need to educate the 
masses for democratic life) and ultimately legitimated a growing 
acceptance for an enlarged role for the modern state. In short, 
the influence of public administration ideas were evidence of an 
attempt to make possible the administration of mass democracy; 
and public service broadcasting was part of that project. 
Public service broadcasting was therefore, as much an 
administrative solution to the arrival of the mass medium of 
wireless as it was a political or cultural response; and it is 
this fact which in the 1990s exposes public service institutions 
like the BBC to the accusation that it has become a 'period 
piece, following the design principles of a vanished 
eral(Christopher Hood, 1994: 4). 
However, the argument that the BBC as a public service 
institution has become outdated is not, as we have seen, 
sufficient to describe the crisis in public service broadcasting. 
This crisis affects the whole balance of public broadcasting 
(including ITV and Channel Four) and is linked to the erosion of 
the tradition of public service in the public utilities at an 
institutional and ethical level. 
9 Hood supports my argument that this approach was shared by 
Fabians, R. M. Thomas's civil servants and LSE dons, her 
philosophers of public administration, and the Australian 
administration (1994: 5) 
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The tradition of public service broadcasting or 'progressive 
public administration' (Christopher Hood, 1994) ' embodied two 
principles. The first was that the public sector ought to be kept 
clistinct from the private, and that public servants ought to form 
a jesuitical corps' of service. This corps was distinct from 
private concerns in matters of recruitment, ethos, reward, 
promotion and organisational structure; since it was only by 
using these methods that the public sector could be kept free 
from corruption. 
The second principle related to the restriction of the 
'hands-on, power of those at the top; Politicians and chief 
executives alike. Power was limited by procedural rules and the 
establishment of public corporations enabled these institutions 
to pursue the public interest in a condition of relative autonomy 
from politicians (Christopher Hood, 1994: 5). 10 
This intimate relationship between public service 
broadcasting and progressive public administration raises serious 
questions about the future of public service broadcasting. A 
commitment to the principles of a progressive public 
administration is now 'waning across OECD countries' and these 
organisations (where they do exist) are now increasingly subject 
to the doctrines of 'New Public Management' (Christopher Hood, 
1.994: 10) . 
11 However, as we have seen, public service 
11 In the case of broadcasting there has been considerable 
clisagreement as to how successful this policy has been. For 
example, the BBC's record suggests that a public trust 
broadcasting corporation is not the only, or even the best, way 
to provide checks on those in high public office that the 
concerns of a progressive public administration would require. 
indeed, it could be argued that there are distinct dangers in 
relying on any one institution to provide such 
checks'(Christopher Hood, 1994: 12). 
" In place of insulating the public f rom the private 
sector, the 'New Public Management' method aims for 
, entrepreneurial bureaucrats' using the method and style of the 
private sector. Equally, in place of rules to check the power of 
those in high public office, the New Public Management method 
aims to strengthen the hands-on capacity of managers to direct 
their organisations without being hamstrung by restrictive 
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broadcasting is as much an ethos relating to the role of all 
broadcasting in democratic society, as it is a single institution 
like the BBC. Furthermore, public service broadcasting is not 
specifically excluded from more commercial or market orientated 
methods of operation. 
" 
In the 1990s the focus has however, remained with the future 
of the BBC. In 1996 the Corporation's Charter 
is due for renewal 
and this has rekindled the debate about the appropriateness of 
its current structure and scale of activity. Several critics, 
echoing the period prior to the 
introduction of commercial 
television, have argued in favour or a more stream-lined BBC 
(Christopher Hood, 1994; Richard Colllins and Tames Purnell, 
IL995). Hood has recommended a smaller organisation with a 
sharper scrutiny mandate' on the grounds that such an 
organisation might be more effective than the present model 
(1994: 12) and Collins and Purnell propose that the 'BBC must 
remain but it must become a number of different BBCs1 
in order 
for it to be more accountable and independent from government 
(1995: 2). 
These authors accept that the arrival of new technologies 
, Will continue to change the media in the UK, but also argue 
, they will not make the broadcasting market work well enough to 
legislation; and more explication of standards of success and 
performance, replacing an earlier emphasis on qualitative and 
irnplicit standards and goals'. New Public Management favours 
, Unbundling, large public sector organisations, gavours contract 
based competitive provision with internal markets and term 
contracts; private management styles as opposed to public service 
ethics and methods. 
In the 1990s these doctrines of 'New Public Management, 
(unbundling, producer-purchaser splits, the director-general's 
tax-ef f icient commercial pay arrangement) were adopted by the BBC 
and the debate (where there has been one) has been about the 
, respective merits of progressivism and managerialism, 
(Christopher Hood, 1994: 10-11). 
12 ITV and Channel Four are commercial broadcasters which 
Ijave, at least until recently, been regulated along public 
service lines. 
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eliminate regulation'; in short, in order for the BBC to survive 
the increasingly competitive market, it ought to be allowed to 
develop and exploit some of its commercial opportunities (Richard 
Collins and James Purnell, 1995: 1-2). 
The future of public service broadcasting is not therefore, 
necessarily undermined by the communications revolution. Public 
service broadcasting evolved as an argument to do with the role 
of broadcasting in a democratic society, rather than because of 
technological difficulties to do with spectrum scarcity or 
interference; for that reason the end of spectrum scarcity will 
not bring the public interest in broadcasting to an end. 
In addition, public service broadcasting has always been 
able to adapt to changed political and * technological 
circumstances; so once again, political and technological 
clevelopments do not necessarily imply the end of public service 
broadcasting. However, it is the case that the privatisation of 
the public utilities, and the erosion of public service values 
lias led to a political vacuum. The Labour Party no longer 
automatically defends public ownership and the failure to 
consider broadcasting in terms of wider arguments about the role 
of broadcasting in society, has made it increasingly difficult 
to defend the current system of public service broadcasting 
against its critics. 
More recently however, some have argued that these 
questions, of how to ensure the delivery of efficient and 
accountable services in the public interest, have been answered 
by the theory of stakeholding and the stakeholder society. To 
its proponents stakeholding is a 'genuine departure, f rom the 
past and attempts to I of f er a set of guiding principles that 
could organise a reformist political programme in five chief 
areas: the workplace, the welfare state, the firm and the City, 
the constitution and economic policy more generally'. This, it 
is argued, is not socialism in the twentieth century' nor an 
attempt to build a socialist Jerusalem by planning and public 
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owmership'; nor is it the I orthodox advocacy of f ree market 
capitalism championed by the Conservative Right'. Instead, 
stakeholding is an 
explicit statement of the values and principles that have 
underpinned the century-long attempt to build a just society 
and moral community that is congruent with private property, 
the pursuit of the profit motive and decentralised decision- 
making in markets - the famous third or middle way (Will 
Hutton, The Guardian, 'Raising the Stakes', Wednesday 
January 17 1996: 2). 
There is of course a profound irony to this description of 
stakeholding because it could just as well describe the theory 
of public service formulated in the 1920s. Indeed, William 
y, eegan, economics editor of the Observer has suggested, I in its 
rnore radical strain, you can trace the idea back to Harold Laski I 
(Ben Webb, New Statesman and New Society, 'Stakeholding. The Big 
3: dea?, 29 March 1996) Stakeholding is further described as 
follows: 
The unifying idea is inclusion; the individual is a member, 
a citizen and a potential partner. But inclusion is not a 
one-way street; it places reciprocal obligations on the 
individual as well as rights - and in every domain and in 
every social class. These rights and obligations can be 
organised in a voluntary code; or they may be codified into 
law. The institutions that grow out of these relationships 
foster relations of trust and commitment; they tend to be 
high investing, attentive to human capital and highly 
creative (Will Hutton, ibid: 2). 
Stakeholding, like public service bef ore it, is probably 
best understood as the next chapter in the long twentieth century 
clebate I on planning and democracy, (Trevor Smith, 1979: X) . This 
debate dominated the interwar years in Britain and as with public 
ownership, support for planning 'cut right across party 
clivisions I even though its supporters of ten had dif f erent goals - 
some envisaging a political end such as greater equality, with 
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others hoping that it would merely lead to economic 
efficiencies. " Planning helped foster a climate of opinion 
which brought about the 'paradigm change in post-war politics 
whose twin manifestations were the Keynesian mixed-economy and 
the Beveridgian welfare statel(Trevor Smith, 1979: 79). It 
remains to be seen however, whether stakeholding will be able to 
challenge the neo-liberal Conservatism which has dominated the 
political landscape for the last seventeen years. 
As far as broadcasting is concerned however, to date 
stakeholding has had relatively little to contribute, save the 
suggestion that public institutions, such as the BBC and the Bank 
of England, ought to suffer less political interference over 
their proper spheres - notably appointments'(Will Hutton, Ibid: 
3-4). Most importantly, it does not, as yet, address the long 
term problems of accountability which the BBC continues to f ace, 
nor the related issue of how to secure the funding of all current 
terrestrial channels in what has become an increasingly 
competitive market. 14 
Debates about public service on the other hand, have 
contributed greatly to the question of how the public interest 
in broadcasting ought to be articulated. These debates have 
focused on whether efficiency ought to be calculated in 
technological or productivity related terms or in the context of 
wider human relations, and how public service institutions like 
the BBC ought to face the problem of accountability - whether 
I expert I governors are better at articulating the public interest 
than Ministers in Parliament, or indeed, other forms of 
representation. 
13 The 'planners' included groups as diverse as the Fabians, 
the guild socialists, academics like Herbert Finer, 
Conservatives, Liberals, Labour, and Oswald Moseley (Trevor 
Smith, 1979: 4-5). 
11 Indeed, the Labour Party's recent support for the liberalisation of cross-media ownership rules, during debates on 
the 1996 Broadcasting Bill, suggest a failure of understanding in this area. 
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If Public service broadcasting is to thrive in the next 
century, a number of issues will need to be addressed. Firstly, 
there must be a sustained challenge to the view that the 
broadcasting market must always be allowed to respond to 
technological developments. As this thesis demonstrates, public 
service broadcasting was forged from a set of political, 
economic, administrative and cultural ideas about the nature of 
society and broadcasting's role in it. Public service 
broadcasting was never a simple response to a set of 
technological conditions; hence its ability to respond to new 
conditions in the 1950s and 1980s. 
Secondly, there needs to be an agreement about the key 
characteristics of public service broadcasting. In the past these 
included efficiency in its widest sense, a conimitment to 
universal delivery and content and a secure funding mechanism. 
The existence of ITV and Channel Four as commercial public 
service broadcasters demonstrates that a commercial element to 
some Public service broadcasting provision can reap positive 
rewards; however, in recent years the public service aspects Of 
all terrestrial provision (BBC, ITV and Channel Four) have been 
eroded by the demand for a narrower kind of efficiency and a 
goverrment committed to competition at any price. 
Public service broadcasting has always been able to adapt to new conditions# its future depends however on the ability of 
Po"cYmakers to Make f irm political decisions about the kind of broadcasti,, g is aLppropriate for democracy at the end of the twenti eth century. In the past public service broadcasting was tied to a wider critique of society, and although the idea of public service 11c-53 been systematically undermined, the current interest in the - 
that t1j, iclea of 
Idea of the stakeholder society, demonstrates 
13ublic service remains an appealing one. 
in r 
2takehOldirjý, 
with its critique of neo-liberal t, ý! rP-retations 
be j, 
O: E efficiency and its belief that there needs to 
new relaLti Oriship between individual and society' (Tony 
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Blair, cited in New Statesman and Society, 29 March 1996), could 
provide the inspiration for a renewed commitment to broadcasting 
in the public interest and a reinvigorated system of public 
service broadcasting; however, for that to happen the lessons of 
the past will need to be addressed and public service 
broadcasting will have to account for itself to the public in new 
and challenging ways. 
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